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Chapter 1: Introduction
Widespread political violence in Iraq has resulted in thousands of deaths (Iraqi 
Body Count 2007), frustrated attempts at the installation of a democratic government 
(Baker & Hamilton 2006) and ripped apart the fabric of Iraqi society (Biddle 2006; Laird 
2005).  Despite the importance of understanding and ultimately bringing this violence to 
an end, very little is known about its causes.  By examining this violence through the 
criminological lens of conflict theory, this research increases our understanding of trends 
in the targeting of violence in Iraq and how these trends are influenced by the changing 
political and social climate there.  Using a time-series analysis of political violence, this 
research finds mixed support for the conflict theory-based proposition that political 
events that increase group tension or reduce a group’s legitimacy will increase the 
frequency of violence targeted against that group.
Conflict theory was developed to explain the violence and disorder that often 
result from power imbalances between differentially stratified groups (Dahrendorf 1959;
Weber 1919).  Conflict theory posits that the unequal stratification of groups within 
society produces competition for the limited resources of power, status and wealth 
(Collins 1975; Vold 1958).  Over time the stronger groups will come to dominate, using
brute force, the law or shifts in cultural norms to reinforce their position at the expense of 
other groups (Black 1976; Chambliss & Seidman 1971).  Legitimacy, an assessment of 
whether a group is perceived to have gained or used their power in a lawful or 
appropriate manner, is central to understanding group interaction and violence as power 
gained or used in an illegitimate manner is often violently contested by other groups 
(Collins 1975; Weber 1919).  Although conflict theory enjoyed a period of popularity in 
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the United States in the 1960’s and 70’s, it has largely fallen from view in the last two 
decades (Berry 1997; Wright & Friedrichs 1998).  Despite finding only mixed support for 
conflict theory, this research may provoke further interest in using a similar theoretical 
approach to understand acts of political violence in similar settings.
Conflict theory is a part of the critical tradition, and likewise shares many of the 
strengths and weaknesses common to that school of thought.  Critical theories focus on 
the inequality that exists within many group relationships, one of the most notable being 
the Marxist focus on the unequal economic relationship between demographically similar 
groups (Bonger 1916; Greenberg 1981; Marx 1858).  Unlike many of the more 
specifically focused critical theories, one of the strengths of conflict theory lies in the
applicability to a variety of environments of its assumptions about group interaction and 
the use and abuse of power (Dahrendorf 1959).  Specific to this research, the main 
differences between the groups in Iraq are those of ethnicity, religion and geographical 
location (Dayaratna 2005; Hafez 2006).  The group stratification, societal unrest and 
weakened legitimacy that serve as primary motivating factors in many conflict theories 
(Bonger 1916; Collins 1975; Dahrendorf 1959; Marx 1848; Vold 1958; Weber 1919) are 
immediately apparent within Iraq (Baker & Hamilton 2006; Hafez 2006).  
The range of groups engaged in violence in Iraq all share the same fundamental 
purpose in that they are in competition for the scarce resource of political power (Hafez 
2006).  Iraq is home to a diverse range of groups, including sizable populations of Sunni 
and Shia Arabs and Kurds, small numbers of foreign insurgents (Kreuger 2006; Neumann 
2006), and the coalition forces comprised primarily of the United States and British 
military.  Each group is seeking to influence the political apparatus in Iraq to further their 
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own ends (Hafez 2006).  Some groups use voting and political maneuvering to secure 
resources while others initiate violent attacks against the government or other groups that 
threaten their claim to power.  The strategic use of violence is perceived by these groups 
to be an effective means to contest legitimacy, enabling them to eliminate rivals, weaken 
the influence of the coalition and prove to the civilian population that their group ought to 
play a central role in Iraq’s future (Hafez 2006; Perl 2006).  As these groups jockey for 
political power and influence, the appropriate conditions are met for a modern-day test of 
the applicability of conflict theory’s unique perspective on changing legitimacy and inter-
group tension as the primary drivers of trends in political violence.
Building on the central premise of conflict theory that competitive group 
interaction is the driving force behind crime and violence, in this research I posit that the 
competing interests of violent groups will be manifested in their choice of targets.  This 
allows for the development of testable hypotheses that link conflict theory’s focus on 
competitive group interaction and the importance of legitimacy to trends in violence 
directed against four specific target sectors in Iraq: military, government, law 
enforcement and civilian.  I focus first on a non-target specific province-wide analysis of 
violence before analyzing attacks directed against these target sectors.
While the group-based focus of conflict theory implies that a group-based rather 
than target-based approach would be simpler and more direct, an empirical evaluation of 
the violence from a group-based perspective is made more difficult by the limited data 
identifying which groups are responsible for each attack.  The database developed for this 
research linked a violent attack to a specific group in only 14% of the cases; too low a 
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number for a valid statistical analysis of this violence at the group level.  This low level 
necessitated the specific focus on target sectors taken in this research.
In line with conflict theory’s emphasis on the importance of the political sector 
(Dahrendorf 1959; Weber 1919), a substantial portion of the violence in Iraq today is best 
referred to as political violence, as attacks are meant to alter the political power balance 
between competing groups (Ruggiero 2005; Schmid & Jongman 2005).  This power 
struggle supports the position that the factors most relevant to the selection of targets are 
events that alter the political climate in Iraq such as elections, changes in the governance 
structure and far-reaching military, religious or social changes that strengthen or weaken 
the legitimacy of the targeted groups.
This research focuses on the relationship between the effects of these political 
changes and trends in the targeting of political violence in Diyala, one of the 18 provinces 
of Iraq.  Diyala, located immediately to the northeast of Baghdad and sharing a border 
with Iran, was chosen due to its high rate of violence (Anderson 2007; Biddle 2006; 
Hafez 2006), its representation of all major ethnic and religious groups, as well as the 
immediate availability of unclassified data on levels of political violence within the 
province.  A database of political violence from the beginning of the Second Gulf War in 
March of 2003 to May of 2006 in the Diyala province was developed from open-source 
material in order to allow for an empirical test of conflict theory as well as to increase our 
understanding of the changing levels of political violence.
The underlying theoretical model introduced in this section may be summarized 
as follows: trends in the targeting of political violence in Iraq are a function of inter-
group competition for scarce political resources and are mediated by the legitimacy of the 
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targets involved.  A group's legitimacy, and therefore its likelihood of being targeted by 
political violence, may be altered by social or political events that alter how it is
perceived by other groups involved.  The following section further develops the concept 
of political violence by analyzing how it is defined and by reviewing research that links 
trends in political violence to government actions.  I also provide a review of the critical 
perspective and conflict theory in particular and its connection and contribution to the 
study of crime.  For those unfamiliar with the history, demographics and course of the 
war in Iraq, Appendix One at the end of this report provides a brief summary of historical 
events in Iraq and the course of the current war and Appendix Two covers the history and 
current status of the main demographic groups in Iraq.  This information is placed as 
appendices at the end of this paper in order to not detract from the development of the 
theoretical and empirical foundations for this research.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Conceptualization
In this chapter I review the relevant literature concerning political violence, 
government actions, critical and conflict theory, legitimacy and the selection of targets.  
The first section focuses on political violence and its relation to government action and 
reaction to that violence.  The second section delves into the critical perspective, with an 
analysis of conflict theory, legitimacy and how research on political violence and conflict 
theory informs our understanding of the variables that could influence target selection.  
The third section describes the hypotheses linking political violence and legitimacy for 
each target sector that I derived from this theoretical model.  It is important to note that a 
good deal has been written about political violence, conflict theory and legitimacy from a 
variety of academic disciplines.  I concentrate here only on research that is directly 
relevant to the model being developed.
Conceptual development: Political violence
Political violence is violence that is meant to have a political effect or bring about 
a political change (Turk 2004, pg 273).  Political violence covers a broad range of 
activities, including collective actions such as riots as well as bombings, insurgencies, 
political kidnappings and assassinations (Collier 2000; LaFree & Drass 1997; Olson 
1971; Wilkinson 2000).  It is differentiated from other crimes by its motive and not its 
method, in that it is not the form that the violence takes, but rather the purpose or 
expected effect of the violence that categorizes it as political.  
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Political violence, including much of the violence in contemporary Iraq, is 
frequently referred to by the western media as terrorism (Kilcullen 2005) although the 
exact definition of terrorism and how it connects with political violence is still subject to 
some debate (Hoffman 1998; LaFree & Dugan 2004; Turk 2004).  Definitions of 
terrorism vary based on the frame of reference of the agency involved.  Agencies and 
organizations define violence as it pertains to their mission; law enforcement agencies 
emphasize the illegality of the violent act while military organizations contrast their 
definition with that of regularly defined warfare.  Despite these definitional issues, most 
groups use a definition in line with the following: “terrorism is politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents” (Perl 2006, pg 31).1  This definition clearly shows that one of the main 
distinguishing characteristics of terrorism is that it is politically-motivated violence.  This 
research is focused exclusively on the political violence-terrorism nexus, as this is the 
form of political violence that is most relevant to the situation in Iraq.
Despite its nominally more insidious overtones, it is important to note that 
terrorism, like all forms of political violence, is usually perceived by those who use it as a 
legitimate means of bringing about a political change (Cooper 2007; Gibbs 1989).  
McCauley (2006, pg. 46) refers to political violence as “politics by other means”, 
suggesting that violence is one avenue available for creating political change.  
Understanding the decision to use violent rather than non-violent means to solve a 
political problem is essential to making sense of the phenomenon.  Political violence is a 
                                                
1
Even a relatively standard definition of terrorism such as this can cause confusion when one 
considers that much of the “terrorist” violence in Iraq is directed against uniformed coalition soldiers, a 
group that many consider not to be a valid target of terrorist violence as presently defined (MIPT 2004).  
Despite this definitional uncertainty, the controversy over the definition of terrorism should not hinder 
research (Ranstorp 2006).
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specific and forceful response to certain conditions of social existence that are deemed to 
be unacceptable (Parker 2007).  Individuals or groups turn to political violence in order to 
address essentially political issues when conventional avenues of change are perceived as 
being less effective (Black 2004; Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens 2005; International 
Crisis Group 2006; LaFree & Dugan 2004).  While many avenues for addressing political 
grievances exist, violence is often selected as the most appropriate method due to its 
perceived effectiveness (Crenshaw 1990; Hoffman 1998; Wilkinson 2000).  Violence can 
bring about direct changes in a political outcome through assassinations or the closing of 
elections, or it can act indirectly to alter behavior through the spread of fear, mistrust or 
government-over reaction (Marighela 1970; Schmid & Jongman 2005).  Well-planned 
political violence enables violent actors to affect an audience larger than just the 
immediate victims of the attack (Crenshaw 1990; Hoffman 1998), furthering its 
usefulness as a tactic.
Literature Review: The connection between political violence and government actions.
Governments rarely refrain from responding when their people are targeted by 
political violence.  There is a good deal of literature about the relationship between 
government reactions and interventions and the amplification or reduction of political 
violence (Della Porta 1995; Parker 2007; Tucker 1997).  This literature tracks the actions 
taken by governments to suppress political violence, insurgent movements or terrorist 
cells, comparing the political, social and military interventions with changes in the rate of 
violence.  Reactions to political violence often take the form of an offensive or aggressive 
military or police action meant to capture or kill the attackers.  A good deal of research 
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focuses on these actions, which often produce spectacular and widespread media 
coverage, increasing their visibility to academics and the public as a whole.
Government reactions to political violence, specifically military reactions, are 
meant to show the resolve of the government to confront the problem head on (Tucker 
1997).  The research literature suggests that an excessive military or police response can 
be seen as repressive or heavy-handed by the general population, shifting popular support 
toward the violent actors and ultimately increasing levels of violence (Tucker, 1997).  
There is little empirical research on this topic, but case studies of the aggressive military 
and police actions taken by governments in dealing with terrorist or subversive 
movements in Northern Ireland, Libya, Israel, Italy, Quebec and Germany all increased 
violence rather than having the intended effect of its reduction (Parker 2007; Sandler, 
Tschirhart & McCauley 1983).  Furthermore, while many governments prefer to maintain 
their monopoly on the use of force by taking aggressive actions against those who use 
force illegally, democracies walk a fine line in responding to terrorist violence in this 
fashion as they must avoid instituting policies that needlessly repress civilians or result in 
unacceptable levels of collateral damage (Parker 2007; Plous & Zimbardo 2004; 
Wilkinson 2000).  
Government overreaction is something that violent groups often specifically try to 
elicit (Marighela 1970; McCauley 2006) as an overreaction may strengthen anti-
government support among the population, increasing the perceived legitimacy of the 
violent group’s cause. Violent groups often specifically base their operational centers in 
heavily populated areas, both to better blend in with the surroundings as well as to 
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decrease the likelihood that government actions against them will avoid collateral civilian 
damage (Roberts 2002).
The United States has experienced being seen as overly heavy-handed in dealing 
with domestic terrorism (Wilkinson 2000).  Following what was perceived as an 
excessive use of force to end the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX, 
anti-government leanings among right-wing radical groups flared.  Timothy McVeigh’s 
bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City in 1997 was allegedly meant to strike 
back at the government for its perceived mishandling of the Waco siege (The Times 
1997).  
How a government chooses to handle violent or potentially violent groups is 
closely related to the level of violent activity directed against that government.  In the 
case of Northern Ireland, when the British forces were seen as having violated the rights 
of the citizens in Ireland the number of attacks against the British and the popular support 
for the struggle there increased (Dayaratna 2005; LaFree, Dugan & Korte 2008).  The 
same effect can also be seen in the French experience in Algeria.  As the French forces 
tried to stifle the growing resentment to their rule, the legitimacy of their presence fell as 
they were perceived to have overstepped their bounds as they attempted to secure the 
country, increasing the violence directed against them (Alexander & Keiger 2002).  A 
government’s legitimacy may be reduced by engaging in poorly planned or over-zealous 
offensive operations against politically-motivated dissidents, and it is this reduced 
legitimacy that often increases popular support for the very perspective that the 
government is attempting to suppress.
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Early research on Northern Ireland by Soule (1979) suggests that British actions 
increased rather than decreased violence between the British and Irish forces.  As 
previously described, violence is thought to increase under the defiance hypothesis as a 
result of a popular reaction to overly restrictive limitations on personal freedoms or 
overly brutal acts of the police (Sherman 1990). While conventional wisdom suggests 
that increasing military or police presence in an area should decrease violence, more 
advanced research done by LaFree, Dugan & Korte (2008) that studied the British actions 
in Northern Ireland showed that each British intervention, with the exception of 
Operation Motorman, which was a form of troop surge, produced a defiance effect and 
increased political violence. 
Francisco (1996) updated the proposed relationship between state coercion and 
defiance by examining whether forceful state coercion would increase protest, a concept 
he refers to as backlash.2  Francisco used data from Germany and Northern Ireland to test 
this link, and found strong support for the existence of a backlash effect following 
forceful government interventions.  In a similar vein, research done by Callaway & 
Harrelson-Stephens (2005) found that when governments, such as Britain during its 
attempt to quell violence in Northern Ireland, instituted policies that were overly 
restrictive or coercive political violence increased.
Campbell & Connolly (2003) suggest that government actions repress the 
freedoms of the innocent as well as the guilty and in doing so create a groundswell of 
anti-government feeling that can be manipulated by violent groups into support for their 
cause (see also Filkins 2002).  Research often finds an immediate and short-term 
                                                
2
See Pridemore & Freilich (2007) for research that finds no connection between perceived 
government coercion and backlash relating to violence surrounding abortion rights.
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deterrent effect of military actions, as violent groups must hide from the increased 
military presence, restricting their actions, but also a long term increase in support for the 
violent group, ultimately correlated with an increased level of violence (Chalk 1998; 
Eppright 1997).  Government actions that are less repressive do not usually elicit this 
response.  By way of example, the installation of metal detectors in airports or the use of 
target-hardening strategies tend to have the expected deterrent effect (Collins 2004; 
Enders & Sandler 1993; Nevin 2003; Tucker 19973).
Violence is not always connected to government actions, but sometimes occurs in 
reaction to government inaction.  Weisburd (1989) offers a unique perspective on the 
relationship between government inaction and violent actions taken by Israeli settlers.  
He shows how groups of settlers launched their own vigilante actions against perceived 
Palestinian encroachment when they felt their government was not taking the appropriate 
steps to resolve their security concerns.  By framing his argument in terms of violence 
being a collective deviant reaction to external attempts at control, Weisburd demonstrates 
that violence, in the form of restricted vigilantism is often used as a means of social 
control by groups who perceive their government as inadequately addressing their social 
concerns.
While the literature on the connection between government actions and political 
violence is filled with a number of historical case study analyses, it is of only limited 
applicability to this research as none of the interventions selected for analysis in this 
research are direct government reactions to political violence.  Furthermore, no research 
that I am aware of has conceptualized the action-reaction interplay between governments 
                                                
3
Softer reactions to violence may be more successful, but that doesn’t mean they always work.  
See Tucker (1997) for a review of the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and the US policy of not 
negotiating with terrorists.
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and violent groups as linked explicitly to conflict theory, despite the fact that conflict 
theory appears to offer a useful explanation for the effects seen.  This research is unique 
in that, unlike much of the work before it that focused on studying the effects of 
interventions meant to have an effect on levels of violence, this research focuses instead 
on political events that should not directly affect the levels of violence except through 
how they alter the legitimacy of the targets involved, or aggravate the tension between 
groups in competition with one another.4  This research will contribute to the literature on 
political violence by testing the unintended effects of policy choices not directly linked to 
a government reaction to terrorism, an approach that is rare within the current discussion 
of terrorist violence.
This review demonstrates that aggressive military or police tactics often produce a 
defiant rather than a deterrent effect on levels of political violence.  Although this body of
literature is not directly relevant to the hypotheses being tested in this research, it does 
offer support for the idea that violent groups do respond to the actions of the government 
and that many of these actions, intentional or not, can have a counterproductive effect on 
reducing levels of violence. Some events that I analyze, such as the bombing of an 
important Mosque by insurgents, were likely meant to increase the tension between 
groups and ultimately the violence; however these events are not specifically 
government-sanctioned interventions.  This research will be the first of which I am aware 
to empirically measure whether political events that are not directly meant to reduce 
                                                
4 While the interventions studied in this research were not meant to directly affect levels 
of violence, it is likely that at some level policy makers considered the affect of their actions on 
levels of violence.  For example, holding a democratic election for internal governance is a 
potential strategy for winning the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqis.  I do not believe that the affect 
of these policies on political violence was at the forefront of the planner’s minds though, as the 
original intent of the Coalition was to hold these elections, and the violence that sprung up caught 
many of the planners by surprise.
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violence have an effect on levels of violence, hypothesized to operate through their effect 
on the legitimacy of the target sector involved.
Theoretical development: Criminology and political violence
While a good deal has been written about political violence over the last two 
decades, the direct study of political violence, particularly terrorism, received little 
empirical attention from criminologists until after the events of September 11th, 2001 
(LaFree & Dugan 2004; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley 2006; Ranstorp 2006; Turk 2004).  
Before 9/11 there were only a small number of academics who devoted themselves 
exclusively to studying terrorism.  Of the articles written on terrorism in major journals in 
the 1990’s, 83% were done by authors writing on the subject for the first time (Cronin 
2006).  In the field of psychology, more articles on terrorism were written between 2001 
and 2004 than in all of the years before combined (Plous & Zimbardo 2004).  Further 
limiting theoretical development, much of the published work on terrorism and political 
violence across a range of disciplines tended toward the philosophical or the descriptive 
rather than the evaluation of theories or the testing of assumptions (Lum, Kennedy & 
Sherley 2006).
The absence of a rigorous and consistent emphasis has left researchers without a 
clear consensus on the best theoretical approach for analyzing this type of violence.  The 
lack of theoretical attention paid to this phenomenon stems in part from the popular 
notion that crime and political violence are fundamentally different, restricting theoretical 
cross-pollination from criminology to the study of terrorism.  This distinction is 
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unnecessary, as terrorism and political violence are both forms of illegal violent behavior 
and therefore de jure and de facto crimes themselves.  
While a range of academic disciplines are needed to fully understand the cause 
and course of terrorism, criminologists have substantial expertise in understanding the 
causation and control of violence and it is essential that they apply their knowledge to the 
problem of political violence.  Additionally, criminology has its roots in the study of 
political violence, as many of the founders of the discipline were concerned with the 
political actions of early terrorists or anarchists and with violence that grew from periods 
of social change (Durkheim 1897; Merton 1968).  One of the first criminologists, Cesare 
Beccaria (1764) argued that sedition was one of the most serious forms of crime, and he 
described these offenses as acts of “lese majesty”, stating: “every crime, even of a private 
nature, injures society, but it is not every crime that aims at its immediate destruction” 
(Beccaria 1764, pg 68).
Criminology’s most important contribution to the study of political violence came 
in the form of conflict theory.  Conflict theory asserts that social problems such as crime 
and violence are the result of conflict stemming from a power imbalance between social 
groups (Collins 1975; Doleschal & Klapmuts 1973; Sellin 1938; Taylor & Walton 1970; 
Taylor, Walton and Young 1973; Weber 1908).  While the conflict perspective can be 
applied to a wide array of problems, conflict theory itself fits within the larger theoretical 
framework of critical theory.  Before delving into conflict theory specifically, it is 
necessary to explore the development, growth and more recent decline in popularity of 
critical perspectives as a whole.  Understanding the intricacies of critical criminology is 
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essential to understanding and evaluating the conflict framework that this research 
utilizes.
It is important to note that the terms critical, conflict, radical and Marxist are 
frequently used interchangeably without appreciation for their subtle differences.  In this 
review I explain the differences between the terms, the core ideas that each represents, 
and the most influential thinkers in each theoretical tradition.  Furthermore, by presenting 
a fresh look at these theories, this research aims to breathe new life into an often-
neglected field of study.  This research is structured around the belief that despite its 
falling out of view in the United States, conflict theory is still a useful theoretical model 
to explain rates of political violence in countries undergoing rapid social and political 
change.  As this research finds a moderate level of support for the conflict model as an 
explanation for changes in the trends in violence in Iraq, perhaps theoretical attention will 
return to conflict theory as a relevant explanation for political violence.
Critical Criminology
At its core, critical criminology focuses on the unequal interaction between 
differently stratified groups as the underlying cause of crime, disorder and social unrest 
(Thomas & O’Maolchatha 1989).  Crime and violence result from the need to maintain or 
challenge the power imbalance that results from this stratification (Berry 1997; Bohm 
1982; Dahrendorf 1959).  
Unlike consensus theories (Hagan 1977; Sutherland & Cressey 1960) that view 
society as being in agreement about what behaviors are fundamentally right and wrong, 
critical theory views the definition of crime and deviance as not universally agreed upon 
and therefore open to interpretation or challenge (Vold 1958).  This view of society is 
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referred to as the conflict model, although this distinction can be particularly confusing in 
that critical theories were based on the conflict model of society, while the conflict model 
and conflict theory are two separate, though related ideas.  Critical theory holds to a 
conflict model of society, while conflict theory is a sub-field of critical theory.  
Much of the philosophical work that supported the birth of the critical theories 
was a result of social changes during and after the industrial revolution (Aron 1970; 
Walsh & Ellis 2007).  The rapid social changes that occurred in the post-industrial 
revolution world of the 19th and early 20th centuries helped raise new awareness of the 
importance of class, race and gender.  Theorists from a variety of disciplines did much to 
develop the critical perspective during this time period, examining societies that were 
undergoing rapid social, economic or political change (Walsh & Ellis 2007).  Within 
criminology, the idea that crime was a function of the competitive interaction between 
societal subgroups became a common theme for theoretical research in the three decades 
following World War II (Dahrendorf 1959; Taylor, Walton & Young 1973; Vold 1958).  
It is important to note that many critical theories are referred to as radical theories 
in that they seek to understand and ultimately address the root causes of social problems.5  
To their credit, critical and radical criminologists have often worked directly on 
implementing social changes and applying their ideas to the reduction of crime or 
inequality (Berry 1997).  That being said, many critical theorists see a revolution or 
dramatic restructuring of the social structure as the only effective way to reduce crime.
Another common conclusion of critical theory is that inequality, in whatever form 
it manifests itself is directly linked to crime.  Michalowski (1985) argues that an 
                                                
5
The Latin root of the word radical is radix, meaning ‘root’, in this case the root cause, while, 
interestingly, radix is also the root of the word ‘radish’ (no pun intended).
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individual’s actions result from their understanding of the world, which is based on their 
position within society.  As inequality is experienced, not necessarily poverty but also 
social, ethnic and other forms, levels of involvement in crime and disorder tend to 
increase.  Inequality, particularly when manifested in economic or educational status, has 
been a frequent topic of study in this field, and a significant amount of research finds 
support for the link between inequality and criminal behavior (Blau & Blau 1982; Platt 
2002).
Although the critical perspective encompasses a wide range of topical areas, it 
may be divided into two conceptual categories depending on whether the focus of the 
specific approach is on the etiology of conflict or on the application of power to 
differentially stratified groups.  This second approach is commonly referred to as the 
status characteristics or radical labeling approach.  The next section briefly describes the 
etiological perspectives and the status characteristics or radical labeling perspective.
The etiological focus of critical theory is based on the idea that differentially 
stratified groups are at odds with each other within society.  Crime, violence and social 
unrest find their origin in this conflict, whatever the differences in stratification may be.  
What is often seen as random crime or meaningless violence to an outsider is actually a 
form of rebellion against a threatening opponent or regime.  Vold wrote of crime: “On the 
surface these offenses seem to be ordinary crimes, but on closer examination they are 
revealed as the acts of good soldiers fighting for a cause against the threat of enemy 
encroachment” (Vold & Bernard 1986, pg 275).  Vold wisely noted that not all crimes fit 
this model, as some crimes are irrational and do not reflect a class or group power 
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struggle6.  The etiological approach is the main focus of this research and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section.
The status characteristics perspective states that based on their personal or group 
characteristics some people will be more likely to be defined as criminal by those with 
more power (Erikson 1966; Triplett 1993; Turk 1975; Turk 1980; Turk 1982; Vold 
1958).  Those personal characteristics can include race, class, gender or other socially 
relevant variables.  This perspective sees crime generally as a result of the symbolic 
interaction between an individual, a potentially criminal label and a biased criminal 
justice system under the influence of a controlling group.  The radical labeling approach 
explains differences in crime rates among social groups by suggesting that while 
underprivileged groups generally do not commit more crime than more influential 
groups, they are disproportionately targeted by the criminal justice system which makes 
their criminality seem greater (Krisberg 1975; or see Hindelang 1978 for evidence to the 
contrary).  Compared with the etiological approach, the status characteristic approach has 
received the bulk of the empirical evaluation efforts and remains the most? popular and 
widely discussed aspect of the critical perspective.
Critical theory, particularly its etiological predictions, was a main focus within 
criminology during the 1960’s and 70’s, but in the last two decades has not been applied
with nearly as much vigor.  This was clearly illustrated in a review of the most frequently 
cited criminologists from 1986 to 1990 by Cohn & Farrington (1994).  Their review 
found that of the forty seven most cited criminologists, only two were considered critical 
criminologists.  As a result of this relatively low popularity, much of mainstream 
                                                
6
Quinney (1970) believed that this model could be extended to all crimes, as irrational people and 
the mentally ill were in fact a recognized segment of society, if not a formal group.
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criminology is uninformed of the contributions of the critical theorists and know the field 
only through the work of a few contributors, especially Richard Quinney (Wright & 
Friedrichs 1998).  This research seeks to address this situation by showing that an 
etiological argument, based in Weberian conflict theory7, may provide an explanation for 
the trends in violence in contemporary Iraq.  The next section explores the two main 
etiological thinkers, Karl Marx and Max Weber, within the conflict tradition, their 
contributions and specifically the ways in which Weber’s ideas support the hypotheses 
developed in this research.
The Etiology of Conflict: The Marxist and Weberian Perspectives
Two of the most important thinkers within the critical perspective are Karl Marx 
and Max Weber, both of whom founded their own unique branches of the critical school8.  
The approach that Marx founded is aptly referred to as Marxist, and more recently neo-
Marxist criminology, and the approach founded by Weber is referred to Weberian 
conflict theory.  This research draws exclusively from the Weberian school, but this 
review includes an analysis of Marxist thought in order to clarify the distinction between 
the two as well as draw useful conclusions from that body of literature.
Although its intellectual roots can be traced further back in time, most theorists 
credit Karl Marx (1848) as being the father of critical theory.  Marx was one of the first 
theorists to address the importance of inter-group conflict as a driver of history.  
                                                
7
Weberian conflict theory refers to the specific conflict theory outlined by Max Weber, as opposed 
to other theories that utilize similar conflict theory principles.
8
There is a third major philosophical tradition within critical theory, that of Georg Simmel (1908).  
Simmel is most closely associated with the idea of symbolic interaction, an idea that grew out of his early 
work.  Simmel is largely excluded from most conventional accounts of critical theories, despite the fact that 
many famous criminologists, including Sellin, Vold, and Quinney can be seen as falling within his 
philosophical tradition (Wolff 1950).
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Problems in society, according to Marx, are a function of the unequal relationship 
between the owners of production and the workers.  Marx wrote very little specifically on 
crime, focusing on social problems related exclusively to the economic sector such as 
unemployment.  Even so, Marx’s ideas are important as they had an incredible impact 
upon the history of the twentieth century, sparking new theoretical development as well 
as altering the governments of many nations and leading to a bitter and continuing 
struggle between capitalist and Marxist groups (Ruggiero 1995).
Bonger (1916) was the first theorist to explicitly outline a Marxist criminology.  
Bonger believed that individuals possessed two moral dimensions, altruism and egoism.  
The capitalist mindset, based in egoism, encouraged competition, the acquisition of 
wealth and the virtue of greed and therefore reduced altruism and increased egoism 
across society.  Crime and a variety of other social ills were a result of this increased 
egoism, as capitalism created unnatural needs that could only be fulfilled among the 
lower classes by crime.  Marxist criminology grew following Bonger’s contributions and 
eventually was restructured into a neo-Marxist criminology that focused on a wider range 
of topics than were being included in the traditional Marxist analysis of social problems.
Testing and expanding upon Marx’s theory by looking at governmental reactions 
to crime, Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) examined the connection between the growth 
of capitalism and rates of incarceration.  The Marxist perspective predicts that as 
capitalism increases, so should imprisonment as a way of controlling potentially 
dangerous surplus population.  Rusche and Kirchheimer found statistical support for this 
hypothesis, as rates of incarceration closely correlate with the economic fluctuations of 
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capitalist societies.  Following this early finding a school of Marxist penology developed 
and much of the research on Marxism today falls within this realm (Adamson 1984).  
Neo-Marxist criminology flourished in the United States during the 1960’s and 
70’s, taking Marxist themes of economic stratification and applying them in 
unconventional ways (Greenberg 1981; Platt 1975).  Neo-Marxist criminologists 
continued Marx’s theme of challenging the status quo and often accused mainstream 
criminology of supporting an oppressive and unjust criminal justice system.  Many 
critical criminologists believe that mainstream criminology is hopelessly compromised 
by its relation to the State (MacLean 1997).  This abrasiveness led in part to the rejection 
of neo-Marxist ideas and leanings by much of mainstream criminology (Wright & 
Friedrichs 1998), as criminological research depends in part upon the funding and access 
that can only come from a harmonious relationship with government and the criminal 
justice system.  Criticizing the criminal justice system, and by extension the government 
as tacitly maintaining the capitalist power structure has been a common theme for critical 
theory.
Chambliss (Chambliss 1975; Chambliss & Seidman 1985) further developed this 
line of reasoning with an analysis of the relationship between law, crime and economic 
problems.  To Chambliss, ruling powers use law and law enforcement to draw attention 
away from more serious economic problems.  The use of the criminal justice system to 
control the surplus population, the unemployed and the unemployable, has been an idea 
frequently studied by Marxist criminologists (Spitzer 1975).  Finally, Quinney’s (1974) 
early work focused on the use not of the law, but of other lower class groups as a means 
of controlling the surplus population.  By pitting the lower class against itself, the ruling 
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class could avoid the social unrest or rebellion that Marxism predicted would eliminate 
the distinction between classes.
Marx's ideas were further developed, if under a new guise, by Taylor, Walton & 
Young (1973) with their creation of a “new criminology”.  Their work was based around 
the belief that the structure of society, including differences in the means of production, 
determined how individuals acted within the various facets of their lives.  This idea was 
developed into a range of theories, including links to the economy (Michalowski 1985), 
social bonding (Colvin & Pauly 1983) and gender differences (Messerschmidt 1986).  
Hagan (1989) more recently updated neo-Marxist thought with his findings that class, as 
a function of economic power and authority, was related to crime.  All told, Marx’s ideas 
have had, and continue to have, a great deal of influence on the focus of critical theory 
and offer a unique angle through which to study the mechanics of a society.
Unlike Marx, Max Weber (1919) believed that social class was not determined 
exclusively by control over the economic sector.  Weber held that class was a function of 
three elements: wealth, status and power.  As the founder of conflict theory much of his 
work, although in the same vein as Marxist thought, contains a uniquely different 
approach to understanding social interaction.  While Marx believed that society could 
evolve into a relatively disorder-free utopia with the acceptance of socialism, Weber 
believed that conflict was part of human nature and therefore inescapable (Aron 1970).  
Conflict, in Weber’s eyes, was socially useful as it helped to define norms, draw 
boundaries and clarify the social hierarchy.
Sellin (1938) was the first criminologist to explicitly take up Weber’s theory.  
Sellin argued that different cultural groups have different conduct norms and when these 
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cultural groups came into contact, either through immigration or neighborhood mixing, 
disorder was likely to result.  Vold’s (1958) work followed that of Sellin’s but put less 
emphasis on cultural groups and more on groups that sprung up to maintain specific 
interests or needs.  Although these groups were thought to compete on a number of 
levels, this interaction was most readily seen in the realm of politics as each group tried 
to move the legal structure closer to supporting its own group’s interests.  Turk (1969) 
helped to explicate this model further with his “theory of criminalization” in which more 
powerful groups sought to criminalize the actions of their competitors.  A review of the 
use of the legal system to control weaker groups is presented later in this section with a 
discussion of Donald Black's work.
Particularly relevant to this research, Weber’s introduction of the concept of 
power helps to explain the ability of one group to impose its’ will over another.  Weber 
defined power as the ability to secure compliance against someone’s will to do otherwise 
(Weber 1968, pg 53).  Groups actively seek power, both for its own sake and for the 
ability to control other groups that power confers.  Building upon Weber’s theme of 
power, Dahrendorf (1959) argued that each sector within society was divided into 
imperatively coordinated associations.  Each association was broken into groups, those 
with and those without power. As the goals of the groups diverged, Dahrendorf believed 
that social order within society was only possible because some groups were able to 
constrain others, effectively coercing them into following their orders. When 
opportunities presented themselves there would be direct attempts to alter the power 
balance by the groups involved, and as a result different groups would gain power at 
different times.  Competition and coercion during these time periods would not only 
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serve to propel individual groups forward, but also to restrict the activities of potential 
competitors (Turk 1966).  
The study of the use of power is a common theme within conflict theory.  Groups 
that gain control or influence over the government have the ability to use that power to 
benefit themselves at the expense of the others, either economically, socially or even by 
using the government to actively repress competitors (Chambliss & Seidman 1971; 
Dahrendorf 1959; Vold 1958).  Power can take a number of forms, and one of the most 
often analyzed forms of the usage of power is control over the law.  The Weberian 
tradition included a heavy focus on the behavior of law, the most important theorist from 
this tradition being Donald Black.  Quinney (1970) and Black (1976) both argue that 
groups in power use the law to exert social control over other groups and to support their 
self-interest.  The more organized a group, the better they are able to gain control of the 
law and use it to their advantage (see Jamieson & Blowers 1993, for a test of this 
hypothesis).  In support of Black’s ideas, Chambliss & Seidman (1982) tested the idea 
that the reality of the practice of law is a function of the perspective of those in power.  
They found that judges often relied on personal values as much as on precedent in 
determining guilt in legal cases (see Gottfredson & Hindelang 1979, for a counter-
argument about the use of law).  As the social gap widens between those with and 
without power, law becomes increasingly important in regulating the actions of the 
powerless (Chambliss 1975).  Research on the use of the law helped connect the 
etiological arguments of Weber with the status characteristics focus of much of the later 
work done within critical criminology.  
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Law is only one form of social control, and when enforcement of the law is 
weaker, other forms of social control, including violence, may be used in its place (Black 
1989).  The active and violent repression of minority groups by governments has been a 
source of civil unrest for centuries.  If resources for defiance are available however, the 
coerced group is likely to fight back, contesting the legitimacy of the government with 
violent action (Etzioni 1961).  In line with my earlier discussion of government 
overreaction, research on crime (Bailey 1998; Sherman 1993) and on terrorist violence 
supports the position that repression can increase violence as a form of defiance (Bohara, 
Mitchell & Nepal 2006).  Although this body of literature often does not explicitly 
mention conflict theory, it is in line with its basic ideas and predictions about power, 
legitimacy and group interaction. 
Legitimacy and the Weberian Tradition
Weber (1919, 1964) was one of the first theorists to explicitly tie legitimacy to 
group interaction.  Legitimacy generally means having followed socially accepted rules 
or procedures in order to gain power, and once in power utilizing resources in a fashion 
in accordance with fairness and law (LaFree 1998; Weber 1964).  Legitimacy is a 
function of perspective, and a group may be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the majority 
while being seen as illegitimate in the eyes of a minority group.  Whether a group or a 
government is seen as legitimate is an important variable in determining how other 
groups, particularly those with competing interests, will interact with it (Blau 1964).  A 
group’s ability to dominate another group successfully is predicated in part upon the 
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controlling group’s legitimacy (Bendix 1960), as an illegitimate group will lack public 
support, encouraging defiance against it.
Aside from the importance of popular support, legitimacy helps to bind groups 
together, encouraging the establishment of and adherence to norms and bonds within the 
groups.  Weber’s theory, as described by Collins (1975), links norms and group bonds 
with group competition: “The creation of emotional solidarity does not supplant conflict, 
but is one of the main weapons used in conflict” (Collins 1975, pg 59).  The more closely 
knit a group, the better it is able to define itself and likewise define other groups as being 
different and perhaps a threat to the original group’s interests.  Groups require legitimacy 
in order to support their own internal solidarity and prevent the development of internal 
fissures.  As long as groups can maintain their legitimacy they can maintain group 
solidarity and use it to extend their power.  While non-violent and norm-based coercion is 
a useful tool for groups to maintain power, the use of violent coercion is always a 
potential resource, although one that can threaten a group’s own legitimacy if used 
incorrectly (Collins 1975).  When legitimacy falls, confidence drops and internal and 
external fractures appear within and between groups, often resulting in an increase in 
violence (Lipset 1960, Marighela 1970; Parker 2007).
Collins (1975) built on Weber’s earlier work to further explore the conflict 
between different groups for legitimate political power.  Collins argued that groups exist 
within a zero-sum political environment where the loss of legitimacy of an authority is a 
potential gain in legitimacy and power for a competing group.  In this research I assume 
that events which reduce a group’s legitimacy present an opportunity for rival groups to 
contest that weakened legitimacy through the use of violence.  As a result, I expect that 
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legitimacy-changing events will result in changes in the frequency of political violence.  
Weber's original argument supports this view as he argued that for groups in conflict with 
an illegitimate foe, any means of rebellion used would be justifiable (Wilkinson 2000).  
As an extension of Weberian conflict theory, modeling political violence as a 
function of perceived legitimacy of the nation-state has been a fruitful theoretical path 
(Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens 2006).  Violent groups threaten a government’s 
monopoly over the use of force within its own territory and thereby weaken its 
legitimacy, inviting further attacks or dissension (Weber 1919).  In nations such as 
Afghanistan or Colombia where the central government has lost control over large 
regions of the country, groups willing to employ violence are major holders of power.  
States in which the government is too weak to control violence within its territory are 
known as failed states (Crisis States Research Centre 2007).  Iraq currently ranks second 
on the Crisis States Research Centre’s list of failed states (Fund for Peace 2007); a 
testament to the weakened central government and high rates of violence the country is 
experiencing.
The loss of legitimacy is something that many nations have suffered through 
during periods of growth or change.  During the 1960’s and 70’s the United States 
government’s perceived legitimacy fell as a result of the Watergate scandal, the Vietnam 
war, civil rights protests and economic crises.  This declining legitimacy and the public’s 
failing trust in social institutions was linked to the increase in crime during the later half 
of the 20th century (LaFree 1998).  As individuals reduce their involvement with or lose 
faith in the ability of their social system to support them and provide for their needs, they 
begin to search for other ways, often criminal, to fill the vacuum.  When governments or 
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institutions lose legitimacy, citizens and groups are less likely to obey or support those 
institutions.  This research supports my model that the legitimacy of the Iraqi government 
and the other institutions involved will mediate their popular support and ultimately their 
being selected as a target.  
However, governments are not the only group for whom legitimacy is important 
(McCauley 2006).  Groups that use political violence as a tool depend heavily on their 
perceived legitimacy, as they cannot hope to gain political influence without some form 
of public support (Cronin 2006).  Popular support for a violent group can dissipate for a 
number of reasons, but if a group acts in an overly violent, callous or unacceptable 
fashion it will weaken its public support.  Legitimacy and public support are so important 
that terrorist groups often propagandize heavily in order to sway public opinion in their 
favor (Ashraf & Brigden 2006).  Winning the support of the local population is central to 
having a legitimate claim to power and both violent groups and governments seek to 
paint their own actions as just and those of their opponents as unreasonable.  In support 
of the conflict perspective, Biddle (2006, pg 5) puts the struggle between insurgents and 
the coalition-backed government for legitimacy and support in the eyes of the Iraqi public 
as: 
“Using a mix of coercion and inducements, the insurgents and the 
regime compete for the allegiance of a common pool of citizens, who 
could, in principle, take either side…In such situations, even the 
government is typically an instrument of one communal group, and its 
opponents champion the rights of their subgroup over those of others.”  
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Unlike Marxist theory and its focus on ideology, Biddle sees the conflict in Iraq as being 
about group survival at its core, as control of the government and the power it bestows is 
the only reasonably sure way to ensure a group’s continued existence.
In sum, legitimacy plays an important role in mediating political violence.  While 
being illegitimate may invite attack, having strong legitimacy ought to help prevent a 
group from being targeted.  As all groups seek to bolster their own legitimacy, targeting a 
legitimate or popular group in a violent attack will weaken the attacker’s popular support, 
and as a result I believe that a target sector that enjoys increased legitimacy will be 
targeted less frequently.  This research will put this idea to the test, determining whether 
legitimacy-weakening events encourage violence against specific target sectors, and 
legitimacy-strengthening events reduce violence.
The evaluation and decline of the critical perspective
While Marx, Weber and subsequent critical thinkers developed and refined many 
unique theoretical ideas, the empirical evaluation of their theories was less rigorous.  
Most of the evaluation has centered on later theorists, as the earlier etiological work did 
not lend itself well to empirical evaluation.  Evaluation of the critical perspective, and 
particularly of the etiological arguments can be complex as early theorists were highly 
critical of positivistic methods of research as a means to support their relatively 
unconventional ideas (Mann & Dashiell 1975; Marx 1848).   Both Marx and Weber 
sought to understand the present by dissecting the past, with no thought of testing the 
connections that they might uncover.  Marx and Weber preferred to rely on qualitative 
data, historical events and secondary sources to support their ideas (Lynch 1987) rather 
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than to test them empirically.  As a result, many of the subsequent critical theorists who 
followed in their footsteps preferred case studies to empirical evaluations (Sparks 1980).
Critical theories, even those with relatively straightforward ideas, are often 
incredibly complex as they grew out of a rich sociological and philosophical tradition.  
For example, Black’s (1976) simple assertion that the law will be used disproportionately 
against minorities has been subject to a heated debate about the empirical support for and 
best way to test this proposition (Bernard 2002).  Research on this proposition finds 
(Gottfredson & Hindelang 1979), contrary to the conflict theory proposition that the legal 
system will be used against weaker or smaller groups, that minorities are the greatest 
consumers of the law and not primarily unfairly victimized by it.  Black has challenged 
this finding as being a faulty conclusion drawn from a mistaken conceptualization of his 
ideas, a response that is frequently encountered within critical theories owing to the 
complexity of many of their core ideas.  
Critical theories and their notions about power and group conflict have been 
tested by comparing statistics about the distribution of wealth and membership on 
corporate boards and ruling bodies (Vold & Bernard 1986).  This approach generally 
finds a relationship between levels of power or social class, crime and disorder.  What 
this research is generally unable to provide proof of is the intent of the stronger groups to 
dominate the others.  There is little research available that shows that stronger groups 
purposefully use their power exploitatively in order to control or disrupt weaker or less 
well-organized groups.
Further adding to the difficulty of properly assessing the empirical support for 
critical theory, there is confusion among critical theorists about the proper focus of the 
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field itself, as each sub-theory focuses on a unique manifestation of the conflict believed 
to be inherent in society (Taylor, Walton & Young 1975).  Critical criminology was seen 
as contradictory in places, given the wide range of ideas that fell under its umbrella 
(Berry 1997).  In addition, critical theorists tend to be critical of other critical approaches, 
and one of the weaknesses of the perspective is the lack of theoretical consensus about 
the proper focus and level of analysis of the field (Fine, Kinsey, Lea, Picciotto & Young 
1979).  
Aside from definitional infighting, many critical ideas are rejected out-of-hand by 
those who hold to a consensus view of society (Hagan 1977; Sutherland & Cressey 
1960).  One criticism of the conflict perspective is the apparent widespread value 
consensus within society that stands as proof of the weakness of these conflict model 
assumptions. Critical theorists respond by stating that what appears to be societal 
consensus is in fact a result of overt coercion from the criminal justice system and covert 
coercion in the form of ideological propaganda and persuasion, as value conflict still 
exists beneath the façade of societal consensus (Walsh & Ellis 2007).  Both sides have 
ample evidence to support their perspectives and the argument about the actual level of 
conflict versus consensus within society continues.
As a macro-level theory, measuring many of the variables described by conflict 
theory is difficult, and proxies are frequently used (Hagan 1989).  Research on critical 
theories generally focuses on comparing social inequality, either economic, class, race or 
gender-based and looking at differential rates of criminality or criminal justice 
processing, ultimately mixing the status characteristics and etiological arguments 
(Chambliss 1973; Hindelang 1978; Lynch & Groves 1986; Reiman 1995; Thornberry 
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1973).  There have been a wealth of cases along these lines, testing for bias within the 
criminal justice system as a means of testing critical theory (Turk 1982), however these 
tests are not directly relevant to this research as they focus primarily on the status 
characteristics perspective.  This research poses a different type of test for conflict theory, 
looking directly at group conflict and political change as a cause of violence, and not at 
institutionalized bias or labeling effects thought to result from these conflicts.
Critical criminology declined in popularity in the United States over the last three 
decades for a number of reasons.  As the intricacy of quantitative methods increased, 
theories that were more difficult to quantitatively test or that opposed the usage of 
quantitative measures altogether became less popular.  The quantitative testing of theories 
with large datasets has become standard practice in criminology and theories that purport 
to be untestable, or which aren’t supported empirically, tended to decline in popularity.   
Critical criminologists respond to this accusation by pointing out that official statistics, so 
often used in empirical tests of mainstream theories do not accurately represent the actual 
crime rate or the characteristics of offenders (Berry 1997).  Furthermore, many of the 
conditions that encouraged the growth and development of critical criminology such as 
societal change and civil unrest became less frequent in the United States.  Critical 
criminology has also moved its centers of intellectual activity to England from the United 
States, reducing its visibility within the United States (Berry 1997).  
Aside from falling from fashion, critical theory also morphed into other theories, 
including left realism, peacemaking criminology (Pepinksi 1995; Quinney 1991) and 
deconstructionist theories that looked at the bias inherent in the use of language (Arrigo 
1995) as a source of control and repression itself.  As a result of these previously 
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mentioned concerns and criticisms, conflict theory as well as the broader range of critical 
theories, have largely fallen by the wayside, especially in the United States.  This 
research seeks to bring renewed attention to this perspective through a modern-day 
analysis of political violence and group conflict within Iraq.
Criminological research on target selection
Before considering target selection from a Weberian conflict perspective, it is 
important to note that mainstream criminology has not been silent concerning how 
criminals select their targets.  Traditional theories such as routine activities (Clarke & 
Newman 2006; Cohen & Felson 1979), rational choice (Cornish & Clarke 1985) or a 
focus on geographic areas with a high frequency of repeat offenses (Weisburd 2005), 
examine the rational process involved in deciding to commit a crime and selecting a 
target.  For a crime to occur, a motivated offender must meet a suitable target in the 
absence of a capable guardian, and have the potential benefits of the crime outweigh the 
potential costs (Cohen & Felson 1979; Cornish & Clarke 1985).  This line of reasoning 
has been very fruitful in terms of crime prevention, but offers little to this research as a 
result of the limited information available about the motivations of the groups, the 
suitability of the targets, the capable guardians that might be present, and the ultimate 
costs and benefits of violent acts.  This is not to say that the contributions of this 
approach should be ignored, for example, modeling guardianship as being a function of 
the number of coalition or Iraqi security forces in an area would be an interesting study.  
However, the level of detail available within my dataset on these variables is too poor to 
test any but the crudest of macro-level rational choice or routine activities models.
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Conflict theory, legitimacy and violence in Diyala
As mentioned in the introduction, this research consists of an initial empirical 
evaluation of conflict theory’s ability to predict trends in violence directed against all 
province-wide targets in Diyala.  After this initial test, a more detailed target sector-
specific evaluation follows that uses conflict theory to more precisely determine the 
specific expected effects on each target sector of the events selected in this research.  
Before discussing the specifics of the overlap between conflict theory and sector-specific 
target selection it is necessary to directly explicate the hypothesis relating non-target-
specific violence in Diyala to conflict theory.  
Weberian conflict theory states that societal subgroups are in competition with 
each other for political and social power.  The perceived legitimacy of the group in power 
should mediate the opposing group’s choice to engage in political violence to contest that 
power.  To this end, events in Iraq that alter the legitimacy of the more powerful groups, 
be they the government, the coalition or major religious/ethnic groups, should directly 
correlate with changes in the frequency of political violence in Diyala.  When the more 
powerful or better organized groups are seen as legitimate, they are less likely to be 
violently opposed by other groups, in part because the Iraqi people will be less likely to 
tolerate violence against a group with higher perceived legitimacy.  When a strong group 
holds legitimate power, it reduces inter-group tension as there is little justification to 
initiate overt or covert conflict.  When a group loses legitimacy, tensions increase as the 
justification for challenging that group increases.  From this model the following 
hypotheses were derived that relate group conflict and legitimacy to violence in Diyala.
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HYPOTHESIS 1A:  Events that increase the legitimacy of controlling groups and 
reduce inter-group tension will decrease political violence in Diyala.
HYPOTHESIS 1B:  Events that decrease the legitimacy of controlling groups and 
increase inter-group tension will increase political violence in Diyala.
In this case the language “controlling groups” refers to the coalition and the Iraqi 
government, although the influence of each has waxed and waned over the time period in 
question.  The coalition was the key controlling group during the first half of the time 
period examined, and once control of the country was handed to the elected Iraqi 
government officials in May of 2006, they became the primary controlling group in Iraq.  
This changeover and the proper way to interpret the findings connected with the test of 
this hypothesis will be explained during the discussion section of this research.
I admit that this all-targets assessment for Diyala is relatively unsophisticated, as 
conflict theory provides excellent target-specific hypotheses.  I include this initial 
analysis in order to get a better sense of the baseline effects of the intervention events 
selected in this research, as well as to provide a comparison group for the later target-
specific analyses.  For clarity, I refer to the all-targets analysis as province-wide violence, 
in order to avoid confusing it with the target-specific analyses.
Target-specific conflict theory research and hypotheses
Conflict theory, ultimately a macro-level theory meant to explain group 
interaction, helps to shed some light on how specific targeting decisions are made aside 
from the research already cited.  The following section explores the conflict theory 
research that is specifically focused around the following target sectors: law enforcement, 
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military, government and civilian, and then outlines the hypotheses linking these sectors 
to political violence in Diyala.  As stated, this research posits that groups are in conflict 
with one another and will therefore select as a target the groups with which they are 
aggrieved, provided the popular support for that target, as manifested by its legitimacy, is 
low.  
My intent was to select target sectors that were mutually exclusive and 
theoretically distinct, which would have made the theoretical and empirical analysis 
much simpler.  In most nations, the police are closely intertwined with the government, 
and the government is often closely intertwined with the presence of the military. In Iraq, 
the coalition military is independent from the government, although the Iraqi government 
was beholden to the coalition military during the rule of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority from April, 2003 to June of 2004.  Iraq is currently developing its own military 
for external defense, although the attacks against military targets in this research refer to 
those targeted against the coalition or allied armed forces.
Given the close relationship between the Iraqi government and its police force, an 
argument can be made that these target sectors should be combined into one.  I made the 
decision not to combine the two sectors based on the different trends revealed in the 
timelines of the attacks against each sector.  While the two sectors map very closely in 
the beginning of the dataset, in July of 2005 the government sector experiences a large 
increase in attacks that the law enforcement sector does not.  Aggregating these two 
sectors would mask this difference, and therefore they were left separate.
In sum, conclusions about target-specific violence will be interpreted with 
caution, as factors that affect the selection of one target sector will likely have an effect 
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on targets in another sector. The following section outlines some of this crossover as well 
as the research supporting the conflict theory propositions believed to be behind the 
selection of the targets of political violence.  Tied into this review is an analysis of the 
research from outside the field of conflict theory that offers historical examples of 
changing trends in violence directed against specific target sectors.  I also list the target-
specific hypotheses for each target sector that will be evaluated in this research.
Law enforcement targets
Disentangling the selection of law enforcement and government targets can be 
difficult, as police are a visible and accessible proxy for the government in many cases.  
Just as groups compete for control of the government, Vold (1958) believes that groups 
struggle for control over the justice system in order to use that system to curb the interests 
of competing groups.  Vold argues that more powerful groups gain control of the criminal 
justice system and use the police to coerce their opponents (Chamlin & Cochran 2000; 
Liska 1992).  Control over the government and its police forces can be used to perpetuate 
overt or covert bias against weaker groups (Krisberg 1975) and as a result of this 
coercion, minority groups may choose to target the police as the visible and most 
accessible representation of that government.  As mentioned earlier, this form of violent 
reaction is similar to Sherman’s definition of defiance (Sherman 1990).
Weber (1919) was one of the first theorists to link the actions of the State with the 
illegitimate use of force through the use of the police.  When police are seen as taking 
orders from illegitimate masters, or of being illegitimate themselves, they encourage the 
defiance discussed by Sherman (Sherman 1993; Turk 1982).  If the government is not 
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seen as legitimate due to its exploitation or support of the exploitation of another group in 
society, then neither are its agents of control: the police and commonly the military.  As 
support for defying a government increases, it is reasonable to expect that attacks against 
police increases in a similar fashion.  If this connection holds true, then I expect to 
observe an increase in attacks against law enforcement targets following a loss of 
legitimacy by the Iraqi government, and a decrease in attacks when the legitimacy of the 
government is increased.
Linked to their perceived legitimacy, the efficacy of the Iraqi police force has 
fluctuated since the beginning of the war (Deflem & Sutphin 2006).  The Iraqi police 
force was created amidst serious internal reorganization, as many former Iraqi police 
were Ba’athists and the Coalition leadership decided that it was necessary to purge the 
loyalists from the old regime before the reconstruction of the police forces could 
commence (Deflem & Sutphin 2006; Hafez 2006).  Further adding to the difficulties, the 
daily responsibilities of the police are made nearly impossible by the high levels of 
continuing violence in Iraq (Baker & Hamilton 2006).  
As an example of the difficulty of reconstructing a police force within a turbulent 
nation, a case study on the reconstruction of the government in Kosovo by Wilson (2006) 
found that it took a substantial amount of time for a reforming nation to reconstitute an 
effective police force and legal system.  Until that reconstitution is complete and the new 
government is firmly established, violence against civilians and the police is likely to 
continue.
The legitimacy of the Iraqi police has been called into question as a result of 
incidents where men dressed in police uniforms have taken part in sectarian killings.  For 
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example, in 2007 men dressed in police uniforms rounded up and killed 15 Kurds in a 
Kurdish village (Komarow 2007).  As a result, given that many Kurds are Sunni, many 
Sunni increasingly see the security forces as a tool of the majority Shia, a situation that is 
likely to lower the legitimacy and increase violence against the Iraqi police (Flashpoint 
2006).
Deflem and Sutphin (2006) analyzed attacks against the Iraqi police forces (see 
page 275 of their article for a chart of attacks against Iraqi police forces over time).  They 
discuss the role of the Iraqi police and the attacks against them, but do not offer an 
explanation for changes in the violence directed against the Iraqi police.  This research 
will be the first attempt of which I am aware at modeling the variables that influence 
violent attacks against the Iraqi police.
Based on the literature and the conflict model previously described, this research 
tests the following hypotheses related to the selection of law enforcement targets in 
Diyala:
HYPOTHESIS 2A: Events that increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi government or 
police will decrease attacks against law enforcement targets.
HYPOTHESIS 2B: Events that decrease the legitimacy of the Iraqi government or  
police will increase attacks against law enforcement targets.
Military targets
Conflict theory is a particularly useful approach for understanding attacks against 
the coalition forces in Iraq.  The coalition forces depend largely on their perceived 
legitimacy to gain the support and trust of the Iraqi public which is essential to 
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accomplishing their mission (Baker & Hamilton, 2006).  As research previously 
discussed on the link between aggressive government actions and violence has shown, 
the higher the perceived legitimacy of the coalition’s presence in Iraq, the less they ought 
to come under attack.
For the coalition forces, legitimacy in Iraq oscillates as events cast their presence 
as either a liberating or occupying army (Laird 2005; PIPA Jan 31st 2006; PIPA Feb 28th
2006).  Although many Iraqi political and religious leaders were at first skeptical about 
the goals of the coalition and the viability of the new government, some have embraced 
the coalition-backed democratic process as a means to secure power and representation 
for their people (Finn & Zenilman 2003).  Despite the civil infrastructure that the 
coalition has helped to construct, their presence is still resented by many Iraqis.  The 
following quote from an Iraqi citizen captures this sentiment nicely: 
“The Americans, yes, they do good things, but only to enhance their 
reputation.  They are occupiers.  We want them to leave” (Filkins 2003). 
This perception is based in part on the fear in the region that the presence of international 
military forces, in particular the United States, is meant to secure the Western world’s 
access to petroleum resources (Clarke & Newman 2006; Hoffman 1998; Korany 2005).  
Many nations have good reason to fear the presence of the industrialized world in their 
affairs, as the history of the last three hundred years is littered with exploitive colonial 
relationships carried out by the militarily strong Western nations at the expense of the 
developing world (Aran 2003; Wallerstein 1979).  There are many cases where nations 
have sought to gain independence from colonial powers through the systematic use of 
violence to reduce the political will of the mother country.  Israel, Northern Ireland, 
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Algeria, and even the birth of the United States required the use of violent tactics to win 
independence from a militarily and economically stronger foe.  The continued presence 
of de facto colonial relationships between the first and third world is subject to much 
debate, and it is important to note that nations do not like to abandon influence over 
former colonies that have become independent.  In the words of the British statesman 
Benjamin Disraeli: “Colonies do not cease to be colonies because they are independent” 
(Disraeli 1863). 
While Iraq is somewhat different than these colonial examples, the forces that set 
violence in motion for those nations, from a conflict perspective, are the same as those 
that are hypothesized to be at work in Iraq.  The legitimacy of the coalition presence in 
the Middle East is dependent upon whether they are viewed as being there for security 
and humanitarian reasons, or for imperialist or colonial reasons to take control of the 
region’s resources (Cronin 2002).  Events that reduce the coalition’s legitimacy by 
portraying them as being the tool of an imperialist force, indiscriminate in the targeting of 
civilians or overly brutal in their tactics ought to reduce their legitimacy and increase the 
violence against them. 
Based on the previously described literature, this research tests the following 
hypotheses related to attacks on military targets in Diyala:
HYPOTHESIS 3A: Events that increase the legitimacy of the coalition forces in 
Iraq will decrease attacks against military targets.
HYPOTHESIS 3B: Events that decrease the legitimacy of the coalition forces in 
Iraq will increase attacks against military targets.
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Government targets
While many critical theories outline the struggle between individual groups and 
the government, it is important to note that from the perspective of conflict theory, as 
outlined in this review, the government is merely a resource controlled by a group.  When 
groups rebel against the actions of the state they are rebelling against the actions taken by 
the group that is using the instrument of state power coercively.
This perspective allows for the adaptation of conventional conflict theories to 
support the model used in this research.  Events that reveal the government to be a tool or 
puppet of one group in the exploitation of other groups will reduce the government’s 
legitimacy and increase attacks against it.  According to Turk (2004, pg 274), political 
violence against the government is a normal “response to feelings of indignation and 
frustration developed in a repressive political environment” and therefore as these 
feelings oscillate as a result of the changing perceived legitimacy of the government, the 
violence directed against the government should oscillate as well.  
One source of frustration or resentment towards the government comes from 
charges of corruption.  In support of this theoretical model, one case study of government 
corruption in Kosovo found that corruption dramatically reduced the legitimacy of the 
government, and was believed to have increased the violence against it (Wilson 2006).  
Although corruption in Iraq doesn’t play a direct role in this research, these findings are 
in line with the conflict theory model.  Other research suggests that States that are 
undergoing periods of governmental transition experience lower legitimacy and higher 
levels of conflict and violence (Feierabend, Feierabend & Nexvold 1969), further 
supporting this model.
44
Recent research on public attitudes in Iraq completed by the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA Jan 31st 2006) highlights the importance of the 
political legitimacy of the new government to the Iraqi people.  A poll conducted in Iraq 
in January of 2006 found that while two thirds of the Iraqi people believed that the 
December 2005 elections were fair and representative, 94% of Sunni’s polled believed 
that the elections were not fair, and 92% said the new government was not legitimate.  
While this doesn’t directly address the importance of legitimacy, it does illustrate the 
divide between the main ethnic groups pertaining to the elections.  Weber noted (Bendix 
1960) that the electoral process was particularly subject to abuse by powerful groups, and 
that elections were a particularly sensitive activity, leading me to believe that periods of 
elections in Iraq will be focal points for violence. 
The evolving Iraqi government is basically sectarian (Baker & Hamilton, 2006) 
and the main leaders often act to benefit their sects more than fulfill their position’s 
duties.  The Iraqi government has gone through periods of not producing adequate levels 
of safety or living conditions for many Iraqis and runs the risk of losing its legitimacy 
during these downturns as a result (Baker & Hamilton 2006).  This variability supports 
the core conflict ideas cited in this research in that some groups see the government to be 
legitimate, while others believe that its legitimacy has fallen substantially since it was 
created.  Based on this literature, this research tests the following hypotheses relating to 
the targeting of government targets in Diyala.
HYPOTHESIS 4A: Events that increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi government 
will decrease attacks against government targets.
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HYPOTHESIS 4B: Events that decrease the legitimacy of the Iraqi government 
will increase attacks against government targets.
Civilian Targets
The fourth category of targets that this research investigates is civilian targets.  
Attacks against civilian targets include any attacks against a non-governmental, law 
enforcement or military target.  These attacks are often directed against markets, public 
gatherings or religious sites and processions.  As religion is one of the main 
differentiating factors in Iraq, it is no wonder that many of the attacks against civilians 
are directed specifically at religious groups.
Conflict theory offers a number of angles from which to examine the targeting of 
civilians.  Unless specifically directed at the other three target sectors, the conflict 
perspective can be directly applied to the targeting of civilians without need for 
additional adaptation or explanation.  In short, as most societal groups are civilian groups 
and are at odds with other civilian groups, it is to be expected that civilians will be a 
frequent and direct target of political violence.  This can be seen throughout history as 
civilians have born most of the violence of civil conflicts (Wilkinson, 2000).  
Furthermore, terrorist attacks generally kill civilians more than non-civilians, although as 
previously discussed, some definitions define terrorism only as violence targeted against 
civilians.  
McGarrell and Castellano (1991) explored the role of status differentiation within 
the context of Weber’s theory.  They posit that people are vastly different from one 
another in a range of variables including class, race, ethnicity and inequality.  Societies 
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with stable or lower levels of differentiation are more stable but as differentiation 
increases, crime and intergroup conflict should increase.  As Iraq is currently undergoing 
a period of transition where the conventional power balance between the main groups is 
shifting, this differentiation ought to be changing, supporting our hypotheses that political 
changes will be linked to changes in violence.  
Conflict theory has been relatively silent on the actions of religious groups when 
they act independent of political groups or movements.  In Iraq, religion and politics are 
often interchangeable, as religion is one of the main dividing lines between ethnic groups. 
As the tensions between the ethnic groups in Iraq increases, civilians are likely to 
experience an increased number of attacks, as the political and symbolic nature of 
terrorist attacks often makes use of seemingly random violence against civilians to send 
political messages (Hoffman 1998). Events that increase tension between the groups will 
likely result in the specific targeting of religious sites.  Attacks on religious sites may also 
trigger reprisal or retaliatory attacks by the targeted group, suggesting that one predictor 
of the targeting of religious sites would be previous attacks on other religious sites.  
Given the limitations of our data, I am not able to tell the ethnicity of the civilians 
targeted by political violence, and therefore am be unable to more precisely link the 
motivation to attack civilians to conflict theory directly.
Based largely upon the conflict model previously developed, this research tests 
the following hypotheses relating to the targeting of religious and civilian targets in 
Diyala:
HYPOTHESIS 5A: Events that increase tension between sectarian Groups in Iraq
will increase attacks against civilian targets.
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HYPOTHESIS 5B: Events that decrease tension between sectarian groupsin Iraq 
will decrease attacks against civilian targets.
In summary, there has been a large amount of research on political violence, 
terrorism, conflict theory, legitimacy and the targeting of violence.  Critical theory, 
particularly based on the conflict theory developed by Max Weber, offers an appropriate 
theoretical platform from which to study the targeting of violence in Iraq.  Weber’s ideas 
about group interaction, power and the importance of legitimacy allow me to develop 
specific testable hypotheses that will help to determine how and why major political 
events affect the trends in the targeting of violence in Iraq.  My hypotheses include an 
initial province-wide analysis of all violence in Diyala and then four subsequent target 
specific hypotheses that take advantage of the complexity of conflict theory and the detail 
available in my data.  The following chapter describes the data and the operationalization 
of my variables and lays out the statistical approach that is best suited for testing these 
hypotheses.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
This chapter describes the independent and dependent variables used in this 
research.  I begin with a description of the database of political violence in Diyala that 
was created for this study.  Important choices about the selection of the level of analysis 
of the data and the selection of target sectors within the data are included herein.  
Additionally, this chapter includes descriptive statistics and visual timelines for the 
dependent variable that help to illustrate how the data relate to the hypotheses being 
tested in terms of the timing and distribution of events.  The independent variables are 
introduced in this chapter as well, and their selection and relationship to my hypotheses 
are explained in detail.  Finally, the analytic procedure for the ARIMA process is 
explained.
I made the decision to place less relevant descriptive statistics about the dataset in 
Appendix Three.  This appendix describes the different types of attacks, their lethality, 
their location and details about how many groups claimed responsibility for the attacks.  
These statistics do not directly relate to the hypotheses being tested, and are therefore 
excluded from the main body of this text in order to improve the flow and clarity of this 
section.
While it is common to include information about the location, in this case Iraq, 
where the data were collected, the decision was made to place this information in 
Appendix One at the end of this report.  I invite readers who are unfamiliar with Iraq to 
refer to this section.  Placing this section at the end of this report also helps to improve 
the flow of the narrative, as the primary purpose of this research is to describe a conflict 
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theory test of political violence, and not to provide a historical or geographic summary of 
Diyala and Iraq.
The Data  
This project has its roots in a database that contains a record of incidents of 
political violence in the Diyala province of Iraq from June 2003 to May 2006.  This 
database was originally compiled by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) from open sources (O’Grady 2006) including newspapers, Internet news sites 
and public reports of political violence in the province.  The inclusion criteria for 
violence in this database were very broad and included all events that were reported as 
political violence or terrorism in the sources listed.
To ensure the comprehensiveness of the data, the dataset was updated and validated by 
students at the University of Maryland in the Spring and Summer of 2006.  The students 
checked the incidents in the database against a database compiled by the National 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) known as the Terrorism 
Knowledge Base (TKB).  Data from MIPT were used to supplement the original database 
where the LLNL database was missing information about incidents, although less than 
10% of the cases in the database are exclusively from the MIPT data.  
The complete database contains a record of 735 events consisting of 676 violent 
attacks and 59 failed attacks in Diyala.  Failed attacks were so named because they were 
attacks that were discovered or interrupted before they could be carried out, or that failed 
in their purpose, i.e. planted bombs not exploding. The 59 failed attacks will be included 
in this analysis as if they were successful attacks as they were meant to be successful.  
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The database developed for this research is the most complete and comprehensive open 
source database on violence in the Diyala province of which I am aware, and will be 
treated as if it contains the population of all attacks over the time period being studied.  
The database measured all violence in Diyala that was not explicitly defined as criminal 
violence or conventional warfare.  
Target Sectors
I classified the violent attacks in Diyala into four mutually exclusive categories 
based on which sector the attacks were directed against: law enforcement (39.9%), 
military (10.4%), government (26.4%), and civilian targets (23.4%).  A visual 
representation of this break-down is presented below in Figure One.  Law enforcement 
targets included Iraqi security and police forces, police barracks, training centers, recruits 
and police patrols.  Attacks against military targets included attacks on coalition military 
patrols, bases and soldiers.  Government targets included government buildings, 
embassies, government officials, and polling places. Civilian targets included markets, 
schools, commercial establishments, infrastructure, public gatherings as well as mosques, 





Law Enforcement Targets: 292 events
Government Targets: 194 events
Military Targets: 77 events
Civilian Targets: 172 events
Figure One: Target-type databases drawn from the main database
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Level of analysis
When working with longitudinal data it is essential to carefully consider how the 
data will be aggregated, as different levels of aggregation can often mask important 
trends.  For this research data were collected at the incident-level and were aggregated by 
week and by month.  This section describes the choices behind aggregating the data in 
this fashion, as well as provides visual references through the use of timelines to explore 
the trends revealed by these different aggregations.
While data collection stretched back from the beginning of the US led invasion in 
March, 2003, the first attack recorded in this database occurred on the 24th of June, 2003.  
The database captures violence that occurred on 153 different weeks, although for 41 of 
the weeks there were no recorded attacks.  When the data are aggregated by week, the 
first week with an attack is the week of the 18th of June, 2003, and weeks are measured 
from Sunday to Saturday.  The first month recorded was June, 2003, and there were 39 
months recorded in the database.  Only four months of the 39 did not register an attack.  
Table One provides descriptive statistics for the target sectors, as well as for the database 
as a whole, first for the data when aggregated by month and then by week.
Table One: Descriptive statistics by week and month for each sector
Aggregated by week (N=153)
Target Sector Target Sector Target Sector Target Sector
All Targets All Targets All Targets All Targets
Government Government Government Government
Law Enforcement Law Enforcement Law Enforcement Law Enforcement
Military Military Military Military
Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian
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Aggregated by month (N=39)
Target Sector Target Sector Target Sector Target Sector
All Targets All Targets All Targets All Targets
Government Government Government Government 
Law Enforcement Law Enforcement Law Enforcement Law Enforcement
Military Military Military Military
Civilian Civilian Civilian Civilian
Table Two illustrates an important problem within the dataset.  The table shows 
that the frequencies of attacks are difficult to assess analytically as attacks are not evenly 
distributed across the time-period in question.  There are many weeks without an attack 
and these attack-free time periods are highly concentrated in the first half of the dataset.  
The number of time-periods without attacks, broken down by target sector, is presented 
in Table Two.
Table Two: Number of time periods with no attacks
Series By Week (N= 153) By Month (N = 39)
All Targets 41 4




To visually illustrate the distribution of attacks against various target sectors and 
how the attacks are concentrated over time, the following ten figures show the frequency 
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of attacks aggregated by week and by month for the entire database as well as for each of 
the target sectors.
Figure Two: Attacks against all targets (monthly)
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Figure Four: Attacks against Government Targets (monthly)
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Figure Six: Attacks against Law Enforcement Targets (monthly)
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Figure Eight: Attacks against Military Targets (monthly)
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Figure Ten: Attacks against Civilian Targets (monthly)
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Choosing between weekly and monthly aggregations
One of the most critical decisions made in this research was the time period at 
which to aggregate the data.  Data aggregated at the monthly level produce a smoother 
overall picture of trends in violence, as the preceding timelines illustrate.  However, data 
aggregated at the monthly level may hide important trends that are apparent when the 
data are aggregated by week.  There were important statistical and methodological 
concerns that ultimately provided the basis for the decision to run the analysis at the 
weekly level and these concerns are described below.
The general rule of thumb is that time-series methodology requires a certain 
number of observations, usually set at 50 (Biglan, Ary & Wagenaar 2004; Cook & 
Campbell 1979) in order to accurately determine the error structure of a series.  As stated, 
I have 39 observations when aggregating by month and 153 observations when 
aggregating by week.  Given that I am often concerned with the effects of multiple 
interventions on each target sector’s time-series, it was necessary to use the weekly data 
and not the monthly data for the primary analysis to avoid losing statistical power.  The 
converse of this is that there are fewer attacks in each of the weekly categories, and more 
weeks than months with zero attacks, increasing the variability of my data.  I was able to 
account for this increased variability by logging the data, as will be discussed shortly, but 
it is important to note that both aggregations are less than optimal.  The main thrust of 
this analysis focuses on the data aggregated by week and the results of this research will 
be interpreted carefully, so as not to make generalizations that are not reasonably 
supported by the data. 
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Independent Variable: Major political events 
The model developed in this research posits that far-reaching political and social 
events in Iraq are likely to have an effect upon the legitimacy and standing of the various 
groups active in Iraq, altering the likelihood of their being a target of violence.  In order 
to determine which events to include in this analysis, a wide range of information on 
political and social events in Iraq was collected.  A comprehensive list of more than 500 
events in Iraq from January of 2003 to April of 2006 were compiled (for full list see 
Appendix 4) and then subjected to two inclusion criteria: magnitude and political impact.  
This list represented every political development, military operation and milestone of 
major significance to the coalition, the Iraqi people and other related international events.  
.
During the event selection process, Internet and newspaper accounts were used to 
provide as much detail as possible about each event to determine the projected effect of 
the event.  In line with other research, I refer to these events as interventions, although 
these events are unique in that, for the most part, they were not designed to directly have 
an affect on levels of violence and therefore do not fit the more common usage of the 
term intervention.
Inclusion criteria: magnitude
The first criteria used to determine the most relevant events was their magnitude.  
Since very few major events actually occurred within the province of Diyala itself, 
selected events must be of sufficient magnitude to have a far-reaching effect that might 
be more likely to be felt across all of Iraq.  Events such as national elections, national 
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changes in the governance structure and the capture of Saddam Hussein are 
representative of the well-publicized and far-reaching events that are believed to be 
related to trends in violence.  While more localized groups might feel the effects of local 
events more acutely than large scale events, the lack of information on localized events as 
well as the locations of the groups involved suggests that the most defensible strategy is 
to utilize events that should have an effect across all of Iraq.
Inclusion criteria: political impact
As this research is meant to test the importance of competitive group interaction 
and legitimacy on the targeting of violence, events were selected from the initial list that 
had strong direct political or social effects.  The expected political and social effects were 
determined by studying media reports of each event.  Within Iraq, the social, political and 
religious landscapes are closely intertwined, as the primary social and thereby political 
division is one of religion.  Many of the political parties are divided by religious 
affiliation, and events that altered the political or social balance between these groups 
were more likely to be selected.   As political events received a good deal of media 
coverage, it is no surprise that four of the eight events were overtly political in nature.  
The other four events ran the gamut from successful coalition operations such as the 
capture of Saddam Hussein to particularly damaging violent attacks such as the Feb 22nd, 
2006 bombing of the Shia Mosque of the Golden Dome.
It is important to note that the events selected were roughly evenly distributed 
over the time period in question.  This is beneficial as it reduces the chance that the 
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effects of one event would confound the influence of other temporally proximal events.  
The spacing of the events over the time period can be seen below in Figure Twelve.
Figure Twelve: Temporal Spacing of 8 Events
Event descriptions
Now that the basic framework for the selection of events has been described, the 
following section outlines the events that were selected for inclusion in the model as well 
as their expected effect on levels of political violence.  In order to place the events in 
their historical context and to see what events occurred immediately before and after, 
Appendix 4 lists a chronology of every significant event in Iraq covering the time period 
measured in this research.
Event One: The capture of Saddam Hussein, December 13th, 2003
Saddam Hussein, the deposed former leader of Iraq, was captured by Coalition 
forces near his hometown of Tikrit on December 13th, 2003.  Hussein had been in hiding 








   Event #1      #2          #3       #4       #5          #6        #7        #8
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coalition.  While he remained in hiding, Saddam Hussein was allegedly able to direct 
resistance against the coalition and there was uncertainty about whether the Coalition 
would fail in controlling Iraq resulting in Saddam’s return to power (Baker & Hamilton 
2006).  A number of former Ba'athists, military officers and party officials remained loyal 
to Saddam and until his capture strove to return his government to power.  His capture 
served to be both a symbolic and practical victory for the coalition, and the legitimacy of 
their presence in Iraq increased (Baker & Hamilton 2006).  Saddam Hussein was tried by 
the Iraqi government in October of 2005 for his part in ordering the deaths of a number of 
Kurds in Iraq in 1992 and was executed on December 31st, 2006.
Expected effect:  Hussein's capture should increase the legitimacy of the coalition, 
reducing attacks against them, and conceivably province-wide violence as well.  This 
event also increases the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government and its police forces, 
which were under the control of the coalition at that time, reducing attacks specifically 
against them too.  
Event Two:  Abu Ghraib prison scandal, April 30th, 2004.  
On April 30th, 2004, information came to light that American soldiers had been 
abusing and humiliating prisoners at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.  This abuse was 
photographed and the photographs became public on April 30th on the American 
television program 60 Minutes II.  A number of the photographs showed Iraqi prisoners 
in American custody in situations that were particularly derogatory to Muslims (CBS 
2004).  As a result a number of US military prison guards and military officials were tried 
and ultimately convicted of abusing the prisoners.  There was a widespread public outcry 
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against the coalition as a result of this scandal, and American Nicholas Berg was 
abducted and beheaded by insurgents in May of 2004 in retaliation.
Expected Effect:  I expected this event to reduce the legitimacy of the coalition 
forces as it portrayed them as having little regard for the rights or dignity of their 
captives.  The legitimacy of the Iraqi government was also called into question as it was 
still under the control of the Coalition Provisional Authority at this time, although it is 
more likely that retaliatory attacks would be directed directly at the coalition forces and 
not at the Iraqi's working with them.  This event should have increased province-wide 
attacks, given its far reaching nature.
Event Three: Government transferred to Interim Iraqi Government, June 28, 2004 
Control of the Iraqi government was transferred from the US lead Interim 
Governing Council to the Interim Iraqi government (IIG) on June 28th, 2004.  This was 
the first major step in returning control of Iraq to the Iraqi people through a 
democratically elected government.  The IIG was still technically under the authority of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, but granted the Iraqi's considerable autonomy in 
preparing their country for its first democratic election for the Iraqi National Assembly.  
The new Iraqi Prime minister under this government was Iyad Allawi, and his cabinet 
was made up of 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis and 5 Kurds, who were also Sunni, as well as a Turk 
and an Assyrian.  While the new government was specifically structured to be as widely 
representative as possible, it did not enjoy support from all of Iraq's ethnic groups.   Local 
militias, particularly the Shia Mahdi Army under Muqtada al Sadr, remained openly 
defiant throughout the rule of the Interim Iraqi Government.
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Expected Effect:  The removal of a portion of the coalition influence should 
increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government and its police forces and reduce attacks 
against them, as well as province-wide attacks.  This effect may be tempered by the fact 
that the new government was not democratically elected, and may have been seen as a 
proxy for the coalition forces.  Furthermore, violent opposition from local militias, 
particularly in Baghdad, may have offset or overwhelmed any pacifying affect that this 
transfer had.  
Event Four: Election Period 2004, Dec 15th, 2004-Jan 30th, 2005
The fourth event selected was the election period for the Iraqi Transitional 
Government and the Iraqi National Assembly.  This event was particularly significant as 
it was the first multi-party election held in Iraq in 50 years.  Turn out was high within the 
Shiite and Kurdish community, but fearing the defeat of their political candidates, many 
Sunni's boycotted the election.  Shiite and Kurdish political parties ultimately won the 
election and gained control over the Iraqi National Assembly.
Expected Effect:  According to Weber (1919), elections are a time of increased 
tension and potential violence as groups jockey for power and influence, suggesting an 
increase in violence during this time period for all targets across Diyala.  Although there 
was much hope (Baker & Hamilton, 2006) during this election for a fair and 
representative government, foreign insurgents, dispossessed Ba'athists and other 
dissidents had a stake in preventing the elections from occurring.  This event should 
produce increases in province-wide violence as well as against sectors such as the 
coalition, government and the Iraqi police forces which were protecting the election sites.  
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Violence should also be heavily focused on  civilians, as only by the targeting of civilians 
attempting to vote could the disaffected groups alter the outcome of the elections.  
Event Five: Transitional Government Installed, March 15th, 2005-April 6th, 2005
The Iraqi Transitional Government was installed on March 15th, 2006, following 
the election.  Shortly thereafter the Iraqi National Assembly convened and selected its 
new Prime Minister and President.  The President, Jalal Talabani was a Sunni Kurd and 
the Prime Minister, Ibrahim al Jaafari was Shia.  One of the main goals for this 
government was to create a constitution for Iraq and prepare the country for transition to 
a permanent government.
Expected Effect:  Despite the earlier boycott of the elections by many Sunnis, the 
representation of both Shia and Sunni on the new government should increase the 
legitimacy of the Iraqi Govt and its police forces, reducing attacks against them.  This 
may have served to ease inter-group tensions, reducing attacks against civilians as well as 
against all targets in Diyala.  Even with this representation, Shia and Kurd parties 
controlled the majority of the seats within the National Parliament leading to a growing 
sense of disenfranchisement by the Sunni. 
Event Six: Sunni withdrawal from the government, July 20th, 2005
Following a political stalemate, Sunni members of the Constitutional committee 
suspended their participation, effectively removing the Sunni voice from the Iraqi 
National Assembly.  Although the Sunni believed they were marginalized in the earlier 
election they still held seats within the Assembly and therefore had a voice and a role in 
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determining the constitution and other important governmental decisions.  By 
withdrawing from the governmental process, the legitimacy of the government in the 
eyes of the Sunni’s was dramatically reduced.
Expected Effect:  This event increased tension between the Shia and Sunni groups 
and reduced the legitimacy of the government.  This should have resulted in an increase 
in attacks against government and law enforcement targets and potentially all targets in 
Diyala.  Civilian targets should have also experienced an increase in attacks given that 
this event increased the tension between the Sunni and Shia.  
Event Seven, Election Period 2005, November 15th, 2005-December 15th, 2005
This election was held to elect the first permanent democratically-elected 
government in Iraq’s history.  Turnout was high across Iraq, believed to be near 70% 
(Baker & Hamilton 2006), especially among the Sunni community that had boycotted the 
previous election.  The Iraqi Accord Front, a Sunni political group, won 15% of the 
legislative seats, a huge increase given the lack of Sunni representation and participation 
in the prior government.  Additionally, insurgent groups declared a moratorium on 
attacks during the elections and many formerly antagonistic groups took part in guarding 
the election sites.
Expected effect: Unlike the first election period in which many Sunni's boycotted, 
widespread participation in this election should reduce inter-group tension, and reduce 
attacks against government, law enforcement and civilian targets, and province-wide 
violence.  This event should have a long-term effect on the levels of violence, as the 
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newly elected government should be more representative and therefore more legitimate 
than the prior governments.
Event Eight: Bombing of a major Shia shrine, February 22, 2006
The Al-Askari Mosque, referred to as the Mosque of the Golden Dome was 
bombed in Samarra on February 22nd, 2006.  This mosque was of major religious 
significance to the Shia community not just in Iraq, but all across the Muslim world.  
There were retaliatory attacks against Sunnis as a result and tensions were dramatically 
increased.  Although this was a localized event, the significance of the mosque and the 
retaliatory attacks caused a ripple of violence across Iraq (Baker & Hamilton 2006).  The 
remains of the mosque were further attacked in 2007 by alleged al-Qaeda operatives, 
deepening the pain felt by many Shia at the loss of a major holy site.
Expected effect: This event increased tension between the Sunni and Shia and 
should increase attacks against civilian targets as well as province-wide violence.  As the
Iraqi government was still controlled by a Shia majority, these attacks could reasonably 
be seen as attacking government and law enforcement targets as well.
In order to make explicit which hypotheses I expect to be supported by the 
theoretical model used for this research for each sector, the following table, Table Two
summarizes the events and their expected effects.  Boxes are marked with a + to show 
that I posit, based on the conflict model developed in this research that the specific event 
will increase violence, or a - to show that I expect the event will decrease violence 
against the indicated target sector.  A blank space indicates there I predicted that the 
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event should have no measurable impact upon this target sector.  This group of ten 
interactions where I expect no effect to occur will serve as a quasi-comparison group for 
this research, and will be discussed once the results from the ARIMA analysis are 
presented.
Table Three: Event Hypotheses and Target Sectors
All Police Military Govt Civilian
E1:  Hussein Captured - - - -
E2:  Abu Ghraib Scandal + +
E3:  Interim Iraqi Govt takes 
power
- - -
E4:  Election One + + + + +
E5:  Iraqi Transitional Govt 
installed
- - - -
E6:  Sunni Withdrawal + + + +
E7:  Election Two - - - -
E8:  Shia Shrine Bombed + + + +
- means that the event would reduce attacks against that target sector
+ means that it should increase attacks against that target sector
Event coding
Once the events had been selected, the next step was to determine the duration of 
the effect they might have on political violence.  The events all have finite start-dates that 
were clearly reported in the sources that described them, making it easy to determine 
when the expected effect would begin.  The two election periods lasted for multiple 
weeks, and were therefore left “on” in the database for their duration.  The effects of the 
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all events were measured beginning in the week after the week the event occurred or 
began in.  This is not a perfect coding strategy, as an event that occurred on Sunday will 
have six days before the effect period was measured.  Given the nature of the data and the 
analytical strategy, this method is the most efficient, and will provide reliable results. 
Furthermore, I have no reason to believe that the events selected would result in a lagged 
or delayed effect given their magnitude, social and political importance.
However, determining the duration of an expected effect is more complicated than 
determining its starting point.  According to McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger & Hay 
(1980), interventions can have one of four possible effects based on the length of their 
effect and the abruptness with which it begins.  The possible effects consist of an abrupt 
permanent effect, a gradual permanent effect, an abrupt and temporary effect or a gradual 
and temporary effect.  They suggest that an a priori understanding of the expected effect 
of each variable should guide the selection of the expected type of effect in the statistical 
model.  In this case, I believe that the eight intervention variables I selected will have an 
immediate and not gradually building affect.   
Some of the interventions may have a long-term effect on the frequency of 
attacks, while some may only have a temporary effect.  While I do have a priori
expectations of what the effects ought to be, these analyses will test the effects across 
three different potential effect durations in order to be thorough in determining their 
effects.  Events were first coded as a pulse function, having an effect only during the 
week that they occurred.  The two elections were coded as ranges, while their effect was 
measured from the first week that they occurred.  Next the interventions were coded as 
having a one month effect, and then a three month effect.  For these functions, events 
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were coded as a “1” during the time period the intervention was thought to have an effect 
and a “0 during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phase.  The election periods 
were coded as a “1” for each week that the elections were occurring.
Analytical procedure
Analyzing the effects of a series of intervention events using time-series data 
poses a number of unique challenges.  Time-series analyses have to contend with the 
effects of serial correlation as well as the existence of trends, seasonal, cyclical and 
disturbance effects (Box & Taio 1975).  This research utilizes an autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) model as ARIMA is an effective statistical 
technique for fitting a model to time-series data that accounts for these effects (Box & 
Jenkins 1976; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg 1998).  ARIMA models work by determining the 
underlying structural model for a time-series, of which the observed series is just one 
possible realization.  This underlying model is what drives the series, and the residuals 
between a well-defined model and the actual series should not be significantly different 
from a white-noise (stochastic) process, eliminating the effects of serial correlation and 
cyclical disturbances.
ARIMA is preferred to conventional regression because it can estimate 
parameters more reliably as it takes into account the lag structure between observations 
as well as cyclical trends within the series (Chamlin & Cochran 1998).   Standard OLS 
regression is inappropriate for analyzing time-series data due to the fact that OLS 
assumes that the error terms in a series are uncorrelated.  With time-series data the errors 
are often correlated as preceding observations often impact subsequent observations.  
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This results in an inflated t-statistic, which increases the likelihood that any significant 
effect will be erroneous (Legge 1990).
There are three components to a standard ARIMA model, labeled p, d, q. These 
three components allow for corrections to be made to the model in such a way as to 
remove the non-stochastic elements, allowing for a more valid test of the effects of an 
intervention upon the data.  The p component refers to the autoregressive structure of the 
model, meaning the number of “p” preceding realizations or observations that influence 
the current realization.  The d component refers to the presence of an overall trend in the 
data.  If the data exhibits a rising or a falling trend, it must be differenced by subtracting 
each observation from its prior observation.  The d component specifically refers to the 
number of times, sometimes more than once, that the data must be differenced in order to 
eliminate that trend.  The q component refers to the moving-average of the model, 
meaning the portion of the preceding q shocks that determine the level of the current 
observation.  















Where the p term refers to the order of the autoregressive term, i  refers to the parameter 
of the autoregressive term within the model, d refers to the differencing required to make 
the series stationary and q to the order of the moving average term and i  to the moving 
average parameter.  L refers to the presence of a lagged effect term.  Finally, t  refers to 
the error term of the model, and errors are assumed to be independent and normally 
distributed with a zero mean.  This assumption is supported by a well-tested pre-
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whitening process, as after correct specification of an ARIMA model of form (p,d,q) the 
remaining variation in the data should be purely stochastic, following an essentially 
random white-noise process.  In order to ensure that this is the case, the portmanteau test 
for white-noise, reported through the Q-statistic, is run to test that the adjusted series is 
not significantly different from a white-noise process.
Estimation of the most efficient ARIMA model for a time-series dataset is an 
iterative process in which values for the autoregressive, moving average, and differencing 
components are varied and the efficiency and fit of the model checked.  This process is 
referred to as the pre-whitening process, and involves checking the auto-correlation 
function (ACF) and the partial auto-correlation function (PACF) for each potential 
model.  These functions show the nature of the auto-regressive, trend, and moving 
average processes at work, allowing for more efficient model specification, as certain 
characteristics of the ACF’s and PACF’s indicate improper model specification.
In order to assess the effect of an event on the number of attacks, an ARIMA 
model needs to be estimated for the pre-intervention time-series.  There is some debate 
within the field as to whether the estimation process should be done on the entire series or 
just on the pre-intervention series only.  Some authors (Chamlin & Cochran 1998; Legge 
1990; Simpson, Bouffard, Garner & Hickman 2006) prefer to use the entire series to 
estimate the original model, given that many pre-intervention series contain too few data 
points to get a valid estimate of the structure of the series, however the definitive texts on 
the ARIMA process use the pre-intervention time-series only for their model estimation 
procedures (Cook & Campbell 1979; McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger & Hay 1980).  
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One of the main limitations of the ARIMA method is that it requires a long series 
of prior observations in order to correctly estimate the structure of the auto-correlations
(Biglan, Ary and Wagenaar 2000).  Estimating the pre-intervention models using fewer 
than 50 data points is not recommended as it increases the size of the standard error for 
the parameter estimates, reducing the power of the statistical analysis (Pridemore, 
Chamlin & Cochran 2007).  This precludes the creation of a statistically reliable ARIMA 
model looking at the first event, the capture of Saddam Hussein, which occurred on the 
25th week, as I don’t have enough baseline data to validly test the effect of this event on 
subsequent attacks.  The second event, the Abu Ghraib scandal, occurred on the 45th
week of the dataset and will be analyzed, although the findings are somewhat weak for 
this intervention, as discussed subsequently.  An exploratory analysis of the effect of the 
capture of Saddam Hussein is included in the results section further below in order to be 
consistent with the theoretical model.
Other researchers who have modeled data with multiple interventions using an 
ARIMA process use only the period before the first intervention as the pre-intervention 
period as the correct model specification applicable to all later interventions (Kim, 
Myeong & Kweon 2006).  I do not believe that this is an appropriate model to follow, as 
my data are relatively sparse for the first third of the dataset and estimating a model from 
an early period to apply to an event that falls well within the latter third of the data would 
miss much of the underlaying structural relationships that are apparent within the data.  
The best way to determine the appropriate model for my data was to run model 
specification analyses for each of the four targets sectors as well as for the entire 
province-wide dataset with each pre-intervention series being a separate model.  
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As a result of the growing frequency of violent attacks over time, each of my 
series shows increasing error variability as well.  The simplest way to account for the 
non-stationary error variance is to log-transform the data, which doesn’t alter the model 
specification process procedures (Cook & Campbell 1979; McDowall, McCleary, 
Meidinger & Hay 1980).  Before this transformation took place, a small amount (.1) was 
added to each of the weeks, as log-transformations can not be done on null-values and 
many of the time periods contained no recorded attacks.  Log-transformation does not 
substantively change the outcome of the ARIMA process, but does require a reverse 
transformation to return the resulting coefficients to their more readily interpretable form.  
The results of these model specification tests, as well as the results of my ARIMA 
analyses and an initial interpretation of the findings are presented in the following 
chapter.
Power analysis
I ran a post-hoc power analysis in order to check whether or not I had a sufficient 
number of observations for each target sector to be able to be confident in the ability of 
my ARIMA model to find an effect where there actually was one (Cohen, 1988).  Many 
statistical tests rely on random samples drawn from a population in order to extrapolate 
results to the larger whole.  In this case, I believe I have come as close as possible to 
measuring the population of political violence in Diyala over the time period measured, 
and therefore my results are impacted less by the sample-size restrictions of many 
statistical analyses.  
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Power analyses determine the likelihood that a test will be able to find an effect 
based on the size of the actual effect in reality.  A small effect size is commonly seen as 
being near .02, a medium effect size near .15 and a large effect size as being .30 or larger 
(Cohen, 1988).  In this research, many of the effect sizes I did find were between a small 
and medium size.  Only the bombing of the Shi’a shrine, event 8, had a large effect size, 
as the event was associated with an increase of 17 attacks per week from the baseline 
level of 40-50 attacks per week.  Other effects were more moderate, finding increases or 
decreases ranging from 1-2 attacks to 7-8 attacks per week with varying baseline levels. 
The results of my power analysis checking for province-wide violence found that, 
given the 745 events measured in my database, combined with all eight predicted effects 
from my events, I had a strong chance of finding even a small effect if there was one.  
For law enforcement targets, with 292 observations and seven predicted effects, I had a 
strong chance of finding medium-sized or larger effects, but not of finding small effects.  
For government targets, with 194 observations and seven predicted events, and civilian 
targets, with 172 observations and five predicted events, I had a strong chance of finding 
medium-sized or larger effects, but not small effects. For military targets, which had the 
lowest number of observations, 77, but also the lowest number of predicted effects, 3, I 
would also have a strong chance of finding medium-sized or larger effects, but not small 
effects.  In sum, my ARIMA analyses had moderate power, and they should have reliably 
located the existence of all but the smallest effects.
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Chapter 4: Results
This chapter presents the results of my pre-whitening model specification tests as 
well as the ARIMA results for the effects of the independent variables on violence 
directed against the five sets of targets.  Results for the province-wide analysis are 
presented first, followed by the results for the four target-specific subsets.  An 
examination of the support provided for each hypothesis is included after the results for 
each sector are presented.  Chapter Five summarizes the findings by target sector and by 
hypothesis, and then provides a summary of the cumulative effects of each event for the 
target sectors in question.  These three analyses, sector-specific, hypothesis-specific and 
event-specific, provide a more complete picture of the violence in Diyala than any one 
type of analysis would provide.
I had to choose between including the first two events in my analysis given their 
theoretical importance and excluding them based on the weakness of the ARIMA model 
in detecting effects so early in a time series.  I decided to include the first two events, the 
capture of Saddam Hussein and the Abu Ghraib scandal in the analysis as they were too 
theoretically important to ignore.  The ARIMA model can still process the effect that 
these events had on the trends in violence, just with less confidence in the validity and 
reliability of the results.  Results are presented for these events alongside the rest of the 
events, although during the discussion of the findings I explain that they should be 
interpreted with caution.  Ultimately, I did not have enough data points before these 
events to reliably evaluate them and therefore the findings related to these events are 
given less weight.
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After using pre-whitening model specification techniques to correctly fit pre-
intervention ARIMA models to my data, I found that the province-wide model and three 
of the four target-specific models only required one change in model specification across 
the eight events.  This generally fits what most of the research I had consulted finds 
(Biglan, Ary and Wagenaar 2000; Cook & Campbell 1979; McDowall, McCleary, 
Meidinger & Hay 1980) as few time-series undergo dramatic enough shifts to warrant 
multiple changes in their model specification.  Only the Law Enforcement target sector 
required three separate pre-event model specifications to “pre-whiten” the series for each 
of the eight interventions.  
I present the specifications for each model along with their Durbin-Watson and 
portmanteau Q-statistics, indicated in Table Three.  The Durbin-Watson test measures the 
presence of autocorrelation, and the Durbin-Watson statistic ranges from 0-4, with a 
value of 2 meaning that autocorrelation has been minimized or eliminated.  The Q-
statistic measures the presence or absence of a stochastic process.  It is important to note 
that the Q-statistic is not meant to be significant as it is a test that the series is not a white-
noise process and therefore the higher the P-value the better.  The ARIMA model is 
correctly specified when auto-correlation has been minimized and the series 
approximates a white-noise process.  I was able to achieve the optimal specification for 
every model used in this research, and the results are presented below.
Table Four: Model Specification Results




Province-wide: Events 1-3 0,0,1 9.38 (p<.99) 1.99
Province-wide: Events 4-8 0,1,1 48.16 (p<.18) 1.97
Government: Events 1-3 0,0,1 23.13 (P<.95) 1.98
Government: Events 4-8 0,1,1 36.72 (P<.62) 1.73
Civilian: Events 1-5 0,0,0 43.67 (P<.32) 1.90
Civilian: Events 6-8 3,1,0 46.65 (P<.22) 2.07
Military: Events 1-3 0,0,0 33.67 (P<.57) 1.52
Military: Events 4-8 0,1,1 .80 (P<.58) B-stat* 1.96
Law Enforcement: Events1-2 0,0,0 27.76 (P<.27) 1.92
Law Enforcement: Event 3 0,0,1 40.59 (P<.27) 1.94
Law Enforcement: Events 4-8 0,1,1 34.01 (P<.73) 1.98
* The B-statistic is another test for white-noise that can be employed when the Q-statistic doesn't approach 
significance despite adequate model specification as determine by analysis of the ACF and PACF (White, 
Goldkamp & Campbell 2005).
In the following section I present the results of my ARIMA analyses and an 
interpretation of the findings for each model which show the effect of each of the 
interventions at the three different potential effect durations of one week (immediate 
effect), one month and three months. Results are presented in their non-logged form for 
easier interpretation.  Positive coefficients indicate that the event was associated with an 
average increase of the listed coefficient amount in violent attacks during the time period 
in question, and negative coefficients with a similar average decrease.  Non-significant 
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results are presented in the initial tables showing the effects of each event across the five 
target sectors in this analysis in order to show the general direction and magnitude of the 
findings.  They are not presented in the subsequent charts in order to make it easier to 
discern the actual effects that each event had on levels of violence.  The p-values for the 
non-significant findings are placed in parentheses after the coefficients.
Results for Province-wide Violence






1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture (0,0,1) Reduce -.82* -1.17* -.72 (.21)
Abu Ghraib (0,0,1) Increase -1.66* .37 (.79) -1.08 (.22)
IIG installed (0,0,1) Reduce 3.95** 2.16 (.80) -.94 (34)
Election One (0,1,1) Increase -4.04 (.24) 2.17 (.23) 5.61**
Trans Govt installed (0,1,1) Reduce -7.42** -2.87 (.32) -.34 (.84)
Sunni withdrawal (0,1,1) Increase -3.88** 1.18 (.62) 1.14 (.55)
Election Two (0,1,1) Reduce -.60 (.86) -1.92 (.37) -3.27**
Shrine bombing (0,1,1) Increase 17.2** 3.43 (.48) 5.5**
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
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Analysis of province-wide violence
Saddam’s capture and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal appear to have reduced 
violence against all targets in Diyala.  While these findings are statistically significant, as 
stated earlier the y occurred too early in the dataset to establish reliable baseline data, and 
therefore my confidence in their validity is low.  
The installation of the Iraqi Interim Government increased violence during the 
week of its installation by almost four attacks from the baseline trend.  The first election 
did not register a change in attack frequency across the province; however the three 
month average level of attacks following the election period was significantly higher than 
the baseline.  The installation of the Transitional Government following these elections
greatly reduced violence, as the level of attacks was seven fewer than the week before.  
However, there were no long-term effects for the governmental transition.  The Sunni 
withdrawal was associated with an immediate short term reduction in attacks, although 
only in the week it was announced.  The second election period was associated with an 
overall three month reduction in the number of attacks, while the Shia Shrine bombing 
increased attacks by the largest margin, nearly 17 in the week following the bombing.
Hypothesis testing results for province-wide violence
Hypothesis 1A posits that events that increase the legitimacy of controlling 
groups and reduce inter-group tension will decrease violence in Diyala.  The following 
table shows the ARIMA results for province-wide violence that was specifically expected 
to reduce violence.
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Table Six: Hypothesis results for province-wide violence reduction
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture -.82* -1.17 -
IIG installed 3.95** - -
Trans Gov installed -7.42** - -
Second election period - - -3.27**
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
In line with this hypothesis, the capture of Saddam Hussein reduced attacks in the 
week of his capture, and in the following month, but only by a small amount.  Counter to 
my hypothesis, the installation of the Interim Iraqi government increased attacks by 
nearly four per week during the week of the change, but there were no long term effects 
associated with this event for all targets.  The second election period was not associated 
with an immediate change in attacks, although over the three months following the 
elections there was an average decrease of 3.27 attacks per week.  These results provide 
mixed, but generally positive support for the conflict theory proposition that increased 
legitimacy and decreased group tension will reduce attacks.  In the case of the installation 
of the Interim Iraqi government, the increase in attacks might be explained by the fact 
that this was an unelected and therefore less legitimate government that was essentially 
put into power by the coalition forces.
Hypothesis 1B posits that events that decrease the legitimacy of controlling groups and 
increase inter-group tension will increase violence in Diyala.  The following table shows 
the province-wide results for events that were expected to increase violence.
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Table Seven: Hypothesis results for province-wide violence increases
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Abu Ghraib -1.66* - -
Election Period One - - 5.61**
Sunni Withdrawal -3.88** - -
Shrine Bombing 17.2** - 5.5**
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
Counter to my hypothesis, the Abu Ghraib scandal reduced attacks in the week it 
became public.  In line with my hypothesis, the first election period was associated with 
an increase in violence, but only over the three month period following the start of the 
election, and not immediately during the election period itself.  Also counter to my 
hypothesis, the Sunni withdrawal from the Constitutional committee was seen to reduce 
violence by nearly four attacks per week during the week of the withdrawal, with no long 
term effects.  Finally, the strongest effect found in this research, the bombing of the Shia 
shrine, resulted in a massive increase of 17 attacks in the week of the bombing, as well as 
a 3 month average increase of 5.5 attacks per week.  These findings provide weak 
support, aside from the shrine bombing, for my hypothesis that increased tension and 
decreased legitimacy will be associated with an increase in violence. 
Results for Law Enforcement Targets
Results for the ARIMA models focused solely on law enforcement targets are 
presented below in Table Twenty One.
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Table Eight: ARIMA Results for Law Enforcement Targets
Event Model Expected 
direction 
of change
1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture (0,0,0) Reduce -.19 (.28) -.28 (.08) -.33 (.17)
Abu Ghraib (0,0,0) No 
change
-.53 (.24) .26 (.69) -.05 (.92)
IIG installed (0,0,1) Reduce 2.14** 1.69 (.10) .01 (.98)
Election One (0,1,1) Increase -2.17 (.14) 2.31 (.32) 1.67**
Trans Govt installed (0,1,1) Reduce -3.02** -1.28* -.81*
Sunni withdrawal (0,1,1) Increase -2.81** -.78 (.22) -.67 (.21)
Election Two (0,1,1) Reduce -.45 (.63) -.64 (.49) -1.19 (.67)
Shrine bombing (0,1,1) Increase -1.17 (.34) .14 (.89) 1.28 (.13)
*  = p<.05, ** = p<.01
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Analysis of Law Enforcement Targeting
Attacks against law enforcement targets were only affected by three of the eight 
interventions.  The transfer to the Iraqi Interim Government increased attacks against law 
enforcement targets during the week of the transfer.  This effect is questionable however, 
as the Iraqi police force really only came into being once the Iraqi government was 
constituted.  The size and visibility of the Iraqi police force has been growing over time, 
and as it grew its accessibility as a target should have increased as well, accounting for 
this effect.   This steady increase in the attacks against law enforcement targets can be 
clearly seen in the timeline listed in Chart Eight.
The first election period had no immediate effect on violence against law 
enforcement targets, but does appear to be associated with a long-term increase in 
violence directed against law enforcement targets.  This long term effect is probably a 
function of the previously mentioned gradual development of the Iraqi police forces.  
Contrary to this rising trend, the second governmental transfer after the elections reduced 
attacks over the short-term and also over the long term, although to a lesser extent.  Also 
contrary to the overall rising trend, the Sunni withdrawal from the government had a 
short term negative effect on attacks against this sector as well.  These findings also fit 
visually with the overall trends in law enforcement attacks series.
Hypothesis testing results for law enforcement targets
Hypothesis 2A posits that increase the legitimacy of the government or of the 
police will decrease attacks against law enforcement targets.  These events include the 
capture of Saddam Hussein (event one), the installation of the Iraqi Interim Government 
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(event three), the installation of the Iraqi Transitional Government (event five) and the 
second election period (event seven).  Table Eight below presents the ARIMA 
coefficients for these models.  
Table Nine: ARIMA results for Law Enforcement Targets
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture - - -
IIG installed 2.14** - -
Trans Gov installed -3.02** -1.28* -.81*
Second election period - - -
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
The capture of Saddam Hussein had no effect on levels of violence against law 
enforcement targets.  Contrary to my hypothesis, the installation of the Interim Iraqi 
government increased attacks against law enforcement targets during the week the new 
government was installed.  In line with my hypothesis, the installation of the Iraqi 
Transitional government reduced attacks the week of the transition, as well as in the 
month and three-months following.  This event was also associated with a permanent 
reduction in the levels of violence.  Contrary to my hypothesis, the second election period 
had no effect on violence against law enforcement targets.  I discuss this in greater length 
in the next chapter, but my initial belief is that due to the moratorium on violence that 
many of the formerly violent groups imposed for the second election period, violence 
against this target sector could reasonably be seen as falling.
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Hypothesis 2B posits that events that decrease the legitimacy of the government 
or of the police will increase attacks against law enforcement targets.  The events that 
should have decreased the legitimacy of the government/police should have been 
Election One (event four), where the police were guarding the polling places and the 
Sunni withdrawal (event six).  I present the ARIMA results for this event in Table Ten
below.
Table Ten: Hypothesis results for province-wide violence reduction
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Election One - - 1.67**
Sunni withdrawal -2.81** - -
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
Election One was associated with a three month increase in violence against law 
enforcement targets, but no immediate or shorter-term effects.  The Sunni withdrawal 
was associated with a one-week reduction in attacks against law enforcement targets, 
contrary to what my hypothesis predicted.  There were no other lasting effects for this 
event however.  The following timeline illustrates the trends in weekly violence and 
where the five events related to law enforcement hypotheses fell.
Results for Violence against Military Targets
Table Eleven: ARIMA Results for Military Targets
Event Model Expected 
direction 
of change
1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture (0,0,0) Reduce -.02 (.55) -.06 (.35) -.05 (.60)
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Abu Ghraib (0,0,0) Increase -.07 (.15) -.16 (.11) -.22 (.64)
IIG installed (0,0,0) None -.16 (.32) -.26 (.09) -.06 (.67)
Election One (0,0,0) Increase 1.54** .56 (.49) .72*
Trans Govt installed (0,1,1) None -.30 (.40) .51 (.38) .87*
Sunni withdrawal (0,1,1) None -.45 (.61) 1.37* 1.10 (.08)
Election Two (0,1,1) None -1.34** .92* -.08 (.78)
Shrine bombing (0,1,1) None 2.78** .14 (.89) -.32 (.34)
*  = p<.05, ** = p<.01
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Analysis of Violence against Military Targets
My research found that attacks against military targets were increased during the 
first election period, and reduced during the second.  This makes sense, as the first 
election was seen as invalid by the Sunnis, while the second featured more widespread 
participation and a moratorium on violence by many groups.  Coalition forces would 
have been guarding the election sites, and therefore been caught up in violence targeted at 
the polls.  The first election period, and the installation of the new transitional Iraqi
Government were both associated with 3 month average increases in violence against the 
coalition forces.   The Shia shrine bombing was associated with an immediate increase in 
violence, as well as a more gradual long-term effect.  This effect was not expected, as the 
targeting of a religious site should not have provoked retaliation against the coalition.  
What does not appear to be captured by the model is the decline in violence against the 
coalition around the time of the Sunni withdrawal.  Visual inspection of the monthly 
trends reveals this pattern clearly, although what accounts for it is not clear from this 
research. 
Hypothesis testing for military targets
Hypothesis 3A posits that events that increase the legitimacy of the coalition 
forces will decrease attacks against military targets.  The main event that should have 
increased the legitimacy of the coalition was the capture of Saddam Hussein (event one).  
This event was not associated with a significant change in any direction for attacks 
against military targets. 
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Hypothesis 3B posits that events that decrease the legitimacy of the coalition 
forces will increase attacks against military targets.  The main events that should have 
decreased the legitimacy of the coalition were the Abu Ghraib (event two) scandal and 
election one (event four).  The election period would not have directly reduced the 
legitimacy of the coalition, but the military forces were guarding the election sites and 
could have been targeted by groups seeking to alter the current political situation and 
prevent the elections from occurring through the use of violence.
Table Twelve: Hypothesis results for military violence
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Abu Ghraib - - -
Election One 1.54** - .72*
Abu Ghraib had no effect on violence targeted against the coalition, which is 
counter to what my model predicted.  The first election period, where the coalition forces 
were guarding the polling places, was associated with a short term increase in violence 
and three month average increase as well.  This finding supports my conflict-based 
hypothesis.
Results for Government Targets
The following table lists the model specification results and the ARIMA model 
results for attacks directed against government targets.
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Table Thirteen: ARIMA Results for Government Targets
Event Model Expected 
direction 
of effect
1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture (0,0,1) Reduce -.14 (.26) -.21 (.17) -.27 (.07)
Abu Ghraib (0,0,1) None -.39 (.07) .33 (.54) -.19 (.54)
IIG installed (0,0,1) Reduce 1.82** .41 (.63) -.33 (.40)
Election One (0,1,1) Increase -1.91** -.31 (.83) 1.15**
Trans Govt installed (0,1,1) Reduce -2.57** -1.24* -.14 (.30)
Sunni withdrawal (0,1,1) Increase -.13 (.89) .52 (.75) 1.13 (.55)
Election Two (0,1,1) Reduce -1.02 (.31) -1.31 (.12) -1.15 (.29)
Shrine bombing (0,1,1) Increase 1.22* -1.38** -.55 (.48)
*  = p<.05, ** = p<.0
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Analysis of Violence against Government Targets
For attacks against government targets, four events were associated with changes 
in the levels of violence.  The first government transfer increased attacks against the 
government sector immediately following the transfer, an effect that fits with my 
hypotheses that a less legitimate government would inspire violence against it.  The first 
election had a short-term reductive effect on violence against this sector, but appears to 
have increased violence over the long-term.  Figure Sixteen shows the overall trend in 
violence over the period measured by this data, and this long-term increase may be a 
function, similar to the case for law enforcement targets, of the increased availability of 
government targets.  Contrary to this perspective though, the installation of the new Iraqi 
government following the election period was associated with a decrease in violence both 
in the week and the month following the election.  The second election period had a long 
term reductive effect on the violence, but this effect didn’t show up until after the third 
month following the elections.  Finally, the bombing of the Shia shrine increased attacks 
in the short-term against this sector, but was associated with a decline in attacks during 
that month, a finding that is difficult to clearly interpret.
Hypothesis testing for government targets
Hypothesis 4A posits that events that increase the legitimacy of the government 
will decrease attacks against government targets.  Events that were expected to increase 
the legitimacy of the Iraqi government included Hussein’s capture (event one), the 
transfer of the government to the Interim Iraqi Government (event three), the installation 
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of the Transitional Government (event five) and election two (event seven).  The results 
are presented below in Table Fourteen below.
Table Fourteen: hypothesis results for government violence reduction
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture - - -
Interim Govt installed 1.82** - -
Trans Govt installed -2.57** -1.24* -
Second election - - -
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01
The capture of Saddam Hussein had no impact on levels of violence against 
government targets.  The transfer of the government to the Interim Iraqi Government 
increased attacks against government targets in the week of the transfer, contrary to my 
predictions.  There were no longer term effects of this transition though.  In line with my 
predictions, the installation of the Transitional Government decreased attacks both in the 
week of and in the month following its installation.  The second election period saw no 
significant changes in the levels of violence against government targets immediately 
following the election, although a six-month and permanent reduction in violence appears 
to follow this transition.
Hypothesis 4B posits that events that decrease the legitimacy of the government 
will increase attacks against government targets.  These events included the Abu Ghraib 
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scandal (event two), Election One (event four) and the Sunni withdrawal (event six).  
Table Fifteen below presents the results of these tests.
Table Fifteen: Hypothesis results for government violence increase
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Abu Ghraib - - -
Election One -1.91** - 1.15**
Sunni Withdrawal - - -
Only the first election period was associated with a change in violence against 
government targets, and this effect was in the opposite direction predicted by my model.  
Attacks against government targets fell by nearly 2 attacks during the week the elections 
were initiated.  There was a three-month average increase associated with the election 
period, although not a one-month change, which is unexpected given that the elections 
lasted for one month and any effect they may have had should have lasted for the 
duration of that period.
Results for violence against civilian targets
Table Sixteen: ARIMA Results for Civilian Targets
Event Model Expected 
direction 
of effect
1 week 1 month 3 months
Saddam’s capture (0,0,0) None -.29 (.47) -1.00 (.08) -.67 (.12)
Abu Ghraib (0,0,0) None -1.61** -.04 (.89) .08 (.83)
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IIG installed (0,0,0) None -.15 (.65) .45 (.07) .36 (.15)
Election One (0,0,0) Increase .80** -.37 (.61) .44 (.35)
Trans Govt installed (0,0,0) Reduce -1.61** 1.07 (.36) .49 (.67)
Sunni withdrawal (3,1,0) Increase -.39 (.51) -.02 (.94) .39 (.22)
Election Two (3,1,0) Reduce 1.47 (.72) -3.23 (.27) -3.5 (.30)
Shrine bombing (3,1,0) Increase 2.44** 1.50* 2.80 (.42)
* = p<.05, ** = P<.01
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Analysis of violence against civilian targets
Attacks against civilian targets were reduced following the Abu Ghraib scandal, 
although the relative scarcity of attacks during this time period suggests caution be used 
in interpreting these results.  Attacks against civilian targets saw a small increase during 
the first week of the election period, but were then reduced when the Iraqi Transitional 
Government was installed.  As expected, the Shia Shrine bombing was associated with a 
large short-term and moderate long-term increase in attacks against this target sector.  
Attacks against this sector increase over the time period studied, and it is unclear whether 
the events measured in this research fully capture this rising trend.  Clearly there was an 
increase in sectarian hostility and the targeting of civilians over the time period in 
question.
Hypothesis testing for civilian targets
Hypothesis 5A posits that events that increase tension between groups will 
increase attacks against civilian targets.  These events included election one (event four), 
the Sunni withdrawal (event six) and the Shia Shrine bombing (event eight).  These 
results are presented below in Table Seventeen.
Table Seventeen: Civilian Targets
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Election One .80** - -
Sunni Withdrawal - - -
Shrine bombing 2.44** 1.50* -
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* = p<.05, ** = P<.01
The first election period increased attacks against civilian targets during the first 
week of the elections.  This occurred in line with my predictions, however no longer term 
effects were seen, which is unexpected as the election period lasted for a month.  The 
Sunni withdrawal was associated with a permanent increase in the average level of 
attacks against civilians, but not a short-term increase.  The Shia shrine bombing was 
associated with an increase in attacks during the week of the bombing as well as a smaller 
average increase in the month after, suggesting that the event caused a spike in violence 
that gradually trailed off.  This event was also associated with a permanent increase in the 
average number of attacks against civilian targets.
Hypothesis 5B posits that events that decrease tension between groups will 
decrease attacks against civilian targets.  These events included the installation of the 
Iraqi transitional government (event five) and the second election period (event seven).  
These results are presented below in Table Eighteen.
Table Eighteen: Civilian Targets
Event 1 week 1 month 3 months
Trans Govt installed -1.61** - -
Second election period - - -
* = p<.05, ** = P<.01
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The second election period was not associated with a change in the level of 
attacks against civilian targets.  In line with my hypotheses, the installation of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government was associated with a reduction in attacks against civilians.
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Chapter 5: Summary and Discussion
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the results from the preceding chapter, a 
discussion of the methodological and theoretical concerns raised by this research and an 
assessment of the value of conflict theory in predicting violence in Diyala.  This chapter 
begins with a summary and comparison of the different target sectors and an analysis of 
the effectiveness of conflict theory in predicting violence, including a summary of the 
support for my hypotheses.  Next I include a review of the specific effects that each event 
had on political violence in Diyala.  This chapter concludes with a review of the 
methodological and theoretical concerns, directions for future research and policy 
recommendations that this work has brought to light, as well as a concluding statement 
summarizing this research.
Summary of violence against specific target sectors
To further summarize the results by target sector, Table Eighteen presents the 
concurrence between the expected effects based on the model developed in this research 
and the actual effects as found in the ARIMA analysis.  It is useful to summarize these 
results by sector in order to compare the efficacy of my conflict model in explaining 
different sectors.  The concurrence score is the fraction of results that concurred with my 
expected effects, including not finding an effect when one was not predicted.  A result 
that matched the expected effect during any of the three time periods analyzed would 
show concurrence.
105
Table Nineteen: Concurrence between expected and actual effects by target sector
Target Sector Concurrence between expected and observed effects
All Targets 3/8 = 37.5%
Law Enforcement 4/8  = 50%
Military 4/8  = 50%
Government 2/8  = 25%
Civilian 5/8  = 63%
My model appears to predict changes in violence reasonably well against civilian 
targets, moderately well for military and law enforcement targets, and poorly for 
government and province-wide targets.  My predictions were especially poor in 
predicting violence against government targets, where only two of the eight events had 
expected effect.  Conflict theory is essentially a theory about how different groups 
interact, partially explaining why the explanatory power of the theory appears to be 
higher when focused on civilian targeting, although there is no clear reason why my 
application of the theory to other sectors should have less predictive power.  The fact that 
the model was successful in explaining trends in the targeting of civilians provides 
support for the continued use of conflict theory in understanding political violence and 
civil conflicts.
These concurrence scores provide mixed support for the idea that legitimacy 
changing events are a major driver of trends in political violence.  In only four cases 
where I predicted an increase in violence did one actually occur, and in only four cases 
where I predicted a reduction in violence did one occur.  There were 40 potential effects 
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tested within these data (5 sectors x 8 events), and my hypothesized results fit the actual 
findings for less than half of the cases.  There are a number of reasons why this might be 
the case, both methodological and theoretical and these are discussed following this 
section.  The next section summarizes the results by hypothesis in order to fully explicate 
the support for conflict theory that this research provides.
Summary of results by hypothesis
Table Twenty summarizes the full set of results by hypothesis.  Within the table, 
the concurrence column indicates whether I correctly estimated the effect of the 
intervention within any of the three time periods analyzed, showing concurrence between 
my hypotheses and my findings from the data.  I include an indicator to state when the 
actual results were in the opposite direction of my predictions.  Concurrence indicates 
that the data provides support for my model.
Table Twenty: Comparison of expected and actual effects by hypothesis




Saddam’s capture Decrease Decrease Yes
IIG installed Decrease Increase No (opposite)
Trans Gov installed Decrease Decrease Yes
Second election period Decrease No effect No
Hypothesis 1B
Abu Ghraib Increase Decrease No
Election Period One Increase No effect No
Sunni Withdrawal Increase Decrease No
Shrine Bombing Increase Increase Yes
Hypothesis 2A
Saddam’s capture Decrease No effect No
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IIG installed Decrease Increase No (opposite)
Transitional Govt Decrease Decrease Yes
Election Two Decrease No effect No
Hypothesis 2B
Election One Increase Increase Yes
Sunni withdrawal Increase Decrease No (opposite)
Hypothesis 3A
Saddam’s capture Decrease No effect No
Hypothesis 3B
Abu Ghraib Increase No effect No
Election One Increase Increase Yes
Hypothesis 4A
Saddam’s capture Decrease No effect No
IIG installed Decrease Increase No (opposite)
Transitional Govt Decrease Decrease Yes
Election Two Decrease No effect No
Hypothesis 4B
Abu Ghraib Increase No effect No
Election One Increase Increase Yes
Sunni withdrawal Increase No effect No
Hypothesis 5A
Election One Increase Increase Yes
Sunni withdrawal Increase No effect No
Shrine bombing Increase Increase Yes
Hypothesis 5B
Transitional Govt Decrease Decrease Yes
Election Two Decrease No effect No
In only ten of the twenty nine predicted effects was my model accurate in 
predicting the effect that the intervention would have on the trends in violence.  For no 
one hypothesis test was I correct in predicting all of the effects of each event, but I was 
also never completely wrong for tests where there was more than one event.  In only four 
cases did I observe a finding in the opposite direction of that predicted by my hypothesis.  
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Taken as a whole, this is difficult to interpret and suggests that my model is relatively 
ineffective at explaining the targeting of violence in Iraq.  As a whole, the results provide 
weak support for the conflict model, but as described in the prior section, the conflict 
model is better at predicting violence against civilian targets and less effective for other 
sectors.  The next section describes the specific effects of each event, summarized for 
each of the sectors.
It is important to note that the findings from Table Nineteen and Twenty do not 
match up directly.  Table Twenty shows the hypotheses where I expected to measure a 
change while Table Nineteen includes null findings in the expected effects.  Put more 
simply, when testing my hypotheses I was only concerned with events that changed 
levels of violence.  When measuring the effects by target sector, when I expected a null 
finding, and found no effect, I recorded that as concurrence.  
Discussion of the effects of each event on trends in political violence
This section explores the specific effects that each event had on trends in violence 
in Diyala.  Although not directly linked to the testing of my conflict-theory hypotheses, 
this approach is useful as it summarizes what was learned from this research about each 
event, which could be extrapolated to similar events in the future.
Event One, the capture of Saddam Hussein, was not associated with a significant 
change in the frequency of attacks for any target sector aside from a small but significant 
decrease for province-wide attacks.  This goes against my initial idea that Hussein's 
capture would increase the legitimacy of the Coalition forces, which should have directly 
reduced attacks against them.  I believe that no effect was observed because the capture 
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occurred relatively early in the dataset, during a period when attacks were still relatively 
infrequent and there were not enough pre-intervention or post-intervention attacks for 
ARIMA to reliably detect an effect, if there actually was one.  A simple visual check at 
the pre-event and post-event levels of violence by week and by month for this event 
confirms that there were very few attacks in Diyala during this time.
Event Two, the Abu Ghraib scandal, also occurred relatively early in the dataset, 
potentially confounding my ability to properly identify an effect if there was one.  I 
predicted that this event would increase attacks against military targets, which it did not 
appear to do.  There was a significant (p<. 01) one-week reduction in attacks associated 
with this event for civilian targets as well as a small reduction seen for province-wide 
attacks.  Attacks against this target sector were reduced by 1.6 attacks for the week 
following this event.  However, attacks had been down for the two weeks before the 
event, and I believe that, similar to Event One, the relative sparseness of attacks in the 
data at that time, particularly in this target sector suggest that this finding should be 
ignored.  
These findings do not fit visually what appears to be occurring in the data.  In the 
dataset, in the week following the Abu Ghraib scandal there was a noticeable increase in 
violence.  Attacks against law enforcement targets rose by 3, against government targets 
by 2 and against religious/civilian targets by 1 from the pre-intervention levels.  The 
ARIMA analysis did not detect this one-week lagged increase in violence.  This lack of 
concurrence between the ARIMA findings and the actual short-term trends in the data is a 
result of the nature of the ARIMA process.  The ARIMA process estimates the 
underlying model, that when combined with a series of random shocks (white noise), 
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produces the observed series reflected within the data.  When inadequate data are used, in 
this case from having too few pre-intervention cases, the model produced may be 
unreliable.
Event Three, the transfer of Iraq from direct Coalition control to the Interim Iraqi 
Government, was the first event for which there was enough pre-intervention data to be 
able to have confidence in the findings.  Instead of reducing violence, this transition was 
associated with a distinct increase.  The transfer of the government increased attacks by 
over 2 per week against law enforcement targets, as well as by nearly four per week 
against province-wide targets.  The data show that attacks against law enforcement 
targets remained elevated for a period of three weeks.  This event was also associated 
with a 1.8 attack per week increase against government targets.  I had hypothesized that 
this event should increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and its police forces as 
it reduced the control by of the Coalition, but it may have merely put into a place a 
Coalition-selected government, exacerbating the conflict already in existence there.  
These findings run counter to my hypotheses, and I will offer an alternate interpretation 
after the results from the other events have been discussed.
Event Four, the first election period for the new Iraqi government, saw a 1.5 
attack per week increase against military targets for the week following the beginning of 
the election period.  Civilian targets experienced a one week increase in attacks as well.  
Government targets experienced a one week reduction in attacks, but the 3-month 
average period was associated with an average increase in attacks following this event.  A 
3 month average increase was seen for province-wide violence as well.  All of these 
results, when taken as a whole, present a clear picture of the relationship between the 
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election period and the associated attacks that was predicted by my legitimacy model.  
Elections are essentially a political reshuffling of the cards and groups that want to 
prevent the elections or alter the results in some way may engage in violence in an 
attempt to terrorize the civilian population.  This is directly supported by my finding of 
increased attacks against civilians, as well as against military and law enforcement forces 
that were guarding the election sites.  As stated, the Sunni largely boycotted this election, 
and the resulting violence supports my hypotheses here.
Event Five, the installation of the democratically elected Iraqi Transitional 
government, ought to have reduced attacks against the various target sectors, and it did.  
Attacks against province-wide targets fell by 7.5 during the week of the transition.  
Attacks against law enforcement targets fell by 3 per week and this event was associated 
with a one month and three month reduction in attacks.  Attacks against government 
targets declined by 2.5 for the week following the election, and the installation of the 
government were associated with both a one month and three month reduction in attacks 
against this sector.   There should be no effect on military targets following this 
transition, as the transfer did not directly alter the legitimacy or standing of the coalition 
forces and there was no change in levels of violence immediately following the transfer.  
This event reduced attacks against civilian targets for the week following the transition 
by 1.6 attacks.  All of these findings squarely fit my hypotheses.  
Event Six, the Sunni withdrawal from the government and constitutional 
processes was predicted to increase violence.  Counter to my predictions, this event was 
associated with a decrease in attacks for province-wide violence as well as a specific 
reduction against law enforcement targets, although only for one week, and was not 
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significantly related to any other immediate changes in attacks.  There was an increase in 
attacks against military targets in the month after the event.  One week after the week of 
the Sunni withdrawal there was a major jump in attacks against religious/civilian targets 
that is also not immediately apparent due to its lagged nature in my ARIMA results.  This 
lagged increase squarely fits my hypotheses, as the Sunni withdrawal would have 
dramatically increased sectarian tensions.
Event Seven, the second election period, saw an increase in attacks against 
civilian targets immediately after the event.  This increase was of more than 2.2 attacks 
according to the ARIMA model, and attacks remained elevated for four weeks, the entire 
duration of the election period.   This is counter to what I expected would occur, as this 
election saw a large Sunni turnout and a supposed moratorium on violence.  This 
moratorium wouldn't have kept foreign insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda from 
launching attacks though, and this may account for these findings.  This event was also 
associated with a decrease in attacks against military targets for the first week of the 
event, perhaps capturing the expected effect of the moratorium, although attacks rose 
slightly thereafter.
Finally, Event Eight, the bombing of the Shia Mosque of the Golden Dome was 
associated with an increase in province-wide attacks, as well as for the specific 
government, military and civilian target sectors.  Attacks against government targets 
increased in the first week after the bombing but then decreased in the month after.  
Attacks against civilian targets increased in the month following this attack.  Military 
targets were subjected to an increased level of attacks during this week although this 
effect was short-lived.  As predicted by my model, this event appears to have 
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dramatically increased sectarian tension, resulting in the elevated level of attacks against 
civilians as well as attacks against the government and Coalition forces.
To summarize the mixed support for my hypotheses that these results show, as 
organized by event, the following table compares the expected effect from the conflict 
theory model with the actual effects of each event, along with a statement about the 
concurrence between the expected and the actual effects.
Table Twenty One: Comparison of expected and actual effects by event
Event Expected effect Actual effect Concurrence
1 (Hussein captured) All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  decrease
Govt       decrease
Civilian   none
All          decrease
Police     none
Military  none
Govt       none
Civilian  none
All          yes
Police     no
Military  no
Govt       no
Civilian  yes
2 (Abu Ghraib) All          increase
Police     none
Military  increase
Govt       none
Civilian  none
All          decrease
Police     none
Military  none
Govt       decrease
Civilian  decrease
All          no
(opposite)
Police     yes
Military  no
Govt       no
Civilian  no
3 (Govt Transition One) All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  none
Govt       decrease
Civilian  none
All          increase
Police     increase
Military  none
Govt       increase
Civilian  none
All          no
(opposite)
Police     no
(opposite)
Military  yes
Govt       no
Civilian  yes
4 (Election One) All          increase
Police     increase
Military  increase
Govt       increase
Civilian  increase
All          none
Police     increase
Military  increase
Govt       decrease
Civilian  increase
All          no
Police     yes
Military  yes
Govt       yes
Civilian  yes
5 (Govt Transition Two) All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  none
Govt       decrease
Civilian  decrease
All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  none
Govt       decrease
Civilian  decrease
All          yes
Police     yes
Military  yes
Govt       yes
Civilian  yes
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6 (Sunni Withdrawal) All          increase
Police     increase
Military  none
Govt       increase
Civilian  increase
All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  none
Govt       none
Civilian  none
All          no
(opposite)
Police     no
(opposite)
Military  yes
Govt       no
Civilian  no
7 (Election Two) All          decrease
Police     decrease
Military  none
Govt       decrease
Civilian  decrease
All          none
Police     none
Military  decrease
Govt       none
Civilian  increase
All          no
Police     no
Military  no
Govt       no
Civilian  no
8 (Shrine bombing) All          increase
Police     increase
Military  none
Govt       increase
Civilian  increase
All          increase
Police     none
Military  increase
Govt       increase
Civilian  increase
All          yes
Police     no
Military  no
Govt       yes
Civilian  yes
This table illustrates that my model was very effective in predicting the violence 
that occurred after the first election, the second governmental transition and the bombing 
of the Shia Mosque of the Golden Dome.  In only five cases did I find an effect in the 
opposite direction compared to what my model predicted.  Three of these opposite 
findings occurred for my province-wide predictions, which may suggest that including 
every sector in a common model may gloss over the intricacies of conflict theory, 
resulting in faulty predictions.  The model produced only mixed results for the other 
events analyzed.  While there was no specific reason why the model should have been 
particularly effective for these events and not others, these findings do provide general 
support for conflict theory.
As stated earlier, the interactions where my model predicted that no to change in 
trends in violence should occur can serve as a quasi-comparison group.  There were ten 
interactions where no changes were expected to be observed, and in six of these cases no 
change in violence during any of the measured time periods was observed.  This finding 
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supports in the conflict perspective predictions in that in sixty percent of the places where 
I did not expect to find any effect from an event, none occurred.
Another interesting finding is that while both elections increased violence against 
civilian targets, the installation of both governments either had no effect on violence 
against this sector or reduced it.  This appears to fit a group-competition model, as 
elections encourage competition, but once the results of the elections are decided and the 
new parties inaugurated, attacks against civilians decline as they would serve little 
purpose in changing political outcomes from that point forward. 
Additionally, the first government transition in which the Coalition Provisional 
Authority selected the Iraqis who would be governing their country, resulted in increased 
attacks against the new government and law enforcement targets, suggesting that the new 
government had little legitimacy.  The second government installed during this time 
period was chosen by the Iraqi people, although the Sunni’s boycotted the election in 
mass, but this government’s inauguration was associated with a decrease in attacks 
against government and law enforcement targets, suggesting increased legitimacy as a 
result of the electoral process.
One conclusion that can be drawn from this research is related to the evolution of 
post-invasion Iraq.  Processes that move a nation toward a more stable and democratic 
society, i.e. elections and the installation of new governments, tend to be associated with 
increases in short-term violence as opposition groups contest the political and social 
changes that these events herald.  For a nation, such as Iraq in this case, to move toward 
long-term political and social stability, it appears necessary to undergo a period of 
growing pains in which violence and disorder are elevated.
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Methodological concerns
Interrupted time-series designs provide a fairly effective quasi-experimental test 
of whether an event or intervention affects subsequent observations within a longitudinal 
series of events.  This methodology is not without its weaknesses however, and this 
section will discuss some of the threats to the internal validity of this research.  
The ARIMA methodology is also less than ideal for the dataset and questions 
involved.  ARIMA analyses require a pre-intervention period of sufficient length in order 
to get stable estimates of the parameters (Biglan, Ary & Wagenaar 2000).  There are 
statistical techniques for performing time-series analyses on short series, but given the 
sparseness of the data and the number of weeks in which there were no attacks, these 
techniques are inappropriate for measuring the effects of early interventions.  The levels 
of violence are so low for these early interventions that a simple visual inspection of the 
data is about the only option for determining whether there were any related effects 
occurring.  As a result, I did not give these first two events much weight in the discussion 
of my findings.  Additionally, the extreme variability week to week for many target 
sectors calls into question the ability of any statistical process to correctly estimate the 
true effects that the eight intervention variables had upon political violence in Diyala.  
One of the main threats to this research comes from ‘history’, in that other events 
occurring at roughly the same time as the selected interventions may be responsible for 
the observed changes in the dependent variable (Chamlin & Cochran 1998; White, 
Goldkamp & Campbell 2005).  History is essentially an omitted variable problem, where 
the observed effect or outcome is a result of an untested variable and not of the 
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independent variable in question.  In this research I attempted to control for the effects of 
other events in temporal proximity to my events by choosing the largest and most 
prominent events.  The impact of these major events should dwarf the effects of smaller 
contemporaneous events, although this is an imperfect control strategy and results should 
be interpreted with caution.  
An additional shortcoming of this research is that it focused on only one location, 
the province of Diyala.  The original research question that prompted the creation of the 
province-specific database was focused solely on Diyala, and therefore this shortcoming 
is not directly relevant, although it does suggest a direction for future research.  A 
comparison across provinces within Iraq would yield interesting information that this 
study does not attempt to address.  Another related shortcoming is that while the events 
chosen should have had effects felt across Iraq, local Diyala-specific events may have 
had effects on the level of violence that were unmeasured and therefore combined in with 
our results.
As mentioned repeatedly, the data used in this research were the best available 
data, but were also less than optimal.  Their accuracy and reliability are unknown, despite 
the fact that they were verified against the MIPT dataset for the same time period.  With 
few other databases with which to corroborate the data, I was forced to assume that the 
data are both a reliable and valid representation of the actual violence occurring in 
Diyala.  Even the relatively obvious finding that the data trends upward over time, 
showing an increase in violence, may be a data collection artifact.  The coalition forces 
were not expecting the violence that continued long after the war was declared over and 
the reporting of the violence would have been less systematic earlier in the time-series, as 
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there was less attention being paid to it.  Fewer media resources would have been directly 
focused on systematically reporting on these attacks.  This may not have been the case 
with MIPT’s recording of the violence though, as they were an independent source.  
People tend to find what they are looking for, and the more emphasis put on tracking the 
violence in Iraq, the more comprehensive the tracking would have become, with part of 
the increase in the recorded violence due to increased scrutiny.  Violence did fall for 
attacks on military targets in the latter half of the time period measured, suggesting that 
this potentially confounding factor may be of less importance.
Related to the prior point, the validity of the data used is also subject to debate.  
Whether criminal events were captured by the database is unknown, and what types of 
reporting bias might be present are also unknown.  The rigor with which the data were 
collected lead me to believe that this is not a problem however the original reporting of 
events in Iraq, given the country's changing and unsettled nature, may have been more 
problematic.  The accuracy and thoroughness of the primary reporting of events in Iraq 
may be less than optimal. 
Target substitution
Another potential confounding factor that this research can not account for is
target substitution effects.  I assume that there are no changes in the availability of targets 
within each of the four sectors over the time-period being studied, although this 
assumption is weaker for the Iraqi government and police, who would have seen their 
numbers increase as time went on and the country’s government became more stable and 
functional.  Targets may change in their vulnerability, military bases or convoys may 
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become more secure, law enforcement patrols or training centers may become more 
dispersed.  This factor was mentioned earlier in the discussion of the targeting of law 
enforcement targets; as time passed and the new Iraqi law enforcement forces were 
recruited and trained there would have been more, and more accessible, law enforcement 
targets.  This research posits that the main factor driving an attack against a sector would 
be its reduced legitimacy, or the presence of strong inter-group rivalry, and this does not 
take into account changes in the vulnerability of targets over time.  An insurgent group 
that seeks to challenge both the coalition and the Iraqi government and police forces may 
shift their attacks away from more heavily armed coalition targets in favor of the less 
well-trained law enforcement arm of the new government. 
Theoretical concerns
Legitimacy is an elusive concept grounded in a subjective assessment of the 
fairness of and popular support for an authority.  Legitimacy is not overly complex, and I 
have no reason to believe that the direction of my hypothesized effects is incorrect.  Even 
still, I recognize that I use a relatively crude assessment in that I utilize no direct test of 
legitimacy in this research, and instead rely upon secondary sources and my judgment to 
discern the legitimacy-changing effects of each intervention.  There are few polls of 
legitimacy in Iraq, and none that directly capture respondents in Diyala (PIPI 2006).  The
PIPA polls do focus on the perceived legitimacy of the government and the coalition, but 
their pan-Iraq focus makes them inappropriate for this research.  While Diyala should not 
be substantially different than other provinces or the nation as a whole, Diyala is unique 
given the much higher percentage of Sunnis, increasing the importance of sectarian 
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harmony to the reduction of violence.  There are few expert assessments of the situation 
in Iraq, particularly Diyala, that have been made public and the situation there has 
changed significantly since the beginning of the conflict meaning that any legitimacy 
measurement would have to be taken repeatedly.
Another problem with using legitimacy in this model relates to the fact that 
legitimacy concerns affect different groups differently.  An event may increase one 
group’s legitimacy, but reduce it in the eyes of another group or groups, and this 
difference is very difficult to accurately capture.  There are a large number of groups 
involved in the violence in Iraq from a wide range of ethnic and ideological backgrounds.  
Broad-brush attempts to measure legitimacy without a thorough understanding of all of 
the groups involved are likely to be inaccurate.  At best this research is a cross between 
an empirical study and an educated guess about which conditions might affect legitimacy 
in Iraq in what way.  This should not detract from the worth of this research though, as 
the conditions do not permit a more rigorous evaluation of the factors involved.  Ground-
breaking research rarely finds a well-structured pre-existing environment from which to 
conduct complex analyses.  This research does the best it can with the tools and data that 
are available and provides useful conclusions as well as advice to those who might come 
later about the conditions affecting violence in Diyala.
With any theoretical test there is the possibility that some other theory provides a 
better explanation for the changes observed.  In this case, there are few other sociological 
or criminological theories that speak to group violence, social and political reorganization 
and reform and legitimacy.  Sherman’s (1993) defiance theory, although not explicitly 
tied to conflict theory, would make many of the same predictions about violence directed 
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against forces seen to be illegitimate or oppressive.  Theories of rational choice would 
also make many of the same predictions, as groups and individuals would seek to 
maximize their benefits and minimize their risks by only attacking targets when the 
popular support for those targets are low, or the expected payoff from such an attack was 
elevated.  In sum, while this research does not pit one theoretical explanation against 
another, conflict theory appears to be the most general, most appropriate theoretical 
explanation for the observed changes in political violence in Diyala.
Assessing conflict theory
Conflict theory provides a reasonable account of the changing trends in violence 
in Diyala, particularly for attacks against civilian targets.  Ultimately, conflict theory's 
core notion that violence is a function of intergroup conflict is supported by this research.  
Specifically, I found that the installation of democratically elected, and thereby more 
legitimate governments tends to reduce violence while the installation of the government 
selected by the Coalition Provisional Authority increased violence.  Events such as the 
bombing of the Mosque of the Golden Dome and the Sunni withdrawal increased 
intergroup tension between the Sunni and Shia and were linked to increases in violence 
against civilian targets, lending further support to conflict theory.  While the conflict 
theory model was less successful in explaining trends in the violence against government, 
military and law enforcement targets, it was much more successful with civilian targets.  
As the focus of the theory is most directly on the role of civilians and the differences that 
define the various groups, this finding suggests that the model, and the manner in which 
it was applied to the data on political violence in Iraq, are fundamentally sound.
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There were contradictory findings, such as the bombing of the Shia shrine, which 
was associated with increased attacks against military targets.  This connection can not be 
explained by the theoretical perspective developed here, as military targets should not 
have been attacked following what was a strongly religious and civilian-oriented event.  
Despite the analytical strength of the ARIMA model, and the rigor used in developing the 
proper model specifications, the high variance between weeks within the data itself made 
clear effects more difficult to identify.  These contradictory findings do not invalidate the 
conflict model, they only suggest that a more rigorous and better designed and controlled 
study would be better suited to reach reliable conclusiosns about the predictive value of 
the conflict theory perspective.
In this research I also correctly predicted that there would be no effect between a 
target sector and a major event in sixty percent of the cases.  This lends moderate support 
to conflict theory’s ability to not only find effects when there are effects, but also to 
correctly specify sectors that should not have been effected by certain types of events.
One of the strengths of conflict perspectives is that they are very difficult to 
conclusively disprove. As long as there are differentially stratified groups and a scarcity 
of resources there will always be some form of competition for those resources.  Some 
groups will win out over others, and the natural response, regardless of time or place is to 
hoard one’s spoils at the expense of the less fortunate.  Karl Marx (1848) was not the first 
to note that greed and the instinct to protect one’s own group are deeply engrained 
responses.  Absent society-changing revolutions, such as those advocated by Marx, the 
conditions that give rise to competition and ultimately violence, from the conflict 
perspective, are likely to continue.  Conflict-based analyses done on any social problem 
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are likely to find support, given the underlying conflict-theory forces that drive individual 
and group behavior.
Legitimacy is the lynchpin that holds society together despite the inequality and 
intergroup competition that conflict theory suggests should drive it apart.  Groups, even 
those that find themselves stuck with an unfavorable outcome will often accept their lot if 
they perceive the process that got them there to be fair.  Violence can be used to 
challenge a stronger groups claim’s to power, but those who seek the support of the local 
population must use violence in a fashion that supports their own legitimacy, so that their 
future claim to power will not be tarnished.  As this research hints at, it is when 
legitimacy is reduced that violence and disorder begin to spring up around the naturally 
occurring fault-lines of society.
Future Research
To improve upon this research, two things could be done.  First, an extension of 
this research could be conducted on more recent events in Iraq by extending the database 
of violence in Diyala to the present.  Updating the data in this fashion is not easy, as the 
original LLNL database collection efforts closed down in May of 2006.  While other 
sources have been compiling this information9, they lack the rigor and 
comprehensiveness of the LLNL data and the two datasets are not directly comparable.  
Second, a comparable model could be applied to other provinces in Iraq, or to Iraq as a 
whole.  These data have been compiled by other agencies, although again with questions 
about their comprehensiveness and accuracy, and the comparison awaits being done.  
                                                
9  MIPT, the other main source of data used for this research was closed down 
March 2008 due to funding cuts.
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Both of these directions would help determine the effects of political events on the 
targeting of violence in Iraq through the lens of conflict theory.
Outside of Iraq, conflict theory can be subjected to a similar test by applying the 
theoretical model developed in this research to historical data.  The hypotheses tested in 
this research do not apply just to Diyala, or even solely to Iraq.  Similar hypotheses could 
be developed for other nations or regions undergoing similar changes.  Other nations 
have gone through comparable political changes, although there are no modern examples 
of a nation being taken over by a military coalition in order to remove a dictator and 
install a democratically elected government.  Few other nations that have gone through 
such a shift have experienced such a dramatic level of violence, either internally or as a 
result of foreign insurgency.  Nations such as post-war Germany and Japan went through 
incredible political and social changes under the guard of a foreign military, but there was 
little insurgent violence or sectarian strife during these changes, owing to their relative 
homogeneity as well as other cultural and geopolitical factors.  Heterogeneous nations 
such as Bosnia experienced high levels of civil strife during a period of governmental 
change (Wilson 2006), suggesting that ethnic tensions are a key predictor of violence 
during periods of change, although there are always examples to the contrary, further 
complicating the development of strong theory.
Policy Recommendations
A number of policy recommendations can be drawn from this research, both 
specific to the situation in Iraq and generalizable to future situations in which political or 
social upheaval are linked with inter-group violence.  The first recommendation is drawn 
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directly from the fact that this research provides support for the underlying presence of 
conflict theory principles in Iraq.  Whenever a country with differentially stratified 
groups suffers from political upheaval, regardless of the source of the upheaval, it is 
reasonable to expect that there will be as increase in violence as groups jockey for power 
and influence.  The first step to addressing a problem is preparing for its existence, and 
therefore I would recommend that nations and the international community prepare to 
respond to inter-group conflict during international situations similar to what occurred in 
Iraq.
This research does not directly address the best ways with which to soothe
sectarian tensions, but it does offer some advice as to what events to watch for.  Building 
upon this first recommendation, and directly supported by this research, elections are a 
time of political reordering and as seen following the first election, can be a time of 
increased violence against a range of targets.  Special care should be taken to guard 
election sites, and to ensure that the elections are fair so that the government selected 
during the election is seen as legitimate.  From our standpoint in an established Western 
democracy, we might assume that the first election should have brought the Iraqi people 
together, as it theoretically should have enabled them to follow a fair process to elect a 
legitimate government. Instead, this research found that the first election was associated 
with a substantial increase in violence in Diyala, directed against nearly all target sectors.  
Conflict theory suggests that elections are a time for a reshuffling of the political cards 
and are therefore an ideal time to attempt to influence or coerce rival groups through the 
use of violence.  The second election was also associated with an increase in violence 
against civilians, as local and insurgent groups attempted to coerce the populace into not 
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taking part in the Democratic process.  Future elections should be monitored very closely 
and security concerns should be balanced against the need to have an open and 
transparent process that will be seen as legitimate.
The greatest increase in violence that this research detected was following the 
February 22, 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque, referred to as the Mosque of the 
Golden Dome.  This was a major Shi’a holy site, and the bombing inflamed sectarian 
passions and touched off a web of sectarian violence in Diyala.  Great pains should be 
taken to reconcile the Shi’a and Sunni whenever a major attack occurs against a religious 
target in order to avoid touching off retaliatory attacks against other sects.  Al-Qaeda 
understands that the sectarian divide in Iraq can be inflamed, and many attacks against 
religious targets have been carried out by foreign insurgents seeking to plunge Iraq into a 
sectarian civil war.
The thread that ties conflict theory to the events in Iraq and the changes in 
violence is legitimacy.  As legitimacy appears to be the moderating factor in target 
selection, the importance of using fair, transparent and inclusive methods to create a new 
government or to restructure a society is paramount. When an event changes the 
perceived legitimacy of a group, the Sunni withdrawal from the constitutional process for 
instance, the likelihood of violence being directed against that group will increase. If a 
government is not seen as legitimate it is likely to experience an increase in violence 
directed against it.  If a group withdraws from the political process, as the Sunni’s did in 
July, 2005, sectarian tensions are likely to increase, resulting in violence directed against 
civilian targets.  Governments should strive to increase legitimacy of institutions in areas 
subject to social disorder and violence.
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Another effect that can be used to base a recommendation upon, the installation of 
the Iraqi Interim Government in June, 2004 could reasonably have been expected to 
reduce violence, as the new government had representatives from all major ethnic groups, 
and represented an increase in Iraqi control over their national destiny.  Instead, this event 
was associated with a spike in attacks against that government and its fledgling police 
forces.  The installation of a new government always brings with it a period of 
uncertainty and change, and this change may be seen as an opportunity to contest to the 
power of the new government openly through the use of violent or nonviolent means.  It 
is recommended that new governments, and the internal and external actors that support 
them, provide patient support while the new government develops and solidifies.
Conclusion
Terrorism and political violence are violent actions meant to have a broader 
political or social effect beyond the harm done to the immediate victims.  This research 
provides a test of the inverse proposition, that political violence can be influenced by 
political and social events.  The simplicity of this proposition belies the fact that violence 
and political change are both complex issues that are subject to influence by a wide range 
of variables.
Legitimacy appears to be a critical factor in the determination of whether a 
government and its law enforcement elements will be targeted by political violence.  
Events that reduce a group’s legitimacy in some cases appear to increase violence against 
it.  While legitimacy is complex, democratic elections and widespread representation of 
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ethnic and religious groups within a political process appear to be important 
characteristics of a legitimate government.
Intergroup conflict appears to be related to levels of political violence.  Events, 
even remote ones, that increase group tensions along religious or ethnic lines tended to 
increase violence against civilian targets in Diyala.  Events that reduce this tension tended 
to reduce violence against these and other target sectors, furthering the support for the 
conflict theory model used in this research.
This research is not merely a study of the past, as it can provide lessons or 
predictions for the future.  Given the results of this research, it is reasonable to assume 
that future elections in Iraq, or in other heterogeneous developing nations, will require the 
support of all parties involved in order to prevent groups from violently interfering with 
the electoral process.  Governments inaugurated without popular support are likely to 
have their position challenged with acts of violence, directed at them, their law 
enforcement forces or civilians.  Finally, this research suggests that legitimacy is not a 
zero sum game, in that it is possible to have cooperation and peace, as evidenced by the 
reduction of violence following the installation of the new Iraqi government, provided 
there is broad-based support for the new leadership.
The ultimate conclusion of this research is that while Diyala and Iraq are unique 
within the international community, the underlying factors driving political violence there 
appear to be no different than the factors that moderate political violence in other times 
and places.  One of conflict theory's strengths lies in its historical basis; the theory was 
created in a period of strife and social change and it applies uniquely well to other 
situations characterized by strife and rapidly changing conditions.  While this research 
129
does not find sweeping support for conflict theory, it does suggest that conflict theory-
related forces are at work and that a more refined test of this theory would likely uncover 
further support for its core premise that group conflict and legitimacy are driving forces 




Appendix One: History and Demographic Background of 
Iraq10
The land that comprises present-day Iraq is the site of an important section of 
human history.  Iraq currently encompasses most of what was known as ancient 
Mesopotamia, the “land between the two rivers”, the Tigris and the Euphrates.  A fertile 
area amidst relatively arid surroundings, many of mankind’s earliest civilizations 
including the Babylonian, Sumerian and Assyrian kingdoms as well as the ancient cities 
of Babylon, Nineveh, Ur, Uruk and Nippur were located in present day Iraq.  The pride 
that the Iraqis have for their role in history can be seen in the opening paragraph of the 
preamble of the recently completed Iraqi Constitution:
We the sons of Mesopotamia, the land of the prophets, resting place of 
the holy imams, the leaders of civilization and the creators of the 
alphabet, the cradle of arithmetic: on our land, the first law put in place 
by mankind was written; in our nation, the most noble era of justice in 
the politics of nations was laid down; on our soil, the followers of the 
prophet and the saints prayed, the philosophers and the scientists 
theorized and the writers and poets created (Iraqi Constitution, United 
Nations translation 2005).
Iraq’s approximately 170,000 square miles are home to 28 million people.  
Roughly the size of the state of California, Iraq is divided into 18 provinces or 
governorates, with the national capital at Baghdad.  Iraq shares borders with Iran to the 
                                                
10
Where not specified as from a specific source, information from these appendices is drawn from 
reliable public sources such as the CIA factbook and online sources on the history of Iraq and is considered 
to be public knowledge.
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east, Kuwait to the south, Turkey to the north and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan to the 
west.  Although almost entirely landlocked, Iraq has a small port on the Persian Gulf at 
Umm Qasr as well as access to a number of major rivers including the Tigris, the 
Euphrates and the Diyala river. 
Iraq has significant oil reserves, many of which remain untapped.  These oil 
reserves and the agricultural fertility of the central region have made Iraq a relatively 
wealthy nation as well as a major player in regional and international politics.  The 
agricultural and petroleum resources of the country are concentrated in the north and 
south (Korany 2005), while the seat of government is in the center of the country, an area
without many natural resources.  Iraq also sits at a geographic and cultural crossroads 
between the Arab, Turk, Kurd and Persian cultures, making its culture a unique mix of 
ethnicities and religions.
Iraq’s demographics
The Iraqi people are not ethnically homogenous and one of the main social 
differences is in the practice of religion.  Iraq is primarily comprised of three major 
ethnic/religious groups, Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds.  From a religious standpoint, 
Iraq is 97% Muslim, with 60-65% of the population being Shia and 32-35% being Sunni 
(CIA Factbook 2007). The largest group are Shia Arabs, who make up 55% of the 
population.  Sunni Arabs comprise close to 20% of the population, and the Kurds who are 
mainly Sunni comprise 21% of the population.  Other ethnic groups make up the 
remaining 4% of the population.  The central region, including Baghdad and many of the 
main cities is dubbed the Sunni triangle as it is predominantly Sunni.  The southern areas 
133
of the country are primarily Shia, while the Kurds are concentrated in the northern third 
of the country.  The Diyala province is to the northeast of Baghdad and is often called 
“Little Iraq” (Emery 2007) as Diyala’s demographics generally mirror those of Iraq as a 
whole, a mix of Sunni, Shia and Kurd.  This suggests that the results of this research will 
be generalizable to Iraq as a whole, as Diyala is not substantially different 
demographically from the rest of Iraq.
Iraq is relatively unique in that its people are primarily of the Shia faith.  
Worldwide close to 90% of Muslims are Sunni and the remainder are Shia or affiliated 
with minor sects.  Iraq has a history of religious tolerance and pluralism, in part due to 
the fact that Iraq was ruled by the secular Ba’ath party from 1968 to 2003.  The Ba’ath 
party was a socialist and relatively secular government that encouraged pluralism and 
religious tolerance, although Saddam and most of the Ba’athist political officials were 
Sunni.  Despite this pluralism, the Shia were long oppressed by the Ba’ath party, and the 
minority Sunni tended to be the recipients of most of the nation’s wealth and resources 
(Piazza 2006). 
To understand the relationship between the Shia and the Sunni it is important to 
understand the origins of the two main sects within Islam.  The Shia / Sunni schism 
occurred in the 7th century following the death of the Muslim Prophet Mohammed (Tripp 
2000).  The followers of Mohammed were divided as to who the rightful heir and holder 
of religious authority should be.  The Shia, a shortened form of the Shi’at Ali, or “Party 
of Ali”, believed that Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law Ali was the rightful heir, and 
that authority traveled down his bloodline.  The Sunni believed that authority fell to the 
Caliphate, or the religious/political governing structure that Mohammed had established.  
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This division is still important, as many Shia and Sunni do not view the social and 
religious institutions of the opposite sect as legitimate.
Military Conflict in Iraq
Iraq has a long and bloody history of having been invaded by other nations.  Each 
invading group has altered the social and cultural landscape in the process making Iraq a 
fairly heterogeneous society.  The Persians in the 6th century BC, the Greeks under 
Alexander the Great in the 3rd Century BC, the Mongols in the 13th century, the Turks 
until World War One, and the British have each occupied the land that is Iraq (Polk 
2005).  In 1916 the British and the French divided up the Middle East into regions of 
control, a compromise known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  This agreement made Iraq 
a British domain until 1932 when Iraq gained nominal independence, with Britain 
maintaining a military presence in the area.  Britain re-invaded Iraq during World War 
Two to keep valuable oil reserves from falling into Nazi hands.  Following the granting 
of independence in the post-WWII era, Iraq has experienced a series of military coups as 
groups struggled for power, ultimately resulting in the rise of the Ba’athist party under 
Saddam Hussein (Slugett 2005).  
Iraq’s most infamous modern political leader, Saddam Hussein, came to power in 
1979 as head of the Ba’ath party.  The Ba’ath party supported a secular and moderately 
socialist political philosophy and maintained its control over the nation through 
oppressive and often brutal methods (Tripp 2000). Hussein’s Ba’athist party espoused 
socialist and secular beliefs and was despised by fundamentalist Muslim countries in the 
region, particularly Iran.  Saddam Hussein, a Sunni in a predominantly Shia nation, used 
135
his political power to benefit the Sunnis at the expense of the Shia and Kurds (Deflem & 
Sutphin 2006; Hafez 2006; O’Leary 2002). Hussein did manage to bring some order to 
Iraq, largely through the use of fear and violence, dissuading many groups from 
attempting to challenge his power (Clarke & Newman 2006).  The Kurds and to some 
extent the Shia were subjected to ethnic persecution under Saddam Hussein’s rule, 
including the 1988 gassing of the Kurdish village of Halabja that killed thousands of 
civilians.  Far from an isolated incident, Hussein had a history of violence against his 
own people, and he was ultimately sentenced to death in November 2006 for ordering the 
killing of 148 Shia in the town of Dujail in 1982.  He was executed as a result of this 
conviction on December 30th, 2006.
The Iran-Iraq War
One of the most significant regional events in the last century was the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988.  The longest running war of the 20th century, 
Iran and Iraq began the conflict over a border dispute, although centuries of animosity 
between the two nations had set the stage for the conflict (Tripp 2000).  The United 
States and Russia both openly supported Iraq, in part to prevent the Iranian theocracy, 
birthed in 1979 under Ayatollah Khomeni, from gaining too much influence in the 
region. As a result of continuous war with Iran, Iraq had developed into a well-armed 
society supporting one of the largest land armies in the world.   The war ended in a 
stalemate and resulted in nearly one million casualties across both sides.  Chemical 
weapons were widely used by the Iraq during this conflict, resulting in serious and lasting 
illnesses for many Iranians.  Following the war the Iraqi government was mired in debt, 
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as it had purchased many weapon systems from Russia, China and other allied nations.  
Kuwait, Iraq’s prosperous southern neighbor, had loaned Iraq $14 billion to help pay for 
the war.  After the war Iraq demanded that Kuwait forgive these debts, but the Kuwait 
government stood firm, and the stage was set for another conflict.
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, capturing their oil fields, the capital city 
and access to the Persian Gulf in a matter of hours.  Widely seen as an unjustifiable 
violation of the sovereignty of Kuwait, the United Nations demanded that Iraq withdraw 
from Kuwait.  When the deadline for withdrawal passed, the United Nations authorized 
an international coalition to use force to free Kuwait.  The resulting liberation of Kuwait 
and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, named Operation Desert Shield/Storm, resulted in 
the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the near annihilation of the Iraqi military.  
An undetermined number of Iraqi soldiers and civilians died in the conflict while 
coalition casualties numbered near 300.  The coalition forces came near to, but did not 
enter Baghdad and Hussein seeing that his cause was hopeless sued for peace.  As part of 
the deal to end the war, Saddam Hussein made a number of concessions to the coalition, 
including participation in an oil-for-food program and the creation of no-fly zones over 
the northern and southern parts of Iraq (Polk 2005).   There was a limited revolt by many 
Iraqis in the north and south of the nation, particularly among the Kurd and Shiite 
populations.  The no-fly zones were meant in part to limit Saddam Hussein’s ability to 
retaliate against these groups, although many Iraqi’s were killed in the purges that 
followed the peace settlement.  Although the first Gulf War was quickly won, the peace 
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that was brokered was not as successful as the coalition would have hoped, as Saddam 
Hussein kept power and remained a threat to regional stability and the security of his own 
people.
It is relevant to note that following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by the Iraqis, 
Osama Bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda, contacted Saudi Arabia and proposed using his 
army of mujahideen from the Russo-Afghanistan war to expel Saddam from Kuwait.  It 
was widely feared that Saddam would invade Saudi Arabia after he took control of 
Kuwait.  Bin Laden, a devout Muslim, feared that Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and 
Medina, both in Saudi Arabia, would fall into Iraqi hands (Polk 2005).  The Sauds denied 
Bin Laden’s request and chose to allow the United States military to set up bases within 
Saudi Arabia for its protection in preparation for the invasion of Iraq.  This event served 
to deepen the hatred of Bin Laden for the United States.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
On March 20th, 2003, a United States led coalition of more than 45 countries 
entered Iraq in a bid to oust the Ba’athist government and its dictator Saddam Hussein.   
The coalition was made of close to 350,000 troops from 49 different nations.  90% of the 
troops were from the United States, with Great Britain supplying the majority of the 
remainder.  The invasion was precipitated by intelligence suggesting that Hussein’s 
regime had acquired weapons of mass destruction and was an active supporter of 
international terrorist groups (see the final report of the WMD Commission for a review).  
Rather than wait until Saddam had made the first move, as he did in his 1990 invasion of 
neighboring Kuwait, the coalition determined the best way to reduce the threat to the 
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stability of the region posed by Saddam Hussein was to move against him with a pre-
emptive strike.  The pre-emptive strike, dubbed “shock and awe” (see Ullman, Wade & 
Alberts 2004, for a review of the effectiveness of the strike) due to the speed and force 
with which it occurred, was meant to quickly eliminate the Iraqi command and control 
structure while leaving the civilian population and infrastructure relatively untouched.  
Although the pre-war intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction would later 
prove to be incorrect, by May 1st coalition forces had driven Saddam into hiding, gained 
nominal control of the country and set up the Coalition Provisional Authority to begin the 
process of establishing a democratically elected government in Iraq.  
The Coalition Provisional Authority was installed to govern the country from 
April 21 2003 until it was dissolved on June 28, 2004.  The Iraqi Interim Government 
was handed the reigns to the country and prepared the country for the coming 
democratically elected government. The Iraqi National Assembly was elected in January 
of 2005 to help with the transition.  The Iraqi Interim government was dissolved on May 
3rd, 2005 when the Iraqi Transitional Government took over.  The purpose of this 
government was to draft a Constitution, which was approved on October 15th, 2005 in a 
nationwide referendum.  The first permanent government of Iraq was installed on May 
20th, 2006.  
The governments that have been in charge of Iraq, as well as their leaders and 
their leader’s ethnic background are as follows:
1. Coalition Provisional Authority (oversaw the Iraqi Governing Council)
a. April 21, 2003 to June 28, 2004
b. First Chief Executive: retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner
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c. Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, who headed the CPA until it 
ended
2. Iraqi Interim Government
a. June 28, 2004 to May 3, 2005
b. President: Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (Sunni Islam)
c. Prime Minister: Iyad Allawi (Shia Islam)
3. Iraqi Transitional Government
a. May 3, 2005 to May 20, 2006
b. President: Jalal Talabani (Kurd, Sunni Islam)
c. Prime Minister: Ibrahim al-Jafaari (Shia Islam)
4. Current Government in Iraq
a. May 20, 2006 to present
b. President: Jalal Talabani (Kurd, Sunni Islam)
c. Prime Minister: Nouri al-Maliki (Shia Islam)
It is interesting to note that the governments attempted to be as inclusive as possible, with 
rough representation of the major parties, Sunni, Shia and Kurd.  Despite the fact that the 
current President of Iraq is a Sunni Kurd, most Sunni Arabs don’t view the government 
as legitimate (PIPA 2006).
Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom
As the international community would come to realize, unseating the former Iraqi 
regime would be the easy part, as the Provisional, Interim and Transitional governments 
struggled with uniting a nation that was strongly factionalized along religious and ethnic 
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lines (Ikenberry & Slaughter 2006).  Furthermore, coalition troops, the fledging Iraqi 
government and their police and security forces found themselves under nearly constant 
attack from foreign insurgents and disaffected Iraqis.  Despite the capture of Saddam 
Hussein on December 13th, 2003, his execution on December 30th, 2006, the ratification 
of a Constitution, sets of elections for both a transitional and a permanent government 
and the installation of a democratically elected parliament, prime minister, and president, 
Iraq has not seen a cessation in violence. 
While the coalition did relatively little damage to the infrastructure and generally 
avoided attacks on the civilian population, many Iraqis were without basic necessities 
such as water and power following the change of power.  Although much of the nation 
cheered the deposing of Saddam’s government, the failure of the coalition to return the 
country to a secure and livable environment caused many Iraqi’s view of the coalition 
operation to sour, reducing the legitimacy of their presence there (PIPA 2006; Schweid 
2006).
One of the first steps taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the 
Transitional Government was the “de-Ba’athification” of the country (Ikenberry & 
Slaughter 2006).  Nearly all political appointees in Saddam’s era were members of the 
Ba’ath party, and systematically removing them from power drained the nation of some 
of its most experienced leaders and civil servants (Packer, 2006).  Many of these civil 
servants were supporters of the Ba’ath party by necessity and were happy to renounce the 
party and maintain their positions, although the stigma of being a former Ba’athists 
prevented their easy reintegration.  There are still a large number of former Iraqi military, 
intelligence and other Ba’ath party officials who were displaced when Saddam’s regime 
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fell and who have low prospects of finding a place within the new Iraq (Deflem & 
Sutphin 2006; Ikenberry & Slaughter 2006).
While Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party were widely despised, the absence of 
the order that they brought to the ethnically and religiously diverse nation of Iraq has 
created a power vacuum in which various groups are struggling to gain power or settle 
old scores (Hafez 2006).  A sectarian war has broken out between Sunni and Shia, as 
each group seeks to control the new political apparatus.  Once restricted to attacks on the 
coalition and the new government, terrorist attacks have begun to target civilian 
populations, mosques and public gatherings.
While the Iraqi government was quickly deposed, one unforeseen consequence of 
the rapidity of this political change was widespread looting, particularly of abandoned 
Iraqi military posts (Hoffman 2004).  Following the collapse of the Iraqi government and 
military, a significant amount of armaments were lost as soldiers walked off the job 
taking their weapons with them and the abandoned posts were looted.  Additionally, vast 
stockpiles of munitions, hidden by Saddam Hussein over the years continually appear in 
the hands of insurgent groups.  These stockpiles supply the terrorist groups in Iraq with a 
nearly unlimited supply of explosives, weapons and ammunitio
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Appendix Two: Analysis of the main groups in Iraq11
Iraq is a heterogeneous nation comprised of a number of different ethnic and 
religious groups, primarily the Sunni and Shia Arabs and the Kurds.  Foreign insurgents 
and coalition forces add two elements of international influence into the competition 
between the native Iraqi groups.  The following section provides a brief introduction to 
what is known about the Shia, Sunni, Kurdish and foreign insurgent groups: their 
motivations, goals and relevant relationships with other groups. 
Much of the violence in Iraq is centered on the regions where there is a mixture of 
ethnic groups, providing basic support for my hypothesis that conflict theory will be able 
to explain trends in the violence there.  The four Iraqi provinces that comprise the Sunni 
heartland, home to many Sunnis as well as a significant proportion of the Shia and Kurds, 
are believed to account for nearly 85% of the attacks (Biddle 2006).  The other provinces, 
mostly Shia and Kurds living in ethnically homogenous communities, are linked to only 
15% of the attacks.
Mohammed Hafez (2006) categorized the violent groups in Iraq as being in one of 
two camps based upon their ultimate view for the future of Iraq.  System-reintegration 
groups wish to create a unified and strong Iraq where they are a major political player.  
System-collapse groups wish to turn Iraq into a puppet or failed state so that they may 
conduct their business unmolested by a central government.  This distinction helps to 
clarify the basis of the decision to use violence for many groups.  System-reintegration 
                                                
11
Where not specified as from a specific source, information from these appendices is drawn from reliable 
public sources such as the CIA factbook and online sources on the history of Iraq and is considered to be 
public knowledge.
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groups are often willing to work with the government or other groups for the good of Iraq 
when it fits their interests, while system-collapse groups have little interest in cooperating 
with other groups.  While conflict theory can be used to explain the specific goals and 
actions of each type of group, the lack of good data about what type of group is 
responsible for each attack prevents this research from following too closely along this 
line of thinking.
The Shia
The Shia Arabs make up 55% of the population of Iraq, and comprise 40% of the
population of Diyala (CIA Factbook, 2007).  This research assumes that the main goal of 
the Shia is to gain control of the political system to prevent a non-Shia from using the 
system to limit their freedoms.  This assumption is based upon the historical situation that 
the Shia found themselves in under Saddam Hussein, who used the government to repress 
the Shia and Kurds (Tripp 2000).  
Given that they are the largest demographic group in Iraq, the Shia should be able 
to use their majority status within the democratic system in order to gain control over the 
government.  Many Shia have embraced this strategy.  During the most recent elections 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a moderate Shia cleric who represents the middle and upper-
class Shia, gained a significant amount of political power by working with the coalition 
forces (Finn & Zenilman 2003).  Through cooperation with the coalition forces al-Sistani 
pursued a peaceful strategy to ensure the political representation of his people.  The 
second most powerful political figure, at least in Baghdad, is Moqtada al-Sadr, a younger 
Shia cleric who represents the lower class Shia and controls the Mahdi Army.  The Mahdi 
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Army, a Shia militia based in Baghdad, seeks to provide meaningful security and service 
needs to the local Shia people in order to ensure their support for their leader, al-Sadr 
(Finn & Zenilman 2003).  Originally using the Mahdi Army to oppose the coalition and 
the new government, al-Sadr has recently become more amenable to the coalition and 
new government and has used his militia to provide security.  Both al-Sistani and al-Sadr 
cooperated in the last election to garner the largest number of votes and seats in the new 
parliament, and to ensure that Shia would gain control of the new government.  The 
victory of Ali al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Shia political parties in the election on 
December 6th, 2006, resulted in his supporters renouncing terrorism.  Data from a PIPA 
poll (Jan 31st, 2006) in Iraq found that 98% of Shia polled believed that ousting Saddam 
was worth doing, and 84% of Shia believed that the country was heading in the right 
direction, suggesting that they are supportive of the current political situation and their 
place within it.
The Sunni
The Sunni Arabs are 20% of the population of Iraq and comprise 50% of the 
population of the Diyala province (CIA Factbook 2007).  The Sunnis lost power 
following the fall of the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and many Sunnis would be 
happy with a return to the former status quo (PIPA, Jan 31st, 2006).  While the Shia and 
the Kurdish populations won a significant number of parliamentary seats in the new 
government, the Sunnis, fearing that they would not received adequate representation, 
chose to delegitimize the entire political process by boycotting the development of the 
government in July of 2005 (Hafez 2006).  As a result of not having a satisfactory 
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political voice, many disaffected Sunnis have turned to violence in order to force a 
reshuffling of the political cards. 
The Sunnis feel that if they do not have a strong political hand, gained through 
violence or the political process, that they will be disenfranchised completely within the 
new Iraq and suffer serious economic and social set-backs as a result.  Natural resources 
within Iraq are not equally distributed geographically, and the Sunni people are both a 
numerical minority and tend to live in areas that are lacking in natural resources (Polk 
2005).  One of their stated goals is to be able to secure control over the natural resources, 
such as Iraq’s oil fields, that fall geographically outside of their traditional domain (Hafez 
2006).  Conflicts over control of natural resources (Collier 2000) are not uncommon in 
many countries.  Control over these resources brings profits, jobs, and greater bargaining 
power within the Iraqi nation and the international community.
Many Sunnis were members of Saddam’s Ba’athist party and have lost power and 
prestige following the collapse of that regime.  These individuals were often high-ranking 
politicians, military commanders or members of the Saddam’s intelligence services.  
Many of these former party members have formed insurgent groups to fight the 
establishment of a non-Ba’athist government in Baghdad (Hafez, 2006).  Following the 
execution of Hussein in December of 2006, many of these groups have joined with the 
foreign insurgency in attacks on the Shia, the coalition and the Iraqi government and 
security forces (Iraqi Insurgency 2007).
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The Kurds
The Kurds make up 21% of the population of Iraq, and comprise 10% of the 
population of Diyala (CIA Factbook 2007).  It is important to note that most Kurds are 
Sunnis, which tips the balance in Diyala in favor of the Sunni sect.
The Kurds occupy a unique place among the world’s ethnic groups, as they are 
the largest ethnic group that lacks a country of its own (O’Leary 2002).  There are an 
estimated 27-36 million Kurds, with the majority living in Turkey and a significant 
amount in Iran, Iraq and Syria. The governments of the nations in which the Kurds have 
resided have often persecuted them, leaving their population without a safe homeland.  
Attempts at creating an independent and self-governing Kurdish nation over the past four 
decades have failed.  The Kurds are less concerned with gaining control over the central 
government in Iraq, and more concerned with gaining local autonomy and political 
control for their people (O’Leary 2002).  PIPA polls have found that most Kurds (91%) 
believed that ousting Saddam was the right thing to do, and 76% said the country was 
heading in the right direction.  
Given the nature of the data collected for this research, it will be very difficult to 
determine Kurdish involvement in political violence.  The Kurds are rarely mentioned in 
the political discussions or violent attacks within Diyala, and while their presence will not 
be ignored, it is less relevant than the Sunni-Shia interaction in Diyala.  An exception to 
this is the Kurdish group, Ansar al-Islam, a Sunni-linked jihadist group with ties to Al-
Qaeda (Neumann 2006) that attempted to kill the former Interim Prime Minister of Iraq, 
Iyad Allaqi while he was in Germany ( Deutsche Welle 2004).  Ansar al-Islam is 
mentioned as the responsible group in a little over 1% of the attacks in Diyala. 
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Foreign Insurgents
While the interplay between Shia, Sunni and Kurd political groups defines most 
of the political landscape in the new Iraq, the presence of foreign insurgents has had a 
major impact on the situation (Hafez 2006; Ricks 2006). The presence of foreign 
insurgents adds an additional level of complexity and violence, as the goals of these 
groups rarely have the best interests of the Iraqis in mind. Despite being a primarily 
Muslim nation, Iraq’s secular government and decade-long war with fundamentalist Iran 
led to an aversion by many Muslims in the Middle East toward Iraq.  Al-Qaeda and other 
foreign insurgent groups with religious motivations do not want to see an Iraqi 
government that does not reflect their predominantly fundamentalist beliefs (Kilcullen 
2005; Masharbash 2005).  As a result they have launched attacks against the newly 
elected officials and the polling places during the elections in an attempt to undermine the 
government’s power.  Neighboring states such as Iran that were traditionally hostile 
towards Saddam’s regime would like nothing more than to turn the new Iraq into a 
puppet state by installing a government beholden to their own ideals (Hafez 2006).  
Insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda are working to see Iraq transform into a failed state so 
that they can establish training camps to be able to spread their campaign further across 
the region.
Many terrorist groups have a decidedly international bent and their stated 
grievances relate to what they see as a violation of one nation’s sovereignty by another. 
Often referred to as a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993) or cultures, the 
boundaries where Western industrialized countries meet the developing world has been a 
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hotbed for terrorism, violence and social unrest for decades (Hoffman 1998; Korany 
2005).
Just as Karl Marx opposed the concentration of the means of production in the 
hands of a few, many violent groups point out that certain western capitalist nations have 
been using their political, economic and military might to exploit less powerful nations.  
Many third-world nations have seen companies and governments enter into exploitative 
agreements to allow the Western world access to natural resources as well as cheaper 
labor (Korany 2005).  While many of the contemporary violent groups operate under a 
religious banner, their proclamations make it clear that they view it as their religious 
duty, as opposed to what Marx thought was a political and economic duty, to protect their 
lands, people and resources from foreign exploitation (Aran, 2003).  The following 
statement made by Al-Qaeda, shortly after the events of September 11th, 2001, illustrates 
how the group’s motivations are framed within a conflict perspective.
The Islamic nation has been groaning in pain for more than 80 years 
under the yoke of the joint Jewish-Crusader aggression. Palestine is 
living under the yoke of the Jewish occupation and its people groan from 
this repression and persecution while no-one lifts a finger. The Arabian 
Peninsula is being defiled by the feet of those who came to occupy these 
lands, usurp these holy places, and plunder these resources. (Aran, 2003, 
date of statement: October 10th, 2001)
This statement demonstrates that Al-Qaeda, an international jihadi group that 
seeks to spread its own interpretation of Islam, couches its arguments in the perceived 
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illegitimacy of the West’s presence in the Middle East, their support for Israel and their 
perceived intent to steal the area’s resources.  By reducing the legitimacy of the presence 
of the foreign nations, Al-Qaeda seeks to encourage others to attack the “crusaders” and 
to see al-Qaeda as the legitimate spokesmen and organizer of the resistance.
It is difficult to estimate the number of foreign insurgents in Iraq, and 
conservative estimates place the figure between 1,000 and 3,000 (Krueger 2006; 
Neumann 2006; US Department of State 2006).  The US military believes that between 
4-10% of insurgents are from outside Iraq (Finer 2005).  To date, captured foreign 
insurgents have been from Algeria (20%), Syria (18%), Yemen (17%), the Sudan (15%) 
and from Egypt (13%).  Very few insurgents have been directly tied to Iran, which brings 
into question the Iranian role in the insurgency.  
Given the relatively small numbers of foreign insurgents, many insurgent attacks 
are designed to be more spectacular and thus get more publicity than many low-level 
attacks by other groups.  Al-Qaeda and other groups rely heavily on publicity and 
propaganda to spread their message (Kepel 2004; Packer 2006) and gain support for their 
cause.  Groups such as al-Qaeda depend upon being able to frame their objectives in a 
fashion that better fits with the religious and social goals of Iraq to garner legitimacy and 
support from the population. When foreign insurgents targeted coalition forces in an 
attempt to free Iraq of coalition interference, the population often supported them (Cronin 
2002).  When the same insurgents targeted civilians or non-combatants their legitimacy 
was tarnished and groups that had previously welcomed their aid turned upon them 
(Parker & al-Kubacy 2006).  For example, Sunni insurgents specifically told al-Qaeda 
members not to target polling places in the December elections or else they would face 
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reprisal attacks (Hashim 2003).  The Sunni group involved wished to give its people a 
chance to win power by embracing democratic methods.  During the elections, Al-Qaeda 
sought to oppose the creation of an Iraqi government backed or influenced by the United 
States, and waged a campaign of terrorist attacks to unsettle the new government and its 
attempts at providing security and basic services to the Iraqi people.  These attacks have 
weakened the popular support for al-Qaeda and other foreign insurgent groups, and many 
Iraqis have become more active in repelling these foreign groups (Anderson 2007; Parker 
& al-Kubacy 2006).  This supports my legitimacy hypothesis in that strong perceived 
legitimacy among the populace will result in a less hospitable environment for violent 
action. 
Furthermore, al-Qaeda is attempting to destabilize the country by attacking the 
Shia, with hopes that the Shia will retaliate against the Sunni and draw the country 
downward into a civil war (Hafez 2006).  Al-Qaeda is not large enough to wage an 
effective war against the coalition or the fledgling Iraqi government, but by starting a 
civil war they aim to use one group against another to weaken the system as a whole.  
The following quote, believed to be from the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Musab al-
Zarqawi, illustrates this strategy:
[The Shi’a] in our opinion are the key to change. I mean that targeting 
them and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth will 
provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies–…–and bare the teeth of the 
hidden rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in dragging them 
into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the 
inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at 
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the hands of these Sabeans. Despite their weakness and fragmentation, the 
Sunnis are the sharpest blades, the most determined, and the most loyal 
when they meet those [Shi’a], who are a people of treachery and 
cowardice. (Cited from Hafez 2006, page 7)
As a result, the foreign insurgents are often viewed with extreme contempt by 
many Iraqis (Anderson 2006).  The nationalist group, the Anbar Revolutionaries, was 
formed to kill foreign fighters entering Iraq, and is comprised of Iraqis who had lost a 
relative to Al-Qaeda attacks (Parker & al-Kubacy 2006).  The fact that groups are 
fighting amongst themselves supports the model of inter-group dynamics and political 
competition developed in this research. 
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Appendix Three: Additional descriptive statistics
Although not directly related to the hypotheses being tested, other descriptive 
statistics help to paint a clearer picture of the nature of the violence in Diyala.  This 
appendix describes some of the additional information available in my database of 
political violence in Diyala.
Within the database, attacks can be broken into ten mutually exclusive categories 
based on the method of attack used, and the frequency of these attacks is presented below 
in Table Twenty Two.  
Table Twenty Two: Attack Type
Attack Type Percent of Attacks
Small arms fire attacks 30.8%
IED attacks (Improvised Explosive Device) 19.2%
Assassinations 16.0%
VBIED attacks (Vehicle-born Improvised Explosive Device) 9.0%
Ambushes 7.4%
Indirect fire attacks 4.2%
Suicide Attacks 6.9%
Military complex attacks 3.9%
Kidnappings 1.9%
Attacks with knives or sharp objects .6%
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Small arms fire attacks account for nearly 1/3 of all incidents and IED attacks and 
assassinations account for a sizable portion of the remainder.  IEDs and VBIEDs have 
been a major problem for the coalition forces, as these types of attacks are very difficult 
to detect and often utilize large amounts of explosives, causing significant casualties.  
Fatalities across the other types of attacks vary widely.  Table Twenty Three shows the 
range and distribution of fatalities for attacks within the dataset.  In 76 (10%) of the 
cases, no data on fatalities was listed and these incidents are excluded from the following 
chart.
Table Twenty Three: Fatalities for military, civilian and terrorists












fatalities 2-21 14 1
This table shows that many attacks resulted in no actual fatalities, although 
injuries were common.  The perpetrator was not killed in a significant portion of the 
attacks, and the attacks where the perpetrator was killed were often suicide bombings.  
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The attacks were also geo-coded by location with the city closest to which they 
occurred.  25 of the attacks, or about 4%, were not geo-coded and were listed as “Diyala” 
in the data.  Aside from the capital city of Baquba, there is very little public information 
in English available about the other cities.  The following table lists the top five cities and 
the number and percent of attacks that occurred there.
Table Twenty Four: Location of Attacks






Other locations 112 15%
There is little usable geographic information here, aside from the simple fact that 
most attacks occurred in the city of Baquba.  This is most likely due to the fact that, aside 
from civilian targets, there are many more government, law enforcement and military 
targets within the city itself.  Much of Diyala consists of small towns, arable or unusable 
land, and there would be little motivation for a politically-motivated attacker to target 
these relatively insignificant locations.
I have very limited data about which groups were responsible for each attack.  
The groups that were responsible for the incidents are only listed in 14% of the cases.  
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This is actually relatively uncommon, as across the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree 
& Dugan 2007) collected by the START Center at the University of Maryland, a group 
claims responsibility for an attack in roughly half of all cases of terrorism.  Data on the 
groups responsible could only be collected where a group publicly claimed responsibility 
for an attack, something that is relatively infrequent in Iraq.  
Table Twenty Five: Groups claiming responsibility for attacks
Group Responsible # of Attacks Percent
Zarqawi Network/ Al-Qaeda 41 5%
Sunni Insurgents 37 5%
Ansar Al-Sunnah 10 1%
Other groups 10 1%
Unlisted/Unknown 635 86%
Our understanding of these groups is limited by the availability of data about 
them.  What is known about these groups comes from publicly available sources, and is 
subject to inaccuracy and incompleteness.  Fortunately, many groups publish statements 
in which they detail their goals and intents.  As stated in the literature review and 
appendices, these statements helped confirm the importance of legitimacy and group-
conflict as a potential driver of political violence.  These statements are useful, but are 
generally meant to paint a situation in a certain light, and more can be determined about a 
group’s position by their actions rather than their words (Hamm 2004).
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Appendix Four: Timeline of events
This appendix lists the timeline of events that were compiled in order to 
determine the most relevant events to be included in the model.  This list of events was 
compiled by a group of undergraduate students from a variety of open sources, including 
newspaper articles, official reports and websites tracking events in Iraq.  No citations are 
listed here, for the information or the quotations, as the process that generated was not 




-Jan. 16, 2003-UN inspectors discover 11 undeclared empty chemical warheads in Iraq.
-Jan. 27, 2003-The UN's formal report on Iraqi inspections is highly critical, though not 
damning, with chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix stating that "Iraq appears not to 
have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was 
demanded of it."
-Jan. 28, 2003-In his state of the union address, President Bush announces that he is ready 
to attack Iraq even without a UN mandate.
-February-
-Feb. 14, 2003-In a February UN report, chief UN inspector Hans Blix indicated that 
slight progress had been made in Iraq's cooperation. Both pro- and anti-war nations felt 
the report supported their point of view.
-Feb. 15, 2003-Massive peace demonstrations take place around the world.
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-Feb. 22, 2003-Hans Blix orders Iraq to destroy its Al Samoud 2 missiles by March 1. 
The UN inspectors have determined that the missiles have an illegal range limit. Iraq can 
have missiles that reach neighboring countries, but not ones capable of reaching Israel.
-Feb. 24, 2003-The U.S., Britain, and Spain submit a proposed resolution to the UN 
Security Council that states that "Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it 
in Resolution 1441," and that it is now time to authorize use of military force against the 
country.
-France, Germany, and Russia submit an informal counter-resolution to the UN Security 
Council that states that inspections should be intensified and extended to ensure that there 
is "a real chance to the peaceful settlement of this crisis," and that "the military option 
should only be a last resort."
-March-
--Mar. 1, 2003-Iraq begins to destroy its Al Samoud missiles.
-Mar. 14, 2003- The U.S. and Britain's intense lobbying efforts among the other UN 
Security Council members yield only four supporters (in addition to the U.S. and Britain, 
Spain and Bulgaria); nine votes (and no vetoes from the five permanent members) out of 
fifteen are required for the resolution's passage. The U.S. decides not to call for a vote on 
the resolution.
-Mar. 17, 2003- UK's ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic process on Iraq has 
ended; arms inspectors evacuate; All diplomatic efforts cease when President Bush 
delivers an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave the country within 48 hours or else 
face an attack.
-Mar. 19, 2003-President Bush declares war on Iraq.
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-Mar. 20, 2003-The war against Iraq begins 5:30 AM Baghdad time (9:30 PM EST, 
March 19), when the U.S. launches Operation Iraqi Freedom. Called a "decapitation 
attack," the initial air strike of the war attempted to target Saddam Hussein and other 
Iraqi leaders in Baghdad.
-American missiles hit targets in Baghdad, marking the start of a US-led campaign to 
topple Saddam Hussein.
-The U.S. launches a second round of air strikes against Baghdad, and ground troops 
enter the country for the first time, crossing into southern Iraq from Kuwait. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claims that the initial phase of the war is mild compared to 
what it to come: "What will follow will not be a repeat of any other conflict. It will be of 
a force and a scope and a scale that has been beyond what we have seen before."
-Mar. 21, 2003-The major phase of the war begins with heavy aerial attacks on Baghdad 
and other cities. The campaign, publicized in advance by the Pentagon as an 
overwhelming barrage meant to instill "shock and awe," is in actuality more restrained.
-Mar. 24, 2003-Troops march within 60 miles of Baghdad. They encounter much 
stronger resistance from Iraqi soldiers and paramilitary fighters along the way, 
particularly in towns such as Nassiriya and Basra.
-Mar. 26, 2003- About 1,000 paratroopers land in Kurdish-controlled Iraq to open a 
northern front.
-Mar. 30, 2003-U.S. Marines and Army troops launch first attack on Iraq's Republican 
Guard, about 65 miles outside Baghdad. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deflects 
criticism that the U.S. has not deployed enough Army ground troops in Iraq.
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-March 2003 - Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports that Iraq has accelerated its 
cooperation but says inspectors need more time to verify Iraq's compliance.
-In the following days US and British ground troops enter Iraq from the south.
-April-
-Apr. 2, 2003-Special operations forces rescue Pfc. Jessica Lynch from a hospital in 
Nasiriya. She was one of 12 members of the 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company 
captured by Iraqi troops on March 23.
-Apr. 5, 2003-U.S. tanks roll into the Iraqi capital and engage in firefights with Iraqi 
troops. Resistance weaker than anticipated. Heavy Iraqi casualties.
-Apr. 7, 2003-British forces take control of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city.
-Apr. 9, 2003-The fall of Baghdad: U.S. forces take control the city, but sporadic fighting 
continues throughout the capital.  
-US forces advance into central Baghdad. Saddam Hussein's grip on the city is broken. In 
the following days Kurdish fighters and US forces take control of the northern cities of 
Kirkuk and Mosul. There is looting in Baghdad and elsewhere.
-Apr. 11, 2003-Kirkuk falls to Kurdish fighters.
- The Los Angeles Times later reported that the fall was “stage-managed” by the Army
-Apr. 13, 2003-Marines rescue five U.S. soldiers captured by Iraqi troops on March 23 in 
Nasiriya, and two pilots who had been shot down on March 24 near Karbala.
-Apr. 14, 2003-Major fighting in Iraq is declared over by the Pentagon, after U.S. forces 
take control of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's birthplace and the last city to exhibit strong Iraqi 
resistance. Saddam Hussein's whereabouts remain unknown.
-Apr. 15, 2003-Gen. Jay Garner, appointed by the United States to run post-war Iraq until 
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a new government is put in place, met with various Iraqi leaders to begin planning the 
new Iraqi federal government.
-April 2003- US lists 55 most-wanted members of former regime in the form of a deck of 
cards. Former deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz is taken into custody.
-May-
-May 2003 - UN Security Council backs US-led administration in Iraq and lifts economic 
sanctions. US administrator abolishes Baath Party and institutions of former regime.
-May 1, 2003-The U.S. declares an end to major combat operations.
-May 12, 2003-A new civil administrator takes over in Iraq. Paul Bremer, a diplomat and 
former head of the counter-terrorism department at the State Department, replaces Jay 
Garner, who was seen as ineffective in stemming the continuing lawlessness and violence 
taking place throughout Iraq.
-May 22, 2003-The UN Security Council approves a resolution lifting the economic 
sanctions against Iraq and supporting the U.S.-led administration in Iraq.
-MAY 29, 2003: The U.S. believes to have found the WMD.
-May 30, 2003-In separate speeches, U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell and British 
prime minister Tony Blair deny that intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction was distorted or exaggerated to justify an attack on Iraq. Both administrations 
face mounting questions because no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been 
found. Each had claimed that Iraq's WMD were an imminent threat to world security.
-June-
- JUNE 6, 2003: The U.S. blames Iraq problems on “pockets of dead-enders” are trying 
to reconstitute, Gen. Franks and his team are rooting them out
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-July-
-July 2003 - US-appointed Governing Council meets for first time. Commander of US 
forces says his troops face low-intensity guerrilla-style war. Saddam's sons Uday and 
Qusay killed in gun battle in Mosul.
-Jul. 7, 2003-Bush administration concedes that evidence that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program by seeking to buy uranium from Africa, cited in January State of the 
Union address and elsewhere, was unsubstantiated and should not have been included in 
speech. Over summer Tony Blair faces even stronger criticism than his American 
counterpart concerning flawed intelligence.
-JULY 11, 2003: Condoleezza Rice that doubts about Iraq intelligence were not 
communicated to the president
-Jul. 13, 2003-Iraq's interim governing council, composed of 25 Iraqis appointed by 
American and British officials, is inaugurated. The council has power to name ministers 
and will help draw up a new constitution for the country. The American administrator 
Paul Bremer, however, retains ultimate authority.
-Jun. 15, 2003-Operation Desert Scorpion launched, a military campaign meant to defeat 
organized Iraqi resistance against American troops. U.S. and British troops face 
continued attacks; about one American soldier has been killed per day since the end of 
combat was declared. 
-Jul. 16, 2003-Gen. John Abizaid, commander of allied forces in Iraq who replaced 
retiring general Tommy Franks on July 7, calls continued attacks on coalition troops a 
"guerrilla-type campaign" and says soldiers who will replace current troops may be 
deployed for year-long tours.
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-Jul. 17, 2003-U.S. combat deaths in Iraq reach 147, the same number of soldiers who 
died from hostile fire in the first Gulf War; 32 of those deaths occurred after May 1, the 
officially declared end of combat.
-Jul. 22, 2003-Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay Hussein, die in a firefight in a 
Mosul palace.
- July 24, 2005-U.S. releases sons' death photos
-August-
-August 2003- Deadly bomb attacks on Jordanian embassy and UN HQ in Baghdad. 
Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, or Chemical Ali, captured. Car bomb in Najaf kills 
125 including Shia leader Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim.
-August 7, 2003- Bombing at the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad
-Aug. 9, 2003-U.S. combat and noncombat casualties reach 255 at 100-day mark after 
declared end of combat on May 1; 43 British have died.
-Aug. 19, 2003-Suicide bombing destroys UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24, 
including top envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, and wounding more than 100.
-Aug. 29, 2003-A bomb kills one of Iraq's most important Shi'ite leaders, Ayatollah 
Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, as well as about 80 others, and wounds 125.
-September-
-Sep. 7, 2003-Continued violence and slow progress in Iraq lead to President Bush's 




-Oct. 2, 2003-According to an interim report by David Kay, the lead investigator 
searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, no WMDs have been found as yet.
-Oct. 5, 2003-White House reorganizes its reconstruction efforts in Iraq, placing National 
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in charge and diminishing the role of the Pentagon.
-Oct. 16, 2003-The UN Security Council unanimously approves the U.S. and UK 
resolution on Iraq's reconstruction, which supports an international force in the country 
under U.S. authority. Several countries originally opposed the resolution unless 
Washington agreed to a faster timetable for transferring power to the Iraqis, but in the end 
voted for the resolution without requiring changes.
-Oct. 23–24, 2003-The Madrid Conference, an international donors' conference of 80 
nations to raise funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, yielded $13 billion in addition to the 
$20 billion already pledged by the United States. This amount fell short of the overall 
target of raising $56 billion, the figure the World Bank and the UN estimated that Iraq 
needs over the next four years.
-Oct. 27, 2003-Four coordinated suicide attacks in Baghdad kill 43 and wounded more 
than 200. Targets included the headquarters of the Red Crescent (Islamic Red Cross) and 
three police stations. 
-November-
-Nov. 2, 2003-In the single deadliest strike since the Iraq war began, guerrillas shoot 
down an American helicopter, killing 16 U.S. soldiers and injuring 21 others.
Other attacks over the course of the month make it the bloodiest since the war began: at 
least 75 U.S. soldiers die.
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-Nov. 14, 2003 -The Bush Administration reverses policy and in a deal with the Iraqi 
Governing Council, agrees to transfer power to an interim government in early 2004.
-December-
-Dec. 9, 2003-A directive issued by Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, bars 
France, Germany, Canada, Mexico, China, and Russia from bidding on lucrative 
contracts for rebuilding Iraq, creating a diplomatic furor.
-Dec. 13, 2003-Iraq's deposed leader Saddam Hussein is captured by American troops. 
The former dictator was found hiding in a hole near his hometown of Tikrit and 
surrendered without a fight.
2004
-January-
-Jan. 18, 2004- Car bomb in Baghdad leaves 20 dead
-Jan. 25, 2004- The U.S. admits that there is no evidence that Iraq stockpiled WMDs
-Jan. 27, 2004- Insurgents killed 6 US soldiers
-February 2004-
-Feb. 1, 2004- At least 67 dead in suicide blasts in Kurdistan
-Feb.10,2004- Car bomb kills at least 50; 47 are Iraq army recruits
-Feb. 21,2004-Red Cross visits Saddam in Baghdad
-March-
-Mar. 2, 2004- 182 killed in attacks in Baghdad, Karbala
-Mar. 8, 2004-  Interim constitution signed
-Mar. 9, 2004- Abu Abbas, Achille Lauro hijacker, dead 
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-Mar.28,2004-Protests as U.S. closes Iraqi paper
-Mar.31,2004- Iraqis hang U.S. bodies off bridge  U.S. officials said they expect more 
attacks like the one that killed 4 U.S. civilian contractors
-April-
-Apr. 6, 2004-Heavy fighting in sealed Falluja
-Dozen U.S. Marines killed
-Apr. 7, 2004-Coalition battled Shiite, Sunni insurgents
-Apr. 8, 2004 -Japanese, Koreans taken hostage
-Apr. 11,2004- Truce bid calms Falluja fighting
-Apr. 16,2004- Missing U.S. soldier on videotape
-Apr. 20,2004- Iraqi tribunal in Baghdad to try Saddam Hussein
-Apr. 21,2004-Car bombs in Basra kill 68
-Apr. 27,2004-U.S. forces kill 64 insurgents near Najaf
-U.S. warplanes pound Fallujah targets
-Apr. 29,2004- Former Iraqi generals offer Fallujah plan
-Apr. 30,2004-Iraq prison abuse sparks outrage.  A coalition military spokesman is 
'disgusted' by photographs that apparently show U.S. soldiers abusing detainees. 
-May-
-May.11, 2004-Video shows U.S. captive beheaded  Captors say they offered exchange 
man, identified himself as Nicholas Berg, 26, for Abu Ghraib prisoners
-May.14,2004-Interrogation techniques banned in Iraq
-May 17,2004-Interim council head killed in car bombing  Ezzedine Salim was killed as 
he was waiting to enter headquarters of the coalition. Several other people also died
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-May. 20,2004-Chalabi angered by raid on home
-May. 24,2004-Bush outlines 5-step Iraq plan
-May. 28,2004-Allawi named as future prime minister.  Former exile Iyad Allawi has 
been chosen to head an interim government.
-May 31, 2004 - Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) Order number 92 establishes the 
Independent electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) as the exclusive electoral authority in 
Iraq.
-June 2004-
-Jun. 1,2004-Interim Council in Baghdad dissolved as new president named
-Jun. 8,2004-Iraq    Kidnapped Italians, Pole freed
-Iraq plan gets unanimous backing in US
-Jun. 16,2004-Probe rules out Iraq-9/11 links
-Jun. 17,2004-Car bomb kills 35 in Baghdad
-Jun. 22,2004-South Korean hostage beheaded  Insurgents carried out their threat to 
behead Kim Sun-il they were holding hostage
-Jun. 23,2004-'Zarqawi tape' threatens Iraq PM
-Jun. 24,2004-Multiple attacks kill 90
-Jun. 27,2004-US hands over sovereignty in Iraq  US administrator Paul Bremer gave 
legal documents to an Iraqi judge two days ahead of schedule. 




-Jul. 1, 2004-Defiant Saddam in court: Saddam Hussein is hearing preliminary charges 
against him that included the gassing of Kurds and the invasion of Kuwait.
-Jul. 7,2004- Iraq adopts emergency powers law
-Jul. 13,2004-Manila begins troop pullout  A move is being made to satisfy demands by 
kidnappers of a Filipino hostage
-Jul. 15,2004-Iraq to form new security force in Baghdad. Attacks by insurgents 
continued as the government is establishing an intelligence service to 'annihilate' terrorist 
groups
-Jul. 23,2004-Militants take Egyptian diplomat hostage
-Jul. 24,2004-Militant threat to Australia and Italy
-Jul. 28,2004-Day of violence leaves at least 115 dead  68 killed in a Baquba suicide 
bombing and 42 in fighting in south-central Iraq. Militants claim to kill 2 Pakistanis
-August-
-Aug. 1,2004-Bomb blasts rock churches
-Aug. 6, 2004-Marines: 300 insurgents killed in Najaf
-Aug. 7,2004-Iraq amnesty targets insurgents
-Aug. 11,2004-U.S. launches offensive in Najaf  The military launched a major offensive 
against militants loyal to renegade Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.  
-Aug. 12,2004-Radical cleric wounded in Najaf
-Aug. 13,2004-Najaf truce brings calm to city
-Aug. 15,2004-Conference on interim assembly
-Aug. 17,2004-Al-Sadr rebuffs truce delegates
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-August 18, 2004 - Iraqi National Conference selects a national assembly to act as a 
parliament until elections are held.
-Aug. 19,2004-Fierce fighting seen in Najaf
-Aug. 25,2004-Al-Sistani returns, urges march on Najaf
-Blast at mosque kills 74
-Aug. 26,2004-Ayatollah reaches peace deal with al-Sadr  Al-Sadr has reached an 
agreement with al-Sistani that grants his freedom from murder charges and secures peace 
in Najaf
-Aug. 31,2004-Militants: 12 Nepalese 'killed'
-September 2004-
-Sep. 7,2004-U.S. death toll in Iraq passes 1,000  More than three-quarters have died in 
combat, and 647 of have been killed since Bush declared an end to major combat
-Sep. 14,2004-Car bomb at police station in Baghdad kills 47  Assailants launched two 
deadly assaults at police targets. 
-12 police officers killed in a drive-by shooting in Baquba
-Sep. 15,2004- Iraq war illegal, says U.N. head Kofi Annan
-Sep. 20,2004-U.S. hostage beheaded
-Sep. 23,2004-Iraq PM thanks U.S.; Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi is laying 
out his government's aspirations to a joint meeting of Congress
-Sep. 24,2004- Six Egyptians taken in Baghdad
-Sep. 27,2004- Kidnapped Iranian diplomat freed
-Sep. 28,2004-Italians freed, Frenchmen to be released
-Sep. 30, 2004- BaghdadBombs toll hits 45
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-October 2004-
-Oct. 1,2004-109 insurgents killed in Samarra  3,000 U.S. troops moved into Samarra. 
One American soldier was killed
-Oct. 8,2004-Hostage Bigley killed
-Oct. 10,2004-Weapons handover in Sadr City
-Oct. 11,2004-Nuclear assets 'vanish'
-Oct. 12,2004-Babies found in mass grave
-October 12, 2004 - Elections regulations published by IECI.
-Oct. 14,2004-Green Zone blasts kill 8
-U.S., Iraqis in Falluja assault
-Oct. 15,2004-Blasts at churches in Baghdad
-Oct. 16- US bombers strike at Falluja
-Oct. 18 -U.S. bombs targets linked to al-Zarqawi
-Oct. 19 -Agency halts aid projects after kidnap
-Oct. 20 - Abu Ghuraib prison guard pleads guilty
-October 21, 2004 - Voter registration materials distributed.
-Oct. 22 - Falluja raid 'nets Zarqawi aide'
-Oct. 24 - Massacre of 50 Iraqi army recruits  The bodies of recruits have been found 
following an ambush near the Iranian border
-Oct. 25 - IAEA: Tons of Iraq explosives missing
-Oct. 27 - British troops move toward Baghdad
-Oct. 28 - Militants claim killings of 11 Iraqis
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-Oct. 30 - Eight U.S. Marines killed
-Oct. 31 - U.S. forces launch new assaults in Falluja
-November 2004-
-November 1, 2004 - Voter and candidate registration begins for the election of a 
transition government.
-Nov. 3 - Three Iraqi guards 'beheaded'
-November 4, 2004 - Determination is made to allow Iraqis abroad to vote in the 
elections.
-Nov. 5 - US military 'seals off Falluja'
-Nov. 6 - Rebel attacks in Samarra kill 33
-Nov. 7 - Allawi declares state of emergency
Iraqi commandos seize Falluja hospital
-Nov. 8 - Battle for Falluja under way
-Soldiers advanced into Falluja
-Nov. 9 - U.S., Iraqis enter Falluja's center  10 U.S. troops and 2 Iraqi soldiers had been 
killed, 22 others wounded. 
-Nov. 10 - Troops find hostage 'slaughterhouses'
-Nov. 11 - At least 19 die in car bombing
  -U.S. troops push into south Falluja
-Nov. 13 - '1,000 Falluja insurgents killed'
-Nov. 14 - U.S.: 'Enemy is broken' in Falluja  Marines spread through the deserted streets, 
kicking in doors during a dangerous house-to-house search
-Nov. 16 - Margaret Hassan apparently killed  The director of CARE International in Iraq 
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was kidnapped on October 19. Videotapes showing her killing
-Nov. 18 - Falluja assault 'breaks' rebels
-Nov. 21 - Elections set for January 30
-December 2004-
-Dec. 1 - U.S. Troop Numbers in Iraq to Hit 150,000
-December 1, 2004 - Recruitment of polling station staff begins.
-Dec. 3 - Baghdad    Violence Kills at Least 25 Iraqis
-Dec. 5  - Insurgents Kill 23 Iraqis Countrywide
-Dec. 15 - Shi'ites Bombed as Poll Campaign Begins
-December 15, 2004 - Deadline for registering parties and individuals for the coming 
election. Validation of voter registration list. Election campaign starts.
-Dec. 19  - Bombs in Karbala, Najaf kill more than 60  In Najaf, a suicide car bomber 
plowed his vehicle into a funeral procession just yards from Imam Ali shrine, killing 48
-Dec. 20 - Police arrest 50 after bombings
-Dec. 21 - 22 killed in attack on U.S. base  Multiple rounds hit a dining hall near Mosul, 
killing U.S. troops, members of the Iraqi national guard, and Iraqi civilians
-Dec. 23 - Rumsfeld arrives for surprise visit
2005
January
-January 1, 2005 - Process of distributing ballots begins.
-The the militant group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, released a video of five national 
guardsmen being shot dead in a street as passers-by stopped to watch.
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-January 2, 2005 - A suicide car bomber struck a bus carrying Iraqi national guardsmen 
north of Baghdad, killing 26 people and wounding six, as insurgents showed no signs of 
letting up in their campaign to wreck elections scheduled for the end of the month. 
-Four Iraqi policemen were killed and one wounded when their vehicle was ambushed 
near Samarra.
-In Diyala province in the east the deputy governor, Ali Haddawi, was shot dead.
-January 3, 2005 - A roadside explosion and three separate car bombs in Iraq killed at 
least 17 people, including three British civilians, as insurgents pressed their campaign to 
disrupt the general election, and the defence minister said that polling might be postponed
-An explosive-laden car struck near Mr Allawi's party headquarters in Baghdad, killing 
two police officers and one civilian.
-Another car bomb in Balad killed four Iraqi national guard soldiers and wounded 14.
-Yet another explosion, at a roadside in Saddam Hussein's home town Tikrit, killed at 
least six guardsmen and injured four others, the police said.
-January 4, 2005 - Ali al-Haidri, the governor of the Baghdad province, was assassinated 
in the al-Hurriya suburb of Baghdad as his car was ambushed in the street in the most 
high-profile killing for several months.  Al-Qaida in Iraq, a militant group led by the 
Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the attack and said that it 
had killed a "tyrant and American agent".
-It also claimed responsibility for a suicide truck bomb attack on an Iraqi commando base 
near Yarmouk hospital, the second time the base had been hit, killing 10 people, 
including eight Iraqi commandos, and injuring 60.
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-In separate attacks, 5 American troops were killed and a further 10 Iraqis died when a 
suicide truck bomber drove into an Iraqi commando base in Baghdad early in the 
morning.
-January 5, 2005 - The Iraqi prime minister, Ayad Allawi, insists that the general election 
would go ahead as planned in three weeks' time, despite growing calls for a delay.
- Three suicide bombers struck in separate towns, killing more than 20 people. 
-In Mosul, Omar Mahmoud Abdallah, an official of the Iraqi Islamic party (the 
mainstream Sunni party) was assassinated.  In another incident a prominent Iraqi union 
leader, Hadi Salih, was shot dead at his Baghdad home.
-Many of the bigger Sunni parties have withdrawn from the campaign, leaving the 
minority community from which the violent insurgency has grown likely to be heavily 
under-represented in the national assembly.
- A suicide car bomber attacked a police graduation ceremony in Hilla, south of Baghdad, 
killing at least 15 people, including at least 10 policemen. The militant Islamic Army in 
Iraq claimed responsibility.
- In Baquba, a third car bomb killed six at a checkpoint. Earlier, a police colonel and his 
driver were shot dead in the town.
-January 12, 2005 - The U.S. ends its hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The 
two-year search failed to yield the weapon stockpiles that Saddam Hussein's regime was 
alleged to possess.
-January 23, 2005 - Last day for expatriates to register to vote.
-JANUARY 27, 2005: 30 Marines, Sailor Die In Copter crash in Iraq, the deadliest single 
event for U.S. forces since the invasion 
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-January 28, 2005 - Official campaign period ends.
-January 30, 2005 - An estimated 60 per cent of Iraqi voters - about 14 million people -
turn out to elect a transitional National Assembly in the country's first free polls in 50 
years. The elections are won by a Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, who win a 
majority of the assembly seats. Kurdish parties come second
-February
-February 3, 2005 - Gunmen kill 12 Iraqi soldiers in an ambush near the village of Zab 
south of Kirkuk.
-Insurgents kill five Iraqi policemen and an Iraqi National Guard officer in an ambush on 
Baghdad’s airport road.
-February 6, 2005 - Insurgents kill 17 Iraqi policemen and 5 Iraqi national guardsmen in 
an attack on a police station in Mahawil, south of Baghdad. Fourteen of the militants are 
also killed.
-Iraqi security forces disclose the December 20 capture in Beiji, 155 miles north of 
Baghdad, of Khamis Masin Farhan Ugaydi, a former Saddam Hussein-era army general 
suspected of financing insurgent bombings and plotting attacks on election targets.
-February 7, 2005 - A suicide car bomb kills 15 civilians and wounds 17 outside the main 
police headquarters in Baquba.
-February 8, 2005 - Gunmen open fire on the convoy of Mithal al-Alousi, the general 
secretary of the Iraqi Nation Democratic Party, in western Baghdad, killing his son and 
bodyguard.
-A suicide bomber kills 21 Iraqis and wounds 27 near an Iraqi army recruitment center in 
central Baghdad.
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-February 10, 2005 -A suicide car bomber kills four Iraqis in a public square in central 
Baghdad.
-February 11, 2005 - A car bomb kills 12 Iraqis and wounds 17 outside a Shiite mosque 
in Balad Ruz.
-February 12, 2005 - A suicide car bomber kills 17 Iraqis at the entrance to a hospital 
south of Baghdad.
-A masked gunman kills 10 at a bakery in a Shiite area of Baghdad.
-Shia holy religious mourning period begins.
-February 13, 2005 - Official results of the January 30 elections for seats in the 275-
member National Assembly are announced. The United Iraqi Alliance, a slate backed by 
Shiite Muslim clergy, receives 48% of the vote (140 seats); the Kurdistan Alliance, a 
coalition of the two main Kurdish factions, earns 26% (75 seats); the Iraqi List, headed 
by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, gains 14% of the vote (40 seats). Voter turnout is 
reported at 58%.
-Gunmen firing from a car kill two high-ranking policemen in Baghda.
-February 14, 2005 - One roadside bomb kills a U.S. soldier and wounds three others, and 
a second kills three Iraqi national guardsmen, both near Baquba.
-A mortar attack kills an Iraqi woman and a 2-year-old girl and wounds seven others in 
Samarra.
February 18, 2005 –
-A suicide bomber kills 15 and wounds 24 as Shiites celebrate the religious festival of 
Ashura in a procession to al-Khadimain mosque in southern Baghdad.
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-A suicide bomber kills two and wounds eight outside the al-Bayaa Shiite mosque in 
western Baghdad.
-A suicide bomber kills two and injures five near a religious procession in a Shiite district 
in northwestern Baghdad.
-A rocket fired in the direction of the Husseiniyat al Thaqilan mosque in northwestern 
Baghdad hits a coffee shop, kills one Iraqi, and wounds three.
-In Karbala, police find the bodies of two kidnapped police officers, both the sons of the 
chief of police of Najaf, Ghalib al-Jazaeni.
-A roadside bomb kills a U.S. soldier and wounds another during a patrol in Tal Afar, 
west of Mosul.
-February 22, 2005 –
-Day of Ashura – the holiest day in Shiite Islam.
-Ibrahim al-Jaafari is chosen by the victorious Shiite alliance as its candidate to become 
Iraq’s new prime minister.
-NATO leaders announce in a joint statement that all 26 members of the alliance will 
help train Iraq’s new security forces.
-Six suicide bombers, including one on a bicycle, kill 39 people and wound about 150 in 
five separate attacks in and around Baghdad. The attacks are meant to disrupt Ashura, the 
holiest day in Shiite Islam.
-February 24, 2005 - A suicide car bomb kills 12 policemen and wounds 29 others at a 
police station in Tikrit
-A roadside bomb kills two Iraqi policemen and wounds three others in Kirkuk.
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-A roadside bomb kills a U.S. soldier in Qiryat in Diyala province, and an improvised 
explosive devices kills a U.S. soldier and wound two others near Samarra
-U.S. forces detain 29 suspected insurgents and seize weapons caches during operations 
throughout Anbar province
-Iraqi national guard troops capture Mohammed Najem Ibrahim, a suspected terrorist cell 
leader with links to Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Baquba.
-February 25, 2005-A roadside bomb kills three U.S. soldiers and wounds eight in 
Tarmiya.
-February 27, 2005 - Iraqi officials announce Syria has captured and handed over a half-
brother of Saddam Hussein, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti, who is accused of 
playing a leading role in organizing and financing the insurgency in Iraq.
- FEBRUARY 28, 2005: Car bombs kill at least 114 Iraqis in Hilla, south of Baghdad.
[BBC, 2/28/05]
-March
-March 2, 2005 - Suicide car bombers kill 13 Iraqi soldiers and wound 30 in two separate 
attacks in Baghdad.
-Gunmen kill a judge and a lawyer with the special tribunal that will try Saddam Hussein 
and former members of his government outside their family home in Baghdad. The 
victims, Parwiz Muhammad Mahmoud al-Merani and Aryan Mahmoud al-Merani, were 
father and son.
-March 3, 2005 - Two suicide car bombs kill five Iraqi police officers and wound seven 
outside the main gate of the Iraqi Interior Ministry in Baghdad.
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-A car bomb kills an Iraqi civilian and wounds 16 others, including five police officers, 
outside the main police station in Baquba
-March 4, 2005- Gunmen kill Sheik Saad Kamil, a Shiite imam associated with the rebel 
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, as he arrived at the Kadmenain Mosque in Baghdad.
-March 7, 2005 - In Baquba, three separate militant attacks on Iraqi Army checkpoints 
and convoys kill 12 Iraqi security officers and wound 25.
-In Balad, a suicide bomber drives a truck laden with explosives into the house of an 
Army officer, kills five civilian bystanders, and wounds 24.
-March 8, 2005 - Gunmen assassinate Major General Ghazi Mohammed, a senior Iraqi 
interior ministry official, in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad.
-March 9, 2005 - Twenty bodies, including those of male and female civilians, are found 
in a remote valley near the Syrian border.
-Gunmen fire on the car of Iraq’s interim planning minister, Mahdi al-Hafidh, in 
Baghdad. Two of the minister’s guards are killed and a third is seriously wounded. 
Hafidh is not injured.
-A suicide bomber detonates a garbage truck full of explosives in a parking lot next to 
Baghdad’s Sadr Hotel, which houses a number of foreign contractors. One Iraqi 
policeman is killed; more than 40 are wounded, including 30 U.S. contractors.
-March 10, 2005-A suicide bomber kills 53 people at a funeral inside a Shiite mosque in 
Mosul.
-The White House announces President Bush has chosen Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. 
ambassador to Afghanistan, to become the new ambassador in Baghdad.
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-March 12, 2005- Gunmen kill three Iraqi police officers as they drive to a colleague’s 
funeral in Mosul.
-March 16, 2005 - Iraq’s first freely elected parliament in a half-century meets for the 
first time in the heavily fortified International Zone in central Baghdad.
-A suicide car bomber kills three Iraqi soldiers and wounds 12 more at an army 
checkpoint in Baquba.
-March 19, 2005 - A bomb kills three Iraqi police officers in Kirkuk in a funeral 
procession for a fellow officer shot by insurgents the day before.
-March 20, 2005 - Iraqi insurgents ambush a U.S. military convoy, igniting a battle that 
leaves 24 of the attackers dead and 7 wounded. Six U.S. soldiers are wounded in the 
ambush, at Salman Pak
-March 22, 2005- Militants ambush a convoy carrying Iraqi security force officials, 
including a senior police officer, Brigadier General Abu Al-Waled, in front of a mosque 
in Mosul. Police kill 17 militants and capture 14. None of the security troops are killed.
-March 23, 2005-Iraqi and U.S. forces kill 85 insurgents during a raid on a guerrilla 
training camp 50 miles northwest of Baghdad. Seven Iraqi police officers are killed and 
six wounded.
-March 24, 2005-A suicide car bomber kills 11 Iraqi special police commandos and 
wounds nine others in Ramadi.
-Militants shoot five Iraqi women dead as they leave work at a U.S. military base in 
southern Baghdad.
-March 30, 2005- Militants launch three attacks on Shiite pilgrims on their way to 
Karbala for a religious festival. Gunmen open fire on a minibus and wound eight near 
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Latifiya, 25 miles south of Baghdad. A second group of gunmen kill one and injure two 
in a car near the town of Mahaweel, 40 miles south of Baghdad. A suicide bomber on a 
bicycle rides into a police patrol protecting pilgrims and kills two officers, also near 
Mahaweel.
-March 31, 2005-A suicide car bomber kills two Iraqi army soldiers and two civilians in a 
crowd of Shiites celebrating a religious holiday in the northern city of Tuz Khurmato
-A suicide car bomber rams a U.S. military vehicle, killing one Iraqi civilian and 
wounding seven in Samarra
-April
-April 2, 2005
Seven suicide car bombers and 40 to 60 insurgents armed with an array of weapons 
attack the U.S.-controlled Abu Ghraib prison. Twenty U.S. soldiers and marines are 
wounded.
-A car bomb kills four Iraqi policemen and one civilian at a police station in the town of 
Khan Bani Saad, 10 miles north of Baghdad.
-April 3, 2005
The Iraqi National Assembly appoints Hajim M. al-Hassani, a prominent Sunni Arab and 
the minister of industry in the interim government, as speaker, and Hussain al-
Shahristani, a nuclear physicist and leading Shiite Arab, and Arif Taifour, a Kurd, as his 
deputies.
April 4, 2005- A bomb in an abandoned taxi kills one U.S. soldier and wounds four 
others in southern Baghdad.
-A bomb in a parked car kills an Iraqi civilian and wounds two others in Amiriya.
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-General Jalal Mohammed Salah, the commander of an Iraqi mechanized armored 
brigade, is kidnapped.
-April 5, 2005-Iraq’s transitional assembly elects Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani to the 
largely symbolic post of Iraqi president. Shiite Arab Adel Abdel Mahdi, a member of the 
United Iraqi Alliance who served as interim finance minister, and Sunni Arab Sheikh 
Ghazi al-Yawar, who served as the interim president, are elected vice presidents.
April 6, 2005 - Kurdish politician Jalal Talabani is Iraq's first freely elected president by 
parliament in 50 years. Shiite Ibrahim al-Jaafari is nominated as prime minister.
April 7, 2005 - Iraq’s new president, Jalal Talabani, names the Shiite leader Ibrahim al-
Jaafari prime minister.
-April 11, 2005- Hundreds of Iraqi troops and commandos backed by U.S. soldiers 
capture 65 suspected insurgents in central and southern Baghdad in one of the largest 
raids in the capital since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
-Kidnappers abduct a U.S. contractor, Jeffrey Ake, in Baghdad.
-A pickup truck packed with explosives kills at least 3 people and wounds 20 near a U.S. 
military convoy in Samarra.
-April 12, 2005 - A suicide car bomber kills four Iraqis and wounds seven near a U.S. 
military convoy in Mosul.
-The Iraqi government announces the capture at a farm northeast of Baghdad of Fadhil 
Ibrahim Mahmoud al-Mashadani, a former official in Saddam Hussein’s government 
accused of coordinating and financing a series of insurgent attacks.
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-April 14, 2005-Two suicide car bombs detonate in quick succession near an Interior 
Ministry building in central Baghdad and kill 15 Iraqis. More than 30 are injured. A third 
blast in the same area several hours later kills one person.
-In Latifiya, 25 miles south of Baghdad, gunmen assassinate the mayor.
-April 15, 2005 - A suicide bomber steers his car into an Iraqi police patrol and kills four 
officers in Mahaweel, 40 miles south of Baghdad. Another three bomb attacks in 
Baghdad wound nine people.
-April 16, 2005- Three U.S. soldiers die in a mortar attack in Ramadi
-A bomb kills 10 Iraqi police officers and three others in a crowded restaurant in Baquba.
-April 17, 2005-Insurgents kill Brigadier General Younis Mohammad Sulaiman, the 
Mosul police public information officer, as he drives to work.
-April 18, 2005 - Ten insurgents dressed in Iraqi military uniforms kill Iraqi Lieutenant 
General Adnan Qaragholi, an adviser to interim Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan, and 
his son at their home in southern Baghdad.
-April 19, 2005 -A suicide car bomber kills two members of the Iraqi army and two 
recruits and wounds 38 others near the Adhamiya Palace in northern Baghdad.
-April 20, 2005-A suicide car bomber kills one and wounds four near the headquarters of 
Iraqi interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s political party in Baghdad.
-Iraqi President Jalal Talabani says the bodies of more than 50 people he believes to be 
Shiites killed by Sunni extremists were recovered from the Tigris River.
-Nineteen Iraqis are lined up against a wall and shot to death in a soccer stadium in the 
town of Haditha, about 140 miles northwest of Baghdad.
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-One Iraqi policeman is killed and two seriously wounded when their patrol is hit by a 
roadside bomb in Mowailha, south of Baghdad.
-April 21, 2005 - Eleven people, including six Americans from the security firm 
Blackwater USA working for the U.S. military, are killed when a commercial helicopter 
crashes near Baghdad. The Islamic Army of Iraq, a jihadist group, says it brought down 
the helicopter and executed a survivor.
-April 22, 2005 - A car bomb kills nine people and wounds 24 outside a Shiite mosque in 
Baghdad.
-April 23, 2005-U.S. soldiers capture six men suspected of shooting down a civilian 
helicopter April 21 in Baghdad.
-A car bomber wounds three U.S. servicemen and seven Iraqi soldiers on a street that 
adjoins the road to Baghdad International Airport.
-Gunmen assassinate the prison director for Nineveh Province, Colonel Khalid Najim 
Abdallah, in Mosul.
-April 24, 2005 - Two bombs kill 15 Iraqis and wound nearly 60 near the Shiite Ahl al-
Beit mosque in Baghdad.
-April 27, 2005 - Insurgents assassinate Lamia Abed Khadouri, a newly elected member 
of the National Assembly, at her home in Baghdad.
-April 28, 2005-Iraq’s National Assembly votes overwhelmingly to approve a cabinet, 
creating the first fully and freely elected government in Iraqi history. The assembly’s 
political factions continue negotiations on candidates for five ministries--defense, oil, 
electricity, industry, and human rights.
184
-April 29, 2005-A coordinated series of car bomb attacks targeting Iraqi security forces 
kills 27 Iraqis, seven of them civilians, and injures more than 100 in and around Baghdad
-April 30, 2005-Syria announces it is restoring diplomatic relations with Iraq after a break 
of more than two decades.
-May-
- Surge in car bombings, bomb explosions and shootings: Iraqi ministries put the civilian 
death toll for May at 672, up from 364 in April.
-May 3, 2005-Iraq’s first fully and freely elected government takes power as new cabinet 
members are sworn into office. Several key cabinet positions remain unfilled.
-Insurgents kill two Iraqi civilians and one Iraqi soldier at a checkpoint in Ramadi, about 
50 miles west of Baghdad. Twelve insurgents are also killed.
-May 4, 2005-A suicide bomber kills 60 prospective policemen and wounds more than 
200 others inside a police recruitment office in the Kurdish provincial capital of Erbil.
-May 6, 2005-A suicide car bomber kills 58 Iraqi civilians and wounds 44 more in 
Suwayra, about 30 miles south of Baghdad.
-A suicide car bomber drives into a police bus and kills 10 Iraqi policemen in Tikrit.
-Iraqi police unearth the bodies of 14 Iraqi men in a garbage dump in Baghdad.
-May 7, 2005-The Iraqi National Assembly approves new defense, human rights, oil, 
electricity, and industry ministers.
-Suicide bombers attack a U.S. private security convoy and kill two U.S. security 
contractors and 22 Iraqis.
-May 8, 2005-Gunmen kill a senior transportation ministry official, Yasser Khudair 
Almaaini, and his driver in Baghdad.
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-Attacks by insurgents kill six U.S. servicemen in separate attacks in the towns of Qaim 
and Obeidi, both near the Syrian border, about 185 miles west of Baghdad.
-May 9, 2005-Hashim al-Shibli, who had been named human rights minister May 7, 
announces he will not accept the post.
-The U.S. military announces it has killed more than 100 insurgents in an offensive in 
Anbar province in western Iraq.
-Iraqi police find the bodies of a senior Iraqi border policeman and five of his relatives in 
Markab al-Tair, a village near the Syrian border.
-May 10, 2005-Iraq’s transitional national assembly names a 55-member committee to 
draft the country’s permanent constitution.
-May 11, 2005-A suicide bomber kills 38 people and wounds more than 80 in Tikrit.
-A suicide bomber kills 32 and wounds more than 40 outside a national guard recruitment 
center in Hawija, about 150 miles north of Baghdad.
-May 12, 2005-Four car bombs in Baghdad and one in Kirkuk kill 21 people and wound 
more than 70.
-May 13, 2005-A car bomb kills five Iraqis in Baiji, about 130 miles north of Baghdad.
-May 15, 2005-Police find the corpses of 12 Iraqi men in northeastern Baghdad, 13 
bodies in eastern Baghdad, and 11 more near Iskandariya, 25 miles south of Baghdad
-Militants armed with bombs and mortars kill four Iraqi soldiers and wound four more in 
an attack on a fire station in Khan Bani Saad, about 15 miles northeast of Baghdad.
-Two suicide bombers kill five Iraqis in Baquba, about 40 miles northeast of Baghdad.
-May 17, 2005-Insurgents kill 21 Iraqis: six truck drivers delivering supplies to U.S. 
forces north of Baghdad, three policemen in Mosul; in Baghdad, two government 
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officials, a former member of the Baath Party and his three grown sons, two Iraqi 
soldiers, a Shiite cleric and his driver, and two Sunni clerics
-May 19, 2005-Insurgents kill eight Iraqis in Mosul during an attack on the house of 
Fawwaz al-Jarba, a Sunni Muslim elected to parliament as a member of a Shiite-
dominated coalition. Al-Jarba survives the attack.
-In Baghdad, gunmen kill an Oil Ministry official outside his home, and a car bomb kills 
two people and wounds five near a Shiite mosque. A roadside bomb kills two policemen 
in Baquba. Another roadside bomb kills a policeman and wounds three more in 
Iskandariya, 25 miles south of Baghdad. Gunmen kill a local police chief in Anbar 
Province. A police officer and his father are shot dead in Samarra, 60 miles north of 
Baghdad.
-May 23, 2005-Two suicide car bombs kill 15 Iraqis outside the home of Hasan Bagdash, 
a Shiite Turkmen politician, in Tal Afar, about 90 miles east of the Syrian border. 
Bagdash survived the attack.
-A suicide truck bomb kills five people and wounds 18 outside the office of the mayor of 
Tuz Khurmatu.
-A car bomb kills 11 Iraqis and wounds more than 110 outside a Baghdad restaurant.
-Gunmen kill Wael Rubaie, an official of the Ministry of State for National Security, and 
his driver, in Baghdad.
-A suicide car bomber kills 21 people and wounds 23 outside a Shiite mosque in 
Mahmoudiya, 25 miles south of Baghdad.
-Two suicide bombers, one in a car and the other on foot, kill four Iraqis and wound four 
U.S. soldiers outside a U.S. base in Samarra.
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-May 25, 2005-Around 1,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops search homes and seize suspected 
insurgents in Haditha, about 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. Ten insurgents are killed; 
two U.S. marines are wounded.
-In Mosul, gunmen kill Mikhlif Khalaf, police chief of the northern town of Sharqat.
-May 26, 2005
A reconnaissance helicopter is shot down 35 miles north of Baghdad, killing two U.S. 
soldiers.
-Insurgents kill Fakri Abed al-Amri, a member of the Shiite Muslim Dawa Party headed 
by Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, at al-Amri’s brother’s home in Baghdad.
-Militants gun down Professor Moussa Salum, a deputy dean at Baghdad’s Mustansiriya 
University, and three of his bodyguards, in Baghdad.
-May 27, 2005-A suicide bomber kills seven people, including three police officers, in 
Tikrit.
-May 29, 2005
Insurgents attack two police stations, an Iraqi army barracks, and a checkpoint in western 
Baghdad, killing three civilians at Baghdad’s police Major Crime Unit.
-Insurgents retaliate against Iraqi forces during a routine sweep of vehicles at 
checkpoints, killing 27 people, including a British soldier.
-Gunmen in Kirkuk kill Major General Ahmed al-Barazanchi, director of internal affairs 
of Kirkuk province and a former police chief.
-Police in Rawah find the corpse of Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi, governor of Anbar 
province. He was abducted May 10 near Qaim, a town near the Syrian border.
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-May 30, 2005-A single-engine plane crashes near Jalula, 80 miles northeast of Baghdad, 
killing four Americans and an Iraqi pilot. The aircraft was used by the Iraqi air force for 
surveillance and personnel transport.
-Two suicide bombers in Hillah, 60 miles south of Baghdad, kill 30 people, part of a 
crowd of 500 police officers outside the mayor’s office protesting a government decision 
to disband a police special forces unit.
-A roadside bomb kills one civilian and injures two others in Adhaim, 30 miles north of 
Baquba.
-Gunmen kill Sunni Muslim tribal leader, Sheik Bishar Abdul Karim al-Dobradani, 
outside his home in Mosul.
-May 31, 2005-Four Italian troops die in a helicopter crash eight miles south of 
Nasiriyah.
-A suicide bomber kills two Iraqi soldiers at an army checkpoint near Buhriz, about 35 
miles north of Baghdad.
-June-
-June 2, 2005-A suicide car bomb targeting a Northern Oil Company facility in Kirkuk 
kills a four-year-old and wounds 11 others.
-A suicide car bomb in Baquba kills four, including a deputy provincial council leader.
-A firefight between insurgents and police in Baiji, 130 miles north of Baghdad, kills a 
Turkish truck driver. Two members of the security forces die in the shootout.
-In Siniyah, 150 miles north of Baghdad, a mortar attack kills an Iraqi soldier.
-June 3, 2005-A suicide bomb in a remote village north of Baghdad kills 10 Iraqis.
-Gunmen kill an Iraqi contractor in charge of renovating a mosque in western Samarra.
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-A suicide bomber kills 10 Iraqis and wounds 10 more at a home in Saud, a remote 
village near Balad, about 50 miles north of Baghdad.
-In Tuz Khormato, a suicide bomber kills 12 people who had stopped for lunch at the 
popular highway stop 55 miles south of Kirkuk.
-A suicide bomber, trying to attack a convoy of civilian contract workers in Kirkuk, kills 
a young boy and three other Iraqi bystanders.
-Gunmen kill Shiite cleric Ali Abdul Hussein outside his home in Basra.
-June 7, 2005-Three explosions in and around Hawija, 40 miles southwest of Kirkuk, kill 
34 people; the deadliest kills 10 people at a checkpoint in Dibis, on the outskirts of 
Hawija.
-An attack on a U.S. military base in Tikrit kills two U.S. soldiers.
-June 8, 2005: Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visits for talks; meets representatives of Iraqi 
community in Britain
- Massoud Barzani is sworn in as regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan.
-A roadside bomb kills a U.S. soldier near Adwar, 10 miles south of Tikrit.
-June 9, 2005-Five marines die during combat operations near the town of Haqlaniyah, 
90 miles north of Baghdad.
-June 10, 2005-A roadside bomb kills two marines near the volatile Anbar province town 
of Saqlawiya, west of Falluja.
-The bodies of 21 Iraqis are found scattered in various locations in an area close to the 
Syrian border.
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-June 11, 2005=A former member of the Wolf Brigade, an Iraqi militia composed of 
roughly 2,000 fighters, kills three people when he blows himself up at the heavily 
guarded headquarters of an Iraqi police unit in Baghdad.
-Gunmen open fire on a minibus in Diyara, killing 11 Iraqi construction workers.
-A four-hour bombardment near the Anbar province city of Qaim kills 40 insurgents, 
according to the marines.
-An explosion in a cemetery in Najaf kills two Iraqis.
-June 12, 2005-In the northern city of Tuz Khormato, a suicide car bomber, targeting a 
U.S. convoy near the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, kills two Iraqis.
-In western Baghdad, insurgents attack two police stations, an Iraq army barracks, and a 
checkpoint; three civilians are killed.
-A suicide attacker in a car filled with explosives attacks the Iraqi Oil Ministry in 
Baghdad, killing two security guards at the heavily fortified complex.
-June 14, 2005-A suicide bomber kills 23 people outside a bank in Kirkuk.
-Two marines die during combat operations near Falluja.
-U.S. and Iraqi forces kill five civilians after they ignored warning signals to stop at a 
Ramadi checkpoint minutes after a suicide bomber blows himself up, killing an Iraqi 
soldier.
-U.S. forces arrest Mohammed Khalaf, the leader of the Mosul branch of al Qaeda in 
Iraq. Khalaf is considered a top aide to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
-June 15, 2005=A militant strapped with more than 100 pounds of explosives kills 26 
Iraqi soldiers in a crowded mess hall at an army base in Khalis, 45 miles north of 
Baghdad.
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-After seven weeks of captivity, Iraqi and U.S. troops free Australian hostage Douglas 
Wood.
-Insurgents kidnap and kill two senior officials in Kirkuk’s anti-terrorist squad, their 
driver, and another passenger.
-A suicide car bomb kills five Iraqi soldiers at a checkpoint in Kanan, 30 miles north of 
Baghdad.
-Insurgents kill seven people in the northern town of Tal Afar.
-June 16, 2005-Six masked gunmen kill a judge and his bodyguard in an eastern Mosul 
neighborhood.
-After weeks of deadlock, Sunni Arabs accept a compromise offer to increase their 
representation on the Shiite-led parliament committee set up to draft a constitution.
-June 17, 2005-A suicide bomber slams his car into a fuel tanker in Baghdad’s eastern 
suburbs, killing two people and injuring six others.
-For the first time, Saddam Hussein’s lawyer is permitted to attend an interrogation 
session with his client.
-June 19, 2005-A suicide bomber detonates his charges in a popular Baghdad restaurant 
during lunchtime, killing 23 people. The cafe is located just 400 yards from the Green 
Zone.
-June 20, 2005
A suicide bomber kills 15 traffic police officers and wounds 100 people outside the unit’s 
headquarters in the northern Kurdish city of Irbil.
-A suicide bomber kills five soldiers at an army checkpoint in Kirkuk.
-Insurgents kill eight officers and an eight-month old baby at a Baghdad police station.
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-A suicide bomber kills a Kurdish town’s security director and three of his bodyguards 
while they are traveling in a convoy.
-June 22, 2005-Four car bombs, which explode within minutes of each other, kill 23 
people and injure 56 others in and around western Baghdad’s Shula neighborhood. 
Gunmen kill a prominent Sunni law professor, Jassim al-Issawi, and his son in the same 
neighborhood.
-June 23, 2005-Simultaneous car bombs in Karradah, central Baghdad’s shopping 
district, kill 15 civilians and injure 28 others.
-An ambush of a U.S. military convoy in Fallujah kills four Marines-including a female 
Marine-leaves two other troops missing and presumed dead, and injures 13 other troops.
-U.S. and Iraqi troops kill seven insurgents in a home in western Baghdad’s Jamiaa 
neighborhood.
-June 24, 2005-U.S. troops shoot and kill an Iraqi reporter working for a Knight-Ridder, 
an American news organization, after he did not respond to a shouted signal from a 
military convoy in Baghdad.
-A suicide bomber trailed by five cars loaded with armed insurgents attacks the home of 
an Iraqi special forces police officer in Samarra, killing nine people.
-June 26, 2005-Insurgents kill three people at a barbershop in Baghdad’s Jadida district. 
Barbershops are the target of some Muslim extremists who believe men’s beards should 
remain long, authorities said.
-A suicide bomber kills five police officers on guard at a teaching hospital in Mosul.
-June 27, 2005-A car bomb explodes between a movie house and a mosque in eastern 
Baghdad, killing seven people.
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-June 28, 2005-A suicide bomber kills a Shiite member of parliament-87-year-old Dhari 
Ali al-Fayadh-his son, and two bodyguards in Rashidiya, 20 miles northeast of Baghdad.
-Car bombs kill two U.S. soldiers; one in Balad and the other in Tikrit.
-A car bomb in Baqouba, 35 miles northeast of Baghdad, kills five people and injures 
nine others.
-Gunmen kill a local city council member, Sabah Hussein, as he drives to work in 
Mansur.
-July-
-July 1, 2005-Gunmen kill Kamal Ezz al-Deen al-Ghuraifi, an aide to leading Shiite 
cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and two of his bodyguards in a drive-by shooting 
outside a Baghdad mosque.
-In Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates a car bomb outside the party offices of Prime 
Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, killing one guard and wounding another.
-A mortar attack at a power station causes a water plant to shut down, leaving millions of 
Baghdad residents with no running water in 100-degree temperatures.
-July 2, 2005-In Hillah, 60 miles south of Baghdad, an attacker detonates an explosive 
belt at a police checkpoint, killing six police officers. Ten minutes later, a second suicide 
bomber wounds 26 people in the crowd of police and civilians that gathered at the scene.
-The head of the Egyptian diplomatic mission to Iraq, Ihab al-Sherif, is pistol-whipped 
and forced into the trunk of a car by kidnappers when he stops to buy a newspaper in 
western Baghdad.
-July 5, 2005-In separate ambushes, gunmen attack convoys carrying the senior 
diplomats from Bahrain and Pakistan in Iraq as they drive through the streets of Baghdad. 
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Hassan Malallah al-Ansari, the Bahraini diplomat, is treated at a hospital for a gunshot 
wound to the hand. The Pakistani ambassador, Muhammad Yunis Khan, is unharmed, 
though the attack prompts Pakistan to announce the diplomat’s withdrawal from Iraq.
-July 7, 2005-Al Qaeda in Iraq announces that it has executed the Egyptian diplomat Ihab 
al-Sherif, four days after his abduction. The Egyptian government confirms his death.
-July 10, 2005
An attacker detonates an explosive vest outside a Baghdad army recruitment center, 
killing 25 and wounding 47.
-A suicide bomber kills four civilians by detonating a car bomb on a highway in Kirkuk, 
180 miles north of Baghdad. A bomb in a parked car, apparently targeting security forces 
responding to the first blast, is discovered and safely detonated by U.S. soldiers.
-Eight members of a Shiite family-a mother and seven children ranging in age from 2 to 
19 years-old-are shot to death while asleep in their Baghdad home in the early morning.
-July 11, 2005=Insurgents firing mortars and automatic weapons assault a police 
checkpoint in Khalis, 45 minutes north of Baghdad, killing eight Iraqi soldiers. Ninety 
minutes later, a nearby car bomb hits an Iraqi army patrol, killing two more Iraqi troops.
-July 12, 2005
Four members of the local International Organization for Human Rights, including the 
head of the organization, are killed when gunmen storm their Baghdad office.
-July 13, 2005-Twenty-seven people, including 18 children and one soldier, are killed 
and at least 70 are injured when a suicide car bomber speeds into U.S. troops handing out 
candy to children in Baghdad.
195
-July 15, 2005-A dozen explosions aimed at U.S. and Iraqi forces sweep across Baghdad 
throughout the day. Altogether the attacks claim 33 lives and leave 111 wounded. One of 
the bombs, detonated near President Jalal Talabani’s residence, kills four guards.
-July 16, 2005-In one of the deadliest suicide attacks since the start of the U.S. 
occupation, a man wrapped in explosives detonates himself under an oil tanker at a gas 
station in a crowded area of Musayyib, about 40 miles south of Baghdad. At least 90 
people are killed and 150 are injured.
-The Pentagon announces charges against 11 U.S. soldiers suspected of assaulting seven 
Iraqis they captured during an attack on a power plant in Baghdad.
-July 17, 2005-Iraq’s Special Tribunal files its first criminal case against Saddam Hussein 
and three aides for their roles in the 1982 massacre of dozens of Shiite villagers in the 
town of Dujail, 50 miles north of Baghdad. If convicted, they could face the death penalty
-A bomb explodes in Baghdad while police are inspecting two bodies left on the road, 
apparently as a trap. Two officers and one civilian die in the blast. An hour later, a 
suicide car bomber targets a police convoy, killing three officers and four civilian.
-July 18, 2005-A series of small ambushes and shootings throughout Baghdad and central 
Iraq claim the lives of 24 police, soldiers, and government workers.
- Death toll rises to 100 in suicide blast in Iraq [Washington Post, 7/18/05]
-July 19, 2005-Two Sunni members of Iraq’s constitutional committee are assassinated 
along with a bodyguard in a drive-by shooting just outside the walls of Baghdad’s Green 
Zone.
-A British research group, Iraq Body Count, releases a report claiming that 25,000 
civilians have died in violence in Iraq since the start of the U.S. invasion. 
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-July 20, 2005-Sunni members of the constitutional committee, in response to the 
assassination of two Sunni delegates, suspend their participation in the committee.
-July 21, 2005-Two Algerian diplomats are abducted in Baghdad when gunmen stop their 
car and drag them from the vehicle.
-July 24, 2005-A suicide attacker drives a truck filled with explosives into sand barriers 
outside a Baghdad police station. At least 39 people die in the massive explosion, which 
leaves a gaping crater and dozens of burning shops and vehicles in its wake.
-July 25, 2005-The Ministry of Interior police command station, housed in one of 
Saddam’s former palaces, is targeted in a suicide attack. Two people are killed and four 
are injured.
-July 26, 2005-Gunmen in cars assault a pair of busses carrying Industry Ministry 
employees home from work. Sixteen workers die and 27 are injured.
- Sunni delegates resume participation in the constitutional committee, ending a week-
long boycott.
-July 27, 2005-Al Qaeda in Iraq announces it has killed the two Algerian diplomats who 
were kidnapped the previous week.
-Seven Iraqi soldiers defending a water plant in Tarmiyah, 30 miles north of Baghdad, are 
killed in an assault by a score of well-armed insurgents.
- August –




-August 1, 2005-Six U.S. Marines are killed by small-arms fire when their unit is 
attacked by insurgents in the town of Haditha, 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. In the 
town of Hit, fifty miles southeast of Haditha, a marine from the same unit is killed by a 
car bomb.
-August 3, 2005-In the deadliest roadside bombing against U.S. troops to date, fourteen 
marines and their translator are killed when a massive explosion destroys their lightly 
armored vehicle outside the town of Haditha, 140 miles northwest of Baghdad.
-Steven Vincent, an American freelance journalist, and his translator are found shot to 
death in Basra. They had been abducted at gunpoint the previous evening.
-August 5, 2005-Insurgents mount a coordinated assault on several Iraqi army posts in 
Baghdad. U.S. forces help to repel the onslaught, but not before one Iraqi soldier and six 
attackers are killed and a dozen insurgents arrested.
-August 10, 2005-Gunmen in Baghdad abduct Brig. Gen. Khudayer Abbas, a senior 
official in the Iraqi Interior Ministry, which oversees the nation’s police and paramilitary 
operations.
-August 12, 2005-An explosion outside a mosque kills four people, including three 
children, and injures nineteen in the town of Nasaf, seventy miles west of Baghdad.
-Police kill three insurgents as they try to break into a polling station to be used in the 
October 15 constitutional referendum.
-August 14, 2005-An Iraqi commando unit discovers thirty bodies in a two-week-old 
grave in Baghdad. The discovery follows a raid in which thirteen insurgents are arrested, 
some of whom confess to dumping bodies in the grave.
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-August 15, 2005 - Date by which a constitution is to be drafted by the transition 
government.
-The deadline to produce a draft of the new constitution expires with Iraq’s Constitutional 
Committee still unable to reach an agreement. The committee grants itself an additional 
week to produce the document.
-August 17, 2005-In a coordinated attack, two bombs explode at a Baghdad bus station, 
one detonated by a suicide bomber. Minutes later, another suicide bomb targets the 
nearby hospital as the wounded begin to arrive. The blasts kill forty-three and injure at 
least sixty-eight.
- A former Iraqi Army Colonel and his son die when they are ambushed by gunmen in 
Baghdad. Another of the colonel’s sons is kidnapped in the attack.
-August 18, 2005-Four U.S. soldiers are killed by a roadside bomb in Samarra
-An Iraqi judge and his driver are killed by gunmen as they travel through Baghdad.
-August 19, 2005-Three Sunni election workers, kidnapped a day earlier as they hung 
voting posters, are killed in front of a crowded mosque in Mosul.
-August 22, 2005-Minutes before the already-delayed midnight deadline, Iraq’s 
constitutional committee submits a draft constitution.
-August 23, 2005
In an online statement, al-Qaeda in Iraqclaims responsibility for a rocket attack against a 
U.S. war ship in the Jordanian port of Aqaba, which occurred August 19.
-A suicide bomber in Baquba, 35 miles northeast of Baghdad, kills one U.S. soldier, one 
U.S. contactor, an Iraqi policeman, and four Iraqi civilians while wounding 20.
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-August 24, 2005-The Iraqi Special Tribunal confirms reports that Saddam Hussein fired 
all but one lawyer in his 1,500-member defense team.
-Dozens of insurgents launch an assault against Iraqi police patrols in Baghdad. At least 
thirteen people die and forty-three are left wounded.
-Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers try to reopen his office in Najaf, which was closed 
last year, but are blocked by a rival Shiite militia. Four people are left dead, twenty are 
injured, and Sadr’s office is set ablaze in the fighting that ensues.
-In a failed assassination attempt, gunmen open fire on Deputy Justice Minister Awshoo 
Ibrahim’s convoy in Baghdad. Four bodyguards are killed and five are wounded in the 
second attempt on Ibrahim’s life in as many days.
-August 25, 2005-Bodies of thirty-six men are discovered in southeastern Baghdad, 
alongside a road leading to the Iranian border.
-August 27, 2005-The U.S. military releases nearly 1,000 prisoners from Abu Ghraib 
prison. The prisoners, who had not committed serious offenses and had admitted to their 
crimes, renounce violence and pledge to be good citizens.
-August 28, 2005-After a week of negotiations, Iraq’s Constitutional Committee submits 
a final draft constitution to be voted on in a national referendum October 15. Sunni 
negotiators, who criticized the document throughout the drafting process, reject the draft.
-August 30, 2005
Fighting between pro- and anti-government tribes breaks out near the Syrian border in the 
city of Qaim, 200 miles west of Baghdad, leaving thirty-five members of the Bumahl and 
Karabila tribes dead.
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-U.S. air strikes destroy three houses in the towns of Husaybah and Karabilah, some 200 
miles west of the Baghdad. Abu Islam, a “known terrorist,” and several of his associates 
are killed in the attacks, according to a U.S. statement.
-August 31, 2006 - Up to 1,000 Shiite pilgrims die in a stampede on a bridge in Baghdad. 
Thousands crossing the bridge to visit a Shiite shrine panic amid speculation that suicide 
bombers are among the crowd. The incident is reported to be the worst single disaster 
since the start of U.S. occupation in Iraq in 2003
September –
-September 3, 2005-Gunmen attack a checkpoint in Baquba, thirty-five miles northeast of 
Baghdad, killing six Iraqi policemen. A second gunfight kills an additional two 
policemen
-September 4, 2005-A series of car bombs aimed at U.S. and Iraqi targets in Hit, eighty-
five miles west of Baghdad, kill eight civilians, an Iraqi soldier, and three suicide 
bombers. U.S. Marines blame al-Qaeda in Iraq for the attacks.
-September 6, 2005-U.S. forces leave their base in Najaf, 100 miles south of Baghdad, 
handing over full control of the city to Iraqi security forces.
-U.S. and Iraqi forces raid a rebel stronghold in Karabilah, 185 miles west of Baghdad.
-September 7, 2005-U.S. and Iraqi forces arrest 200 suspected insurgents—including at 
least 150 foreign fighters—in Tal Afar, 250 miles north of Baghdad.
-September 8, 2005-Police discover the bodies of fourteen people, dressed in civilian 
clothing and shot to death, near the town of Mahmoudiya, twenty miles south of 
Baghdad.
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-September 10, 2005-Some 5,000 Iraqi troops, backed up by 3,500 U.S. military 
personnel, descend upon the insurgent stronghold of Tal Afar, 250 miles north of 
Baghdad. Some 150 insurgents are killed and forty-eight are captured. Five Iraqi soldiers 
are killed in the fighting.
-September 11, 2005-The invasion of Tal Afar concludes after three days of fighting. 
Though a total of 200 insurgents are killed and over 400 are captured, many escape into 
the countryside through a network of tunnels. The joint offensive uncovers eighteen 
weapons caches and a large bomb-making facility.
-September 13, 2005-U.S. ground and air forces mount an attack on Haditha, an insurgent 
stronghold 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. Four militants are killed and one is captured.
-Two Sunni clerics are killed by gunmen in Baquba, thirty-five miles northeast of 
Baghdad.
-September 14, 2005-Twelve coordinated explosions tear through Baghdad killing at 
least 167 people and wounding nearly 600. At least 112 day laborers gathered in search 
of work in a predominantly Shiite neighborhood are killed. Al Qaeda in Iraq claims 
responsibility for the attacks, which are in retaliation for the Tal Afar military offensive 
earlier in the week.
-In a predawn raid, gunmen sweep through Taji, a Sunni village ten miles north of the 
capital, rounding up sixteen Iraqi contractors working for the U.S. military and one 
policeman. The victims are later found handcuffed, blindfolded, and shot to death.
-September 16, 2005-A suicide car bomber attacks worshippers leaving a Shiite shrine in 
Tuz Khormato, 130 miles north of Baghdad, killing a dozen people and wounding 
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twenty-three. A man wearing an explosive belt is detained while en route to a second 
mosque in the city.
-September 18, 2005-Faris Nasir Hussein, a Kurdish lawmaker, is killed along with his 
brother and driver when their vehicle is ambushed outside of Dujail, fifty miles north of 
the capital. Haidar Shanoun, another Kurdish member of parliament, is wounded in the 
attack.
-Police discover four bodies in east Baghdad and pull an additional twenty out of the 
Tigris River near Balad, fifty miles north of Baghdad. The dead are part of retaliatory 
attacks between Sunni and Shiite militants.
-September 19, 2005-British armored vehicles crash through the walls of a Basra prison, 
freeing two British soldiers but allowing 150 Iraqi prisoners to escape. The two Britons 
were arrested earlier in the day for shooting a pair of Iraqi policemen.
-The Iraqi Central Criminal Court in Baghdad sentences Ayman Sabawi, Saddam 
Hussein’s nephew, to life in prison for funding and making bombs for the violent 
insurgency. It is the first verdict against a family member of the former ruler.
-The body of Fakher Haider, a Basra-based Iraqi journalist and photographer for the New 
York Times, is found beaten and shot to death. He is the second journalist to be killed in 
Basra in as many months.
-September 20, 2005-Insurgents mount an ambush on fifteen lost vehicles carrying 
supplies for U.S. forces in the Sunni town of Dhuluiyah, killing four security contractors 
and wounds two additional contractors, as well as a pair of U.S. soldiers. In response, 
U.S. war planes mount a series of air strikes on the town, though there are no reports of 
casualties.
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-The Mosul bureau chief of As-Safeer an independent Iraqi national newspaper is gunned 
down in the street two days after one of his reporters was killed.
-September 23, 2005
A passenger aboard a Baghdad minibus detonates his explosive belt as the vehicle 
approaches a crowded terminal. At least five people are killed in the blast and eight are 
wounded.
-September 25, 2005-U.S. and Iraqi military personnel, operating on a tip, raid a Baghdad 
high-rise where they find Abdullah Abu Azzam, a top deputy in the al-Qaeda in Iraq 
terrorist group. When Azzam refuses to surrender, he is killed.
-A convoy of U.S. and Iraqi military personnel takes on small-arms fire as it enters 
Baghdad’s Sadr city to arrest several members of the al-Mahdi Army, a militia based 
there. At least five Shiite gunmen are killed in the ensuing ninety-minute shootout.
-A suicide car bomber targets an Interior Ministry convoy in Baghdad, killing seven 
members of the elite commando unit on board along with two civilians. Nineteen people 
are injured in the attack.
-Baghdad police discover the bodies of seven people. Six of the bodies—including that of 
a policeman—were bound and shot; the seventh body—a young woman—was strangled 
and tortured.
-September 26, 2005-As a Baghdad school is letting out, nine gunmen drag five Shiite 
teachers and their driver from their van, past a crowd of students, and into an empty 
classroom, where they line them up against a wall and execute them.
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-U.S. and Iraqi officials, in an attempt to win support in the coming constitutional 
referendum, release some 500 detainees from the notorious Abu Ghraib prison near 
Baghdad to mark the coming Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
-Stray mortar shells land in a residential section of Samarra, sixty miles north of 
Baghdad. One shell hits a house, killing seven members of the family inside.
-September 27, 2005-A suicide bomber sets off an explosion amidst a group of Iraqis 
applying for jobs in Iraq’s Quick Reaction Police Force in Baqouba, thirty miles north of 
Baghdad. Nine of the applicants are killed and twenty-one are injur
-Police in Kut, 100 miles southeast of Baghdad, discover the bodies of twenty-two men in 
civilian clothes—most of them bound and blindfolded—shot in the head.
-September 28, 2005-=Iraq ’s first-known female suicide bomber disguises herself as a 
man and attacks a line of army recruits in Tal Afar, near the Syrian border, killing six and 
wounding thirty-five.
-September 30, 2005
A car bomb detonates in a food market in Hillah, a mostly Shiite town sixty miles south 
of Baghdad, killing five people and wounding thirty.
-October-
-October 1, 2005-U.S. forces launch their anti-insurgent offensive, Operation Iron Fist, in 
the village of Sadah, eighty miles northwest of Baghdad. Some 1,000 Marines and other 
troops assault the small village near the border with Syria in an attempt to drive out al-
Qaeda linked fighters.
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-October 2, 2005-Operation Iron Fist continues for a second day as U.S. forces expand 
their offensive into Karabilah, a town 200 miles west of Baghdad, killing twenty-eight 
insurgents.
-October 3, 2005-A seven-car convoy carrying the Iraqi oil minister is hit by a roadside 
bomb in Baghdad. The minister survives; three of his escorts do not.
-The UN begins circulating millions of copies of Iraq’s draft constitution in anticipation 
of the October 15 referendum.
-October 4, 2005-2,500 U.S. troops accompany Iraqi forces as they sweep into three 
cities along the Euphrates River in an anti-insurgent offensive dubbed Operation River 
Gate.
-A suicide car bomb strikes at the gates of Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone, 
killing two Iraqi policemen and wounding one.
-October 5, 2005-Prayers to mark the beginning of the Islamic month of Ramadan at a 
Shiite mosque in Hillah, sixty miles south of Baghdad, are cut short by an explosion 
killing at least twenty-five people and wounding eighty-seven others.
-Faced with UN criticism and Sunni anger, Iraq’s National Assembly backtracks on a 
last-ditch attempt to alter the rules governing the October 15 constitutional referendum 
that would have made it more difficult for the draft constitution to be rejected.
-October 6, 2005-A combination of suicide bombers and roadside bombs kill twenty-one 
people in various attacks across Iraq. In Baghdad, a man detonates an explosives-laden 
belt while traveling in a packed minibus, killing nine and wounding nine. Elsewhere in 
the capital, a convoy ferrying private security contractors is targeted by a suicide car 
bomber, who kills three bystanders.
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-October 7, 2005-Twenty-nine insurgents are killed in Karabilah, 185 miles west of 
Baghdad, during the continuing Operation Iron Fist offensive, designed to crush al-Qaeda 
insurgents near the Syrian border.
-October 12, 2005 - murderous attack in Baghdad aimed against a delegation of the Arab 
League.
-October 15, 2005-Iraq holds a referendum on its Constitution to create an Islamic federal 
democracy, which is adopted despite a "No" campaign among Sunni Muslims. More than 
61% of Iraqis vote in a historic referendum on a new constitution, which is passed by an 
overwhelming majority.
-October 19,2005 - The trial of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein over crimes 
committed during his reign begins in Baghdad, before being adjourned until November 
28. Hussein faces at least 12 charges on war crimes allegedly committed during his reign. 
He defiantly pleads not guilty.
-October 19. 2005 - Hussein co-defendant's lawyer killed in Baghdad.
-OCTOBER 25, 2005- Italy contributes to Iraq Police training reform in wake of events 
at Basrah.
-Draft constitution passes  The referendum has passed, according to final provisional 
results issued by Iraqi election officials.  
-OCTOBER 26, 2005-UN: Secretary-General commends Iraqis on approval of 
constitution, hopes historic event will mark milestone on Iraq's path to democracy
-November-
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- NOVEMBER 8, 2005: Powerful new evidence emerged that the United States dropped 
massive quantities of white phosphorus on the Iraqi city of Fallujah during the attack on 
the city in November 2004
- Hussein co-defendant's lawyer killed.
-November 10, 2005- Condeleeza Rice on surprise visit.
-November 11, 2005 - Key fugitive Saddam aide dead
-November 15, 2005 - Detainees 'found starving'The government begun an investigation 
into the abuse of more than 170 detainees held by Iraqi forces.
-November 16, 2005 - U.S. admits using white phosphorous.  Pentagon acknowledged 
that U.S. troops used white phosphorous as a weapon against insurgent strongholds
-November 18, 2005- Suicide bombers kill dozens in 2 cities
-November 19, 2005-Suicide bomber kills 35 at funeral
November 28, 2005- Hussein trial adjourned amid rancor
-November 29, 2005- Video airs of purported hostages.  Al-Jazeera broadcast a video 
issued by an unknown group showing what it claimed were 4 hostages. Watching 
developments following Al-Jazeera's screening of video from previously unknown 
Swords of Righteousness group showing four kidnapped foreigners; foreigners - two 
Canadians, one Briton, one American - described on video as "spies for the occupation 
forces"; UK citizen Norman Kember among those kidnapped
-2005 November - Suicide bombers target mosques in Khanaqin, killing at least 74 
people. 
-December-
-December 2, 2005-  10 Marines killed near Falluja
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-December 3, 2005-Attackers wielding small arms and detonating roadside bombs struck 
in the late morning in Adhaim
-December 4, 2005-Allawi chased from mosque
-December 5, 2005- Witness at Hussein trial describes torture: The witness is describing 
the torture of man from a Shiite village in 1982: 'They broke all his body parts'
-December 6. 2005-Suicide bombers kill 36
-Saddam witness tells of abuse
-December 8, 2005- Bomber on bus kills 30.
-December 15,2005 – Iraqi National assembly elections.  Iraqis vote for the first, full-
term government and parliament since the US-led invasion.  A crucial political transition.  
-Legal term for deployment of Japan's Self-Defense Forces troops in Iraq to expire
-Polls open in historic election
-Republic of Iraq to France, signed the bilateral agreement between France and Iraq on 
Iraq's debt to France by providing for 80% of Iraq’s debt to be cancelled between 2005-
2008.  It is a substantial contribution to the restoration of the country's financial situation 
and its reconstruction. The debt canceled by France will amount to about 4 billion euros 
in the period from 2005 to 2008.
-December 18,2005 – Bush admits that much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong.
-Bush hails Iraqi anti-terror role
-December 20, 2005-Hussein claims he was beaten in custody
-December 23, 2005- More than 825 people have died and another 1, 300 have been 
wounded this year in the Diyala province.  Consists of a diverse mix of Sunni Arabs and 
Shiites alongside a Kurdish minority.
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-December 27, 2005-Ukrainian, Bulgarian troops left Iraq
-December 29, 2005-International team to review elections
- Death threats cut oil flow
2006
-January-
-January 4,5, 2006- More than 150 people are killed in suicide bombings and attacks 
targeting Karbala, Ramadi, Miqdadiya and Baghdad. 
-January 20,2006- Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance emerges as the winner of December's 
parliamentary elections, but fails to gain an absolute majority. 
-January 28,2006-    Captors: Last chance for demand
-February-
-February 2006- A bomb attack on an important Shia shrine in Samarra unleashes a wave 
of sectarian violence in which hundreds of people are killed. 
-Feb. 12-Jaafari set to stay as PM 
-Feb. 14 -Baghdad     Saddam in 'hunger strike' protest
-Feb. 21 - Blast damages Shia shrine  A bomb attack has damaged one of the Muslim 
world's holiest shrines, sparking demonstrations outside.    Thousands have gathered at 
the al-Askari shrine in Samarra where 2 men blew up the famous golden dome. The 
shrine is one of Samarra's 2 tombs for revered Shia imams.
-Feb. 22- Shrine blast sparks protests 
-Feb. 23 - Curfew aims to curb violence  The government has put Baghdad and 3 
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provinces under curfew for much of Friday 
-Feb. 26 - Renewed violence amid calls for calm 
-March-
-Mar. 10 - FBI: Body of U.S. hostage found  The body of Tom Fox, a Christian peace 
advocate, has been found
-Mar. 14 - More than 80 dead in reprisal killings  86 bodies were found in the capital-
during a 30-hour period. Officials announced a vehicle curfew 
-Mar. 16- Military launches largest air assault  50 aircraft are involved in Operation 
Swarmer with more than 1,500 Iraqi and U.S. troops near Samarra
-Mar. 23 - Peace group hostages freed 
-April-
-Apr. 1 - Pressure mounts in Baghdad on PM to go 
-Condelizza Rice and Straw arrive
-Apr. 4 - Hussein charged with genocide 
-Apr. 5 - Hussein grins during cross-examination 
-April 7,2006- 80 people are killed when three suicide bombers attack a Shia mosque in 
Baghdad.
- Bombs kill at least 12 amid deadlock
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